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PREFAOE. 
Th1s study is one of four exploratory stud1es 
concerned with coa11tlons ot organlzations that are 
tormed to plan and develop soclal welfare programs 
within the local community. Although each study was 
conducted 1ndependent'ly, taken together, their major, 
purpose was to develop some 1ns1ghts and knowledge 
into the behavior ot organ1zat10ns a.nd the ways 1n 
whlch they 1nteract as they work together to develop 
community programs. They are then, exploratory stu­
d1es of lnterorgan1zatlonal behavior. 
Each of the stud1es had a different tocus. One 
study attempted to 1dentl,ty the present areas of agree­
ment and dlsagreement regard1ng interorgan1zatlonal 
behavior by systematlca.lly rev,tewlng the literature 
over the past ten yea.rs. Another focused on.the sta.ges 
ot development of the coa11tlon,:attempt1ng to deter. 
mine 1f organizational coa11tions seemed. to follow si­
m1lar developmental patterns as has been reported In: 
the lltera.ture on small groups. Another focused on the 
decision-maklng patterns ln the coalit10ns by flrst 
reviewlng the llterature and constructing a decls10n­
mak1ng model and then nteating ft the model against.. a 
set" of case histor1es. The final study ,.~ following a 
grounded theory a.pproach,~ simply trled to 1dent1ty a 
set of common varlables or ana.lytica.l ca.tegories wh1c,h 
seemed to be present~in a number of coalit10ns. Al. 
11 
though each of these exploratory stud1es was oonduct­
ed Independently with a dIfferent emphasis and analy­
t1cal focus, they each utilized the same data - a se~ 
of case h1stor1es of coa.1Itions. Consequently,:each 
of the stud1es ·utilized a common set of data but v1ew~ 
. ed the data trom. quite dIfferent. analyt1cal perspec­
tives. 
The particular focus of: this study fa upon the 
declsion-mak1ng .patterns in' coali tiona. In'; revIewing 
the llterature,. formulating an:analytlcal model,: and 
applying the same to the casestudles,:two principal 
areas of concern are focused upon: decislon...malcing 
power analysis and decision-making process analysis.: 
The literature provided essent1ally no material orr 
coa11tional decision-making as such. Howev·eri: the 
broader category of organ1zational declsion-mak1r~ 
behavior did contain conceptual and theoretical no­
tions which were app11cable to coal1tional decislon­
:making bl means at inference and extrapolation: into 
hypothet1ca.l propositions around power and process 
issues. These 2 dimensions were then expl;ored throue;ll' 
the use ot these hypothetical propos1tiona by It t'est~ 
lngt! them against the case history da.ta. The results 
were then assessed with 8ubsequen~ modiflcations where 
oonceptual weaknesses were evident. A tinal cha.pter.· . 
was included to relate what the researcher learned, 
what other researchers might learn from that exper1enoe" 
111. 
and: whati,Soclal Work could 'learn from the study about:. 
the area.· of coa11tional dec1s1on!-making., 
There is nothing new aboutt, the concept. or: a c.o­
a11tion of organizations. Organiza.tional coalltlon~ 
have been formed. and reformed ever since man began 
working through organizationa.l structures. They are' 
oommon, everyday occurrences" yet. aurprisingly 11ttle' 
1s known about them since much of the theoretical 
work has fooused on coalitions of ind1v1duals·or small. 
groups or on-' the alliances and coa11tiona of political 
groups and nations. Surpr1s1ngly little work has been:~ 
done specifically on' organ1zational ooal1tions •. 
A coa11tion of:- organizations is an 1nterorgan1~ 
z.a'tional structure. That is,, a structure in' wh1ch two 
or more organizations del1berately relate the1r baha- ' 
vior to. each other as when several organizations Joint~ 
ly agree to plan some new program in the community. 
They are alao unique structures in; that each of the 
!organizatlons maintains its own autonomy, but for a 
per10,d of time they work together around some commOll! 
issue or mutual problem. 
Coalltions"in'contraat to other types ot in'-!­
terorganizatlonal structures such as councila or. fed-­
eratlons, tend to be ad hoc and 1asue-oriented struc­
tures. That"ls,.there is little permanence to the 
structure. A group of organizations joi~together a­
round an issue" mee~ tor a period of time, and s1mply 
disband or dissolve once the 1ssue 1s resolved. ~ey 
are rather flu1d and amorphous structures but they do 
represent one of the ways that organizat1ons'cooper­
ate w1th each other. 
W1thin recent years the coa11tion has been 
v1ew~d as a possible means to· coord1nate disparate 
programs w1th1n the community. The Office of Econo­
m1c Cpportun1ty and the Un1ted Way of Amer1ca ha.ve 
jointly sponsored a. project to examine the use of 
coa11tion 1n: ~he planning process. TD. some degree 
then, the coalition se·ems to be an 1ncreasingly 1m­
portant struoture a.nd one that needs to be t.Ully un.. 
derstood by the planner if it is to be effectively 
utilized. 
Oonsequently"an increased knowledge'of organ­
1zational behav1or,.expec1a.lly on'the relat10nship be­
tween organ1zations, would not. only a1d the' plan. 
ner in' his daily ta.sks but", a.t the same time contri­
bute to the lim1ted knowledge ot interorga.nizational 
behavior. 
- -
CHAPTER.l 
Review or The L1terature 
The l1terature reviewed was concerned with two pr1mary 
areas of analys1s of decision-making: power and process. 
I. power Analysis Of Decision-Making 
Wh1le tew of the works reviewed dealt primarily witb 1n­
terorganizational coalitions, most ot them in some way were con­
cerned with the issue ot power and 1ntluence in the decislon­
mak1ng process, which otten secondar1ly related to· the 1ssue of 
coal.1tions. These wr1 tinga focused on matters of theory, struo­
ture,~and exchange. 
A. TheQretical: 
Beoause of the general reoognition of the signifioance of 
power.and influence in dec1sion-making, a rev1ew of methods of 
power analysis and theory was regarded to be helpful. Conse­
quently. -:the-perspectives of four scholars of powe.~ and 1nfluence 
analysis will be br1efly summarized. 
Interorganiz&tlonal coalit1ons, being an informal, tempor­
ar,y ooalescence ot members from separate formal organ1zations 
with their own respective interests, the relevance of power 
theory 1s evident. Terry Clark summarizes the three analytl~a~ 
models which are most broadly used to ascertain the power struc­
ture of dec1sion-making: ttposi tional," i'reputatlonal, It and ffde_­
c1s1onal." The "pOSitional method" attempts to dlscover commu­
nity "leaders" through compiling a list of the occupants of the 
top posit10ns in significant "community organlzations."1 
the "reputational method" gathers a panel or community mem­
2. 
be~s and asks them about the leaders in the community; and,~from 
thiS, a llst of leaders· is developed. A variation of this method 
ls the "lssue-spec1f1c reputat10nal method." It asks 1nformants: 
to s·core or rank 1nd1vidual commun1ty leaders wi th regard to thelr 
power in "specif1c 1ssue areas." 2 
The "decisional method" follows the history of spec1fic de­
clsions or issue areas and seeks to identify the sign1ficant per­
sons who were involved in the actual decis10ns and those whose 
recommendat10ns were accepted. It does not deal with Indirec~ 
influence and value bias 1nfluences. The decisional method can 
be ref1ned further by tak1ng into account the 1mpact of past de­
clsions upon current power atructures. 3 
Three writers, Banfield, Dahl, and Polsby attempt to devise I 
theoretical models of power-and- 1nfluence analysis 1n more oper.~ 
at10nal terms. The first of the authors, Edward Banf1eld, de­
fines "influence" as the "ab1lity to get others to act. think. 
or feel as one 1ntends. It V1ewed wi thin a soclal or po11t1cal 
context of "concerted" decision-mak1ng and activlty, Banf1eld 
asserts that "Any cooperative activi~y - and so any organization, 
formal or. informal, ephemeral or lastlng - may be viewed as a 
system of 1nfluence." 4 To obtain an overv1ew of relevant ma­
terial from Banfield. the study w1ll examine his analyt1cal mo­
del for study1ng influence and secondly, h1s proposit1ons about_ 
the operations ot inrluence~ 
the basic conceptual s~heme used by Banf1eld to analyze 
-influence" in his casestud1es was constructed around four prin­
cipal quest10ns I: 
1. 	"Who has influence and who is subject to it?" 
2. 	"How does 1nfluence work?" 
3. 	"What are the terms upon which influence is expended?"
4. 	~How is action';concerted by influence?" 5 . 
From his analysis ot. ...oAsestudies through the use of the a­
bove model, Banfield derived certaln baslc propositlons about the 
processes of'influence. Among others, these included: 
1. 	The w1der the dlstribut10n of authorlty, the larger the 
stock of power that 1s requ1red it proposals are to be a­
dopted.
2. 	As the number of. autonomous actors 1n a sltuatlon increases, 
the probablllty of adoptlons decreases. 
3. 	As the number of' autonomous actors 1ncreases, c~ontrol tends 
to become less structured. '-. " 
4. 	The more power an actor has, the less he wiil'be a.ffected 
by uncerta1nty in his efforts to secure control. 
5. 	The more klnds of power an actor has, the greater the 
probabillty that be can secure control ln a given case. 
6. 	The probablllty of' adoptions (and the probablllty that 
there wll1 not be much compromise) tends to increase as 
the correspondence improves between the kinds of power
thatpo-werholders ha.ve at their dlsposal and the kinds to 
wh1ch actors will resp'ond.
7. 	The neconom1es of scale" that arise f'rom ccntrolling a 
structure and from hav1ng a large and varied "inventory" 
ot power give a cumulative advantage to certa1n actors 
and thus may lead to structural centralization. 
8. 	In situatlons where there 1s a Shortage of power 1n rela­
tion to profitable opportunitles for lts exercise (l.e., 
a Shortage of lnvestment capital), there will be a ten­
dency to klll some proposals and to comprom1se others in 
order to increase the supply of-power.
9. 	When public-regarding power does not sufflce to' meet the 
needs of a system (elther because there is not enough of 
1t or because those over whom control is to be establish­
ed will not respond to it) there will be a te~dency to 
employ pr1vate-regarding power in its place. 6 
". 
The second wrlter,.Robert Dahl also proposes a model for 
analyzing power and its use. For Dahl, power ls the capaC1ty ot 
one actor to influence the other to the extent that the second 
does 80methlng he would not do otherwise. Dahl then dellne~tes 
" certa1n propOSitions about influence. He maintains that there 
are three essentlalooncep"ts or proposi tlons which serve 'to ex­
4. 

plain why some actors have more influence than others, as well 

as, demonstrating the dIfference between "potential" and "actual 

influence: 

1,_ 	 Some actors have more polit1cal resources at their dISpos-­
&1 than others. Or 
2. 	G1ven the resources at their dlsposal, some actors use 

more ot them to ga1n political influence. Or 

3. 	GIven the resources at thelr dlsoosa1 some actors use 
them more SkIllfully or effectively than others do. 7 
He also asserts the ex1stence of two baslc types of in­
fluence: "coerclve Int1uence fl (negative, positive; pun1shment, 
reward) and "rel1able influence" (high probab1l1ty of comp11anc.e). 8 
A thIrd wrlter, Nelson W. Polsby, IS concerned with scru­
tinlzlng the exlstlng power analysls approaches In terms of the 
questlonable va11dlty of thelr methodology. In hls analysls, he 
def1nes power-as "the capaclty of one actor to do somethlng af­
fect1ng another actor, wh1ch changes the probable pattern of 
"apec1fled future events.« 9 There are three baslc questlons In: 
1,he power analysls theor1es accordlng to'Polsby: n(l) the pro­
blem ,of Ident1fying and characterizlng partlclpants In decIsion­
mak1ng, (2) the problem of determ1nlng who galns and who loses 
from outcomes of decIs1ons, (3) the problem ot d1scoverlr~ what 
makes for successful part1clpat1on 1n decls10n-makl~g." 10 
Polsby assumes a plurallst notlon of soclety and commun1ty 
power. From stud1es ut1lizlng the above analytIcal framework 
for 1nvestlga tlon, Polsby has drawn some general propositions a-. 
'bout power in dec1s1on:mak1ng. WIth respect to nwho governs," he 
ma1ntains that decislon-maklng partic1pants are usually spec1al­
1zed 1n::certaln "issue areas." He holds that thls l1m1ts appll­
cab111ty 01' an e11t1st model of power. In the area of "who 
ga1ns" and "who loses," Polsby cautions the un1versa11ty and re­
l1abll1ty of these questions, because many value outcomes of com~ 
mun1ty dec1sions are frequently distr1buted 1n "un1ntended, unan­
tlcll?ated ways n_ and the powerful often intentionally "d1stribute· 
values to the nonpowerful." So, wh1le useful tor analyz1ng value 
distr1bution, the above 1nqulry is not useful in disclosing po­
wer structures. The issue of "who succeeds" is approached by 
the use ot three indices: "when an actor initiates some commun-­
lty policy, meets with no opposition, and it is enacted; when an 
actor prevents the poliCY of some other actor from being enacted; 
and when an actor initiates a policy, meets with oppOSition, and 
the polley 1s enacted. tt 11 
One ot the usual methods whereby actors assure their suc­
cess tor Polsby is through coalition ~ormation. He has develop­
ed certain hypotheses about these coalitions. They are establish­
ed by-actors to 1ncrease their resources to pursue their own ends. 
Subsequently, actors with complementary resources otten coalesne. 
Secondly, there needs to be compatibility of goals and strate­
gles of members. Subsequently, the larger the coalition the 
more "fragile" it is and the more l1mited 1ts goals and viewpolnt. 12 
Summar:y:~ 
Allot the authors above have concerned themselves with &­
nalyzing power in decision-mak1ng in terms of what can be called 
a "decisional model." It is one of the general methods described 
by Clark. In his terms, 1t consists of a history ot spec1f1c 
l' . 
.. 
6. 
dec1s1ons and 1dent1f1oat1on of those 1nvloved 1n the deo1s1ons 
and those who were successful. The other wr1ters, Banf1eld, 
Dahl, ano..,to some extent. Polsby ut1l1ze an analysis of dec1sions 
and the1r opponents and proponents to assess power and 1nfluence. 
They'all ~et1ne "1nfluence" 1n terms of one actor being succeS8~ 
tul in 1mpos1ng his dec1s1o~~~ 1ntent1ons, and 1nterests upon 
another actor. Polsby qual1ties this phenomenon w1th the assert10n 
that, while th1s may be true, 1t rarely occurs as a zero-sum re­
sult. Banf1eld, Dahl, a.nd Polsby ma1nta1n that actors utilize 
their·resources to attain the1r goals which means to 1ncrease 
the1r interests or domain.- In terms of d1fferences, Banf1eld 
tends to Ident1ty 1nfluence w1th the possess1on of power re­
sources; Dahl 1dent1fies 1nfluence with not only the possess1on 
("potential") of resources but with whether and how they are 
used ("actual"); Polsby identit1es influence with the ac~ual out.­
come ot decisions which is usually coalitional shar1ng, 1nstead 
ot zero-sum vanquished or Victor. 
~ B. Structura.l: 
The structural element of a power analysis of dec1s1on­
mak1ng 1s bas1cally concerned with the 1nternal and external op~ 
er&tion and order1r~ of the power and dec1sion-making relation­
ships ot the actors involved. 
1. -Internal 
The 1nternal structure of organizational power 1n decis1on­
making w1ll be rev1ewed f1rst. The views of five writers, Long, 
Dror, Presthu8, L1ppett, and Lindblom will be considered. 
In an'article concerned more with Intraorganizational de­
clsion-making, Norton E. Long analyzes decls10n and pollcy-mak­
lng as a polltlcal system. He emphasizes that 'organizational 
distribution of labor fosters the proliferatIon of expertise in: 
specific problem areas to specific Individuals who become "vlr­
tual representa.tIves of the problem area In the decisional process. II 
Wlthin organIzatIons thIs leads to the departmentalIzatIon ot in­
terests with the formatlon of "extra"';'organizatlonal constituen­
cles." The "speclalized" expert wlth1n the organlzation. acmes 
to relle upon thls as a Upolltical base" to support "hls posl­
tlon In the Internal decIs1on-making process." .13 The relevance 
ot th1s political dyna.mic to Interorganizaticnal coalit1on mem­
bers 1s ev1dent in their preservatlon.or promotion ot what War. 
ren calls organizational "domaln. 11 This "domaIn" 1s analogous to 
Long's departmentalized "lnterests" ot expert organizat1onal 
actors. 
Some notions about 1nternal structural declsion-mak1ng 
variables ot broader applicatlon are presented by Yehezkel Dror. 
Not all of Dror's propOSitIons will be mentioned, because h1s 
pr1mary interest is 1n developing an "OptImal Model" for dec1­
slon-making and several assertions a.re not relevant to the pur­
poses ot this paper. Those generalizatIons whIch are relevant will 
be discussed according to Drorls arrangement of them in what he 
regards to be the basIc units of systems of declsion-making: U!!!_ 
divldual, ,ma.ll-group, .,and organizational." 
S1gn1ticant "Individual" decision-making subun1t charac­
terist10s and intluenoes ot each decider include thelr: (1) Indi­
v1dual characterist1cs, (2) "emotIonal-physical state", (3) op1n­
8 
) 

ion giv1ng environment, (4) perception and availab111ty of the 

data. 14 

The only really sign1f1cant and relevant "small-group" sub... 
unit decision-making characteristics and 1nfluences concern the 
"group's "structure and history," the relationsh1ps among part-i­
c1pants, group leadership, "the formal role-definit1ons of the 
group, and the nature of the issue-to be dec1ded." 15 
Useful "organizational" decision-making subunit character.... 
istlcs, processes, and structures include: 
Few instances of "formal rules a.nd doctrines." 
Only a. few "sophisticated off1cials" are conscious of and
" 
.;... - able to manipulate decision-shaping forces • 
(3) 	Organizational decision-making generally "follows semi­
structures, that are mainly informal, channels and modes" 
ot "tradhtlons, power relations, and formal divis10ns of 
work. II _ (4) 	Organizational decis10ns are the outcome of its many "sub­
deciaionunits." . (5) 	 ItBar§aining and coalition formation." 
(6) 	Few clear operational goalsJ"~tllittle data" and "limIted 
search for alterns.tives." 16 _ 
Also concerned with the internal structure and d.ynam1cs or 
organizational decis10n-making 1s Robert V. Presthus. He 1s 
primarily interested in organizational author1ty on the level ot 
1nterpersonal relationships 1n organ1zat10ns. He def1nes author­
ity as a "transact1onal process" 01' "1nterpersonal relation­
ships." ~n this process authority 1s va11dated by leg1t1mat1ont 
based on four var1ables: "techn1cal expertise; formal role or 
position in the organizat10n's hierarchy; rapport with others; 
and 1ndIv1dual psycholog1cal deference to author1ty !'17 ~h1s 
approach 	talls to give considerat10n tQ maIl1 p"01fer val'lab1es. 
~ther psycholog1cal v1ew of authority processes whIch 1s 
9. 

de~ply concerned with power relationsh1ps 1s g1ven by L1ppitt, 
et. al.: 
( 1 ) 	 In groups a real consensus upon who Is powerful tends to 
occur; 
(2) 	A group member 1s more likely to, accept direct attempts 
to 1nfluence hlm from a person he defines as powerful; 
(3) 	The ·average group member wll1 tend to 1n1t1ate deferen­
t1al, approval-seek1r~ behav10r toward h1gher power
cho1ces. 18 
Charles E. L1ndblom has analyzed decision-maklng cn the 
level of polley formatlon 1n part 1n terms of authority and of 
1nformal systems of cooperation. 
L1ndblom's deflnltion of authorlty includes that ''If x 
can routlnely exert power or Influence over y because y accepts'· 
a rule that he obeI, then x has author1ty over y." Author1ty 
1s lim1ted and speciflc. It Is also a "concesslon" to obey by 
the "controlled" to the tfcontroller." In sltuat10ns "Wbere it. 
lacks authorlty over B, he wlll use his authorlty elsewhere to 
ach1eve an Influence on B." He further malnta1ns that struc-, 
tural and rule changes tend to be revolutlonary 1f they are of 
dras'Uc proportions. Consequently, sta.tus qUO Influences usu­
ally remaln predomlnant and changes -are typically "1ncremental."1~ 
Also related to decislon-making for Lindblom Is the s1gn1­
f1cance of Informal systems of coOperatlon. He pr1nclpally Is 
concerned wlth the process whereby poliCY makers adjust their in­
terests and goals mutually through informal processes". 'rhe me­
. at 
thods or adjustment 1nclude: (1) "negotiat1on," mutual persua­
slon" or exchang1ng "threats and prom1ses," (2) "creating and 
.d1scharging obligatlons" - network of mutual "debts," (3) "thtrd 
persons," (4.) "d1rect manipulatlon," - use of authorlty to in­
10 

tluence others, and (5) "adaptive adjustments" deter to those 
with higher knowledge and authority. 20 
Summary: The internal structuring of organizational dec1s1on­
making is essent1ally concerned w1th two issues: leadersh1p and 
process. Long and Presthus both view expert1se as a source 01' 
-organizational dec1sion-making author1ty. In addit1on, Presthus, 
as well as Lindblom, regard formal role and rule defin1ng author­
1ty as another bas1s of leadership. Bo,th Presthus and Lippett 
recognize the s1gn1f1cance of individual deference to author1ty 
among the less powerful. Lippett maintains that authority also 
results from group consensus as to who 1s most powertul. In 
coa11tiona formal roles would tend to be m1nimized"because'ot 1ts 
usuall,y being an informal group, and deterence to power would be 
01' minor 1mpact due to the operat10n of the pursuit of selt 1n~ 
terest. This would tend to leave expertise and consensus as the. 
most 11ke~y sources of authority. 
Struct~res eVident in decision-mak1ng processes are allu~ 
ed to by Dror and Lindblom. They both regard the process to be' 
highly 1nformal and characterized by bargain1ng and manipulat10n. 
For Dror, the informality of structure extends to rules, roles,. 
methods aDd operat10ns 1n dec1sion-makicg. These seem qu1te con -­
slatent w1th the concept of coa11tions as ad hoc, 1nformal ent1t1es. 
2. External 
'fhe 1mp~ications of external structures 1n the power anal1­
818 ot coa11tional decision-making will be considered next. The 
11. 

wr1ters rev1ewed who discussed this- topic area iI,lcluded: Reid, 
Zald, and Dror. 
Wil11am Reid deals with external relationships on the 
inter-organizational level. He identities three possible "modes~ 
of organizational co-exiatence: u independence, interdependence, 
and conflict. 
Organizations are independent of one another, when they do 
'not need the resources ot the other to achieve the1r goals and. 
when the other is not interter1ng in their "goal aChievement." 
Interdependence exists when organizations see their own goals 
'. 
to be 'more eff1c1ently realized with the supplement of the re­
sources ot the other. Their goals need not be 1dentical,buu tha 
perception ot the organizational interdependence must be con~ 
soious. Conflict arises when the goal attainment of one or more 
organizations takes place at the cost of the goal attainment of 
others. 21 
xayer:N. Zald discusses the conditions affect1ns whether 
formal organizations will be likely to co-ordinate and co-op~r­
ate wIth each other. The grea.ter the margInal profits of an or­
ganization and/or the greater the symb1ot~relatlonship between 
agenCIes, the greater the likelihood of co-ordination. The 
greater an organization is committed to a set program and stra­
tegy, the less the lIkelihood of co-ordinat1on. 22 
He maintains that "Organizations, in attempting to aohieve 
ends, form external al11ances, curry tavor, and conform to the re­
quirements ot"agents having greater power." The extent to wh1ch 
these relatIons become stable tor a member organization (focal) 
r.: ., 
12 
1s' 	important, because: 
F1rst, the greater the sanction and resource control of the 
other party, or the coalitional al11ance, the less the au­
tonomy of the faoal organlzation ••• ' 
Second, the more a focal organization is bound into a stable 
external political structure, the more areas of internal 
policy-setting are influenced by the coalltion. 23 
Dror 1s concerned about the significance of coalitions for 
external pollCy execution. He mainta1ns that coalit10ns are es­
sent1al in.-: thls regard. Some of the po1nts whlch he regards as 
relevant to pollcy-maklng include:: 
( 1 ) 	 The probability of form1ng a coalltlon-able to execute 
a policy depends upon the characterlstlcs of the polioy, 
power dlstributlon, and the structure and tendency to 
torm coalitlons by the "lnvolved soclal and political
institutlons. u 
(2) 	Given number one, the format1on of a policy is slgnifl­
cantly shaped by the need tor a strong enough execution' 
coa11tion. 
(3) 	The need to form a coalition llmits the posslble alter­
natives but does not .eliminate the "freedom of cho1ce tf ot 
polley-makers.(4) 	Each potential coalition member decides 2wbether.to join
based upon power gain and value system. 4 
Summary: \ihile distinct in their approaches to the external 
structure of coa11tional decision-making, there are definlte 
llnks between the proposltlons of each author. The common ele­
ments dlvlde into the bas1s or motivation for lnterorganiz&tion. 
&1 co-ordinatlon and into the implications for the autonomy of 
members 1n decl·sion-maklns. 
The commonly identified mot1ve for coalition formation 1s 
se1tlnterest: either to expand or to protect one's doma1n. 
Reid S&18 that independence exists between organizations when 
they do not need the resources ot others. On the other hand 
Reld says that interdependence arises when organlzatlonal goals 
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are reallzedor, protected better with the assistance of the oth­
er's resources. In l1ke manner, Zald sees co-ordinat1on:1n In­
stances of marg1nal prof1ts where the resources of other organ­
izatlons' are desirable. Dror ma1ntalns that members Joln coall­
t10ns tog&ln power, promote thelr value system or better assure 
the successful execution of a polley. 
The autonomy of coa11tlon members, accord1ng to Zald, 1s 
limlted relative tQ the coa11t10n's control of resources and mem­
ber lnvolvement ln a stableco&lltlonal, politlcal structure. 
Dror, on the other hand, 'looks at the l1mltations of alternatives 
the coalition can pursue as a whole, as the result of belng com­
posed of members of var10us interests. 
'0. Exbhapge: 
The subject of exchange in power analysls of coalltional 
declsion-makir~ ,w1ll be examined next. It provides a oomplex 
set of varlables to be analyzed. Nuttall, Scheuch, and Gordon 
present broad conceptualizatloDSof the ccnditions ~f influence 
and exchange. Adrlan and Press present an analysls of cost, 
while Clark, Reid, and Blau discuss types of exchange s1tuations. 
1. ponditlons: 
The flrst model to be rev1ewed whlch analyzes the area of 
resourc.es and exchange is done by Nuttal, Scheuch, and Gordon. 
Thelr model seeks a "conceptuallzation of condltions of 1nflu­
ence." Thelr typology of lnfluence is bu1lt upon two central 
dlmensions of the actors: "(1) actual access to relevant re­
14," 
sources ••• and, (2) whether or not others in the system credit. 
h1m w1th this possess1on." 25 
Some ot the key concepts around resource access 1nclude 
sanction, resource, and author1ty. They define sa~ct1on as 
"anything wh1ch can be applIed to a person, group or collectiv­
.ity (an actor) whIch the gIven actor'subject1vely defInes as re-· 
warding or harmful. n Resource is defined as "anyth1ng wh1ch a1-­
lows one actor to ~ontrol, provide, or apply a sanctIon (pos1­
t1ve or negative) to another actor. 1t The actual process of 
sanctioning 1s thus the "actual use of resources to reward or 
harm another." W1th1n th1s scheme authorIty Is "the leg1tlmated 
'r1ght' Qt the cert1fied 1ncumbent of a poslt1on to make bIndIng 
comm1tments regarding the collectiv1ty's polic1es and resources.: 
and to direct the activ1tles ot hIs subordInates." In the pheno­
menon ot "influenc1ng the outcome of decision-mak1ng," the re­
sources ot an ac~or are e1ther direct (own) or 1nd1rect (through 
others) and the power (control) is "legitimated" (author1ty) or 
Wnot leg1 timated" (unauthor1zed, c.oerc ion or deterence). The 
strateg1es of Influence wh1ch they identify are: (1) "persuas1on," 
(2) "1nducement" (3) "1nvok1ng obligaticn," (4) "structuring" (a­
va11able alternatives), (5) "man1pulating the perception of 
th~se alternatives," (6) "dlvert1ng the other's attentIon," (7) 
·coerc1on." imother key concept 1s "generalIty" ot resource wh1ch 
"denotes the number of Situations (or contexts) and actors tor 
wh1ch the very same resource Is effect1ve In·lnfluenc1ng." In 
an exchange of resources there are two actors: "one ot whom pos­
sesses" and the other a "receptor." 26 
15. 
In order to analyze .a particular decision-making process 
1 t 1s important to c cnsider: It ( 1) the types of resources each 
actor possesses, (2) the presence ot receptors for them, and '(3) 
.., 
the type or mode of resources which·is crucial for the decis1on: 
belng made." Also the extent to whIch an actor ca.n transform 
bis resources into other types is basic to his influence. Fur~ 
thermore, in analysis, the typology which these writers propose 
1s constructed around two :basic dimensions: "(1) the actual abil­
ity to apply a resource in sanctioning l.f payoff time comes, and 
~ - .. 
(2) the belie! of the other actors that the actor possesses or 
controls the resource which would allow him to sanct1on. The 
cross-cutt1ng of these two dimensions results in four cate­
gorles of 1nfluentials: 
PERCEIVED ACCESS TO RESQURCES 
Yes 	 Ho. 
lOTUAL ACCESS Yes Ma.n! est. Influence Potential 
InfluenceTO. RESOURCES 
No 	 Reputed Influenoe W1thou~-
.7,27 
~h. authors then state hypotheses about each category o.f 
actor:: 
(1) 	"Actors 'Without Influence" ••• "will try to change the 
mode or structure of a decis1on-making system." 
(2) 	"Actors with reputed influence" a.nd who know it "W1ll try 
to avoid a demand for pay-off sanctions." Also, in sys­
tems with many cr1ses, few actors will have "reputed in­
fluence" while decision-making systems with few recent 
cr1ses w1ll have many actors with "reputed 1nfluence." 
"Actors with potential influence" once they sanction u­
sually are seen by others as having consumed their resource 
and become f1without influence" or others bel1eve it 1s 
consumed when it 1s not and the actor rema1ns 1n~a situ­
ation of "potentia.l influence. 1t (4) 	"Actors w1th manlf'est 1nfluence" wlll 1nfluence decls10ns 
-'-.. 
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mostly by the "invocation ot resources." Whetherthey use 
up a resource after a particular decision and hew others 
v1ew.them will determ1ne in which ot the four categorles
they wl11 be. 28 . 
Other key hypotheses Include: 
(1) 	The order of readlness to sanction wll1 be "potentlal,"
"manl:test,11 "reputed." 
(2) 	Except for actors whose §oal is to increase their Influ­
ence, actors w111,avo1d pay-offs" unless they will 1088­
Influence It they do not. 29 
2 •. Costs:: 
. The next wr1ters. Charles R. Adrlan and Charles Press, are: 
Interested In "declslon. costs in coalltions." Wh1le the basls· 
ot the discussion 1s coalltions.the maln focus Is on the costs 
involved ~n the formatlon and decislon-maklng of coalltlons. 
'rhe notion of coalltlon whlch they use Is related to the notlon 
ot a subun1"t of a larger formal body. Thls subunit, however,~is:' 
the dom1nant force In the formal group_ They deflne' a "wlnning 
coalltlon" as "any portlon of the group .that can declde to do or 
not to do somethlng that Is on the agenda of the group and over 
wh1ch 1t has competent authorlty." Once the formal rules decide 
what 1s needed for a wlnnlng coalltlon, the slze and composition 
ot the coalitlon 1s 1n theory set by the total of the "declslon 
costs 1nv<?lved tor partlc.ipants _tl . The "costs" are Influenced 
primarily by three prlnclples; (1) "unanlmlty prlnciple" group 
pressure tor unanlmlty (derived from small group theory), (2) 
"s1ze principle" a.ttempt to achleve "mlnimal wlnning coalitlons" 
to maximlze "payotts," (3) "lndlspensible membershlp princ1ple H 
deals w1th the sltuations In~which certaln powertul parties must 
••• 
be included for 1t to succeed. 30 
The authors next are 1nterested in discussing th~ d1ffer­
ent types of "decision costs." These include: (1) 't1nformatlon'~ 
costs," (2) "responsibi11ty costs," (3) t'intergame costs,·' (4) 
"division - of - payoffs costs," (5) udlssonance costs," (6) 
"InertIa costs," (7) "pressure - of - time costs," (8) "persua­
sion. costs. It 31 
3. Sltuat1ons: 
!here are three authors who present somewhat differ1ng 
VIews of the aitua.tion of exchange. Clark characterizes it by., 
mutualit1,'while Reid and Blau contend that conflict and Ine­
quality are pr~dominant in exchange situations. 
For Clark the crucIal.stage of the formatIon and exercise 
ot power occurs when "one actor is able to otfer to others some 
kInd of commodity which places them in his debt. It In situat10ns 
of mutual, rec.1proca·lexchange, he has developed five possible 
relationships: (1) "reciprocation in kInd, tt (2) "reciprocation 
•••• ot an entIrely different sort," (3) "noblesse oblIge," (4) 
instItut1ona11zed "altru~sm," and (5) "ciroular" t'pa.th" ot ex­
changes. 32 He a.dds three qualif1cations of the exchange sys­
tem: ( 1 ) "the more general the resource - ••• utIl1ty ••• di­
verse •••- the greater the potential for extension of the ex­
change system;" (2) "t~e.larger the number of resources ••• : ~he; 
more dIrect, complex, and extens1ve eXChanges 1n the system may 
'becomej" (3) "the sr~ater the consensus among members of a 80­
:"~~~""4_!~" . ~ 
'c1&1 system on basiC 'values the more extensive, complex, and 
. .. ~\ :":' ...... 
ind1rect may be .the eXChange relationships among members of the 
system." 33 For Clark, there are three basic categories of ex­
change values of resources: "prestige value,u "institutionaliza­
tion importance," and "power value." 34 
·Reid's notions of exchange are derived from his interpre­
tation· of inter-organizational conflict. The first type of con­
.. 
fllet 1s the "competltive situa.tion" wherein there is a struggle 
over acquiring scarce tt~esource inputs." The second type is the 
"bargaining Situation- wherein disagreement occurs over what and 
how much of. resources are to be contributed by whom in exchanges:. 
The third type 1s the "legitimacy issue tl concerned with disputes 
over "output of resources" by one organization as defeating the 
goals of another. It this is done, organizations ca.n refuse to 
legitimate one another's goals and domains. 35 
Peter Blau's scheme assumes that inequalities in power 
exist and develop among actors. In instances of the exercise of 
power by a more powerful actor upon a less powerful aotor, the 
eXChange can be analyzed through the use of a model he has tormu­
lated. The key elements in this struc~ure are: "alternatives to 
comp11ance" (choices to l~ss powerful for noncompliance), "cond1­
tions of 1ndependence" (essentials to less powerful to be non­
comp11ant), ·"requirements of power" (essentials for powerful to 
torce comp11ance), and "structural lmpli.cat1ons" (areas involved 
t.hat should be studled). The scheme 1s as follows: 
.. ' 
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Alternat1ves 
to Compliance 
Cond1tions ot 
Independence 
Requ1rements 
ot Power 
Structural 
Impl1cations 
1. Supply in-' 
ducements 
Strategic 
resources 
. 
Ind1fterence 
to what others 
otter 
Exchange and 
distribution"' o:t 
r.esources • 
2. Obtain",­
elsewhere 
Available 
alternat1ves 
Monopoly over 
what others 
need 
CompetIt1on'and
exchange rates.. 
3•. Take by 
force 
Coercive 
force 
Law and 
Order 
Organizat1on­
and d1fferent1­
ation. 
4. Do 
Without:. 
Ideals 
lessen1ng
needs 
Katerialls­
tic and oth­
er relevant 
values 
Idealogy
format1on' 
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Summary: The section on exchange has had writ1ngs, which not so 
, muoh disagree among themselves, as much as" they complement each 
other. 
Nuttall, et. ale present a model which stresses the condi­
tions of influence and exchange, wh1ch are bas10 to power analy­
sis. The notions of perceived and actual influence are helpful 
to coalitional analysis, especially Since coa11tions in the1r early 
stages are characterized by a lack of inter-member familiar1ty" 
which, in turn, would initially base a great deal on appear­
ances. A gamut ot strategies could also be utilized. The three 
analytical quest10ns perta1n1ng to resources are useful tools 
and directly pertaln to the areas consldered by the other "ex_ 
change" writers. These ~uestlons concern: (1) each actor's re­
8ourc·es, (2) presence of ' receptors for them, (3) type of resour­
ces necessary for the declslon belng made.• 
Adrlan and Press are concerned about the types of costs 
incurred by declsions, whlch in turn requlre resources to sup­
port them. They are concerned with the feas1blllty and conse­
quences ot coalltlonal decls10n costs and varlables influenclng 
them, such as, the unanlmltyand s1ze pr1nclples and the lmpact 
ot the 1ndlspens1ble member. 
The only real area of dlspar1ty among the wrlters is found 
,between Clark, and Reid and Blau. Clark characterlzes eXChange 

relatlonships as mutual eXChange and co-operatlon and consen­

sus, whlle Reid and Blau malntaln that S.ltuatlons of exchange 

. are based on inequallty and conflict among members. In coali­

tional behavlor, it ls conceivable that either consensus or con­
flict relatlons could exist dependlng upon the level of scarCity 
ot resources and interdependence or dependence of actors. 
I~ Process Analysls or Declslon~Mak1ng 
The actual process of decision-maklng i~coalitlons will 
now be addressed. The literature reviewed was ot abroad scope~ 
and the authors d1d not speclfy coalitional dynam1cs for the1r 
principal focus of analySis. However, as with the writers re­
viewed tor t.he sectlon on power analYSiS, these wrlters second­
arily covered lssues relevant to coalltions. The two ma1n areas 
discussed in these works are declsion-making typo1og1es and 
·phases. 
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.6.. typologies:' 
Th1s sectlon presents d1fferent schemes that ha.ve been 
developed to categor1z~ decision-types. The authors who were 
reviewed were: Braybrooke and Lindblom, William J. Gore, and 
Harvey and M1lls. 
Braybrooke and L1ndblom have formulated a typology that . 
is constructed around two focal conoepts: (1) degree of' chanse 
brought by decis1on, (2) adequacy of information and understand­
1ng ava1lable to the dec1s1on-makers. Their dec1sion types in-· 
elude: 
Ca) decis10ns that effect large change and are guided by ade­
quate information and understanding; (b) decls10ns that et­
fect large change but are not s1m1larly gu1ded - hence, at .. 
an extreme, blind or unpredictable decisions; (c) decis10ns 
that effect only small change and. are guided by a.dequa.te in­
formation. a.nd understanding, and (d) decisions that effect 
small change but are not simllarly guided, being therefore 
subject to constant recons1deration and redirection. 37 
Expressed in a grld box 	1t appears as follows: 

I NFOBMATIO!r 

adequate 1nadequa.te

Large

CHANGE 

Small 

I 
 I 
W1lliam J. ~ attempts to develop a typological model 
wh1ch also addresses ltself' to the variable of "change." It 1s 
Gore's contention that "recurring" or "programmed" decis1cns 
have been the only types of decisions studied while nnonrecu~­
r1ng" and "nonprogrammed" decisions have been left 'unanalyzed, •. 3S: 
Be then del1neates a typology wh1ch attempts to 1ncorporate both 
main categories of' decisicns in a three element continuum: 
1. 	-Routine decisions," "correspondence between the prefab­
ricated response and the response required by the s1tua­
t10n. II 
2. 	"Incremental change" and dec1s1ons t "to a.djust to an antl- , 
c1pated sta.te of affa1rs." Usually opera.tes by way of 1n­
formal procedures based on experience. It 1s more apt to . 
concentrate upon "negotIation and development of new un­
derstand1ngs,1f because 1t focuses upon problems and not 
tasks (rout1ne decis1ons).
3. 	"Innovat1ve dec1s1ons" concern a "major change 1n activ1ty
and operation wh1ch leads to a change 1n goals, purposes,; 
or po11c1es." 39 
!h1s model also 1ncorporates a.n analytIcal pos1tion on the 
phases which these d1fferent dec1s10n. types tend to tollow. This 
will be'presented under the following sect10n on "phases." 
Harvey and Mills have developed a typology ot deciaion­
mak1ng s1milar to Gore's. However, they reter to dec1sions as 
solut1ons. Their bas1c categor1es are rout1ne and innovat1ve 
solutions. In addition, they emphas1ze that wh1le rout1ne solu­
t10ns tend to be \SEd for routIne problems and innovative Bolu­
tions for innovative problems,routine solutions oan be used tor 
1nnovat1ve problems and 1nnovative solut10ns for rout1ne problem. 40 
They have also expressed this model 1n terms of phases wh1ch will 
be d1scussed later. 
Summary: There are connecting factors which run tr~ough the co~ 
cepts ot each of the above wr1ters. They are all concerned with 
the·dec1s1on response in theIr typologies. There are other com­
mona11ties from author to author. 
Bralbrooke and L1ndblom focus upon the variables of lntor­
matlon.and Change. Information can be adequa.te or 1nadequa te. 
Change can be large or small. Gore 1s also concerned with change. 
What Braybrooke and L1ndblom reter to as "large change," Gore 
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'calls "innovative. II What they designate "small change" is com­
parable to Gore's category "incremental change," adjustment. 
What"Gore calls tf ro\1t1ne," they do not have a des1gnat10n for, 
but oonoeivably it would' be classified uno change." 
Wh1le addressing the issue of change resulting from a de­
cision, Gore does not discuss information, as do Braybrooke and 
Lindblom. 
Harvey and M1lls also are concerned with innovative an~ 
routine decisions or "solutions" but draw a further distinction 
which no~e of the other writers presented - 1nnovative and rou­
tine problems. The other authors appear to have assumed a co~ 
tinu1ty between problems and solutions. In add1tIon,llarvey and 
KIlls' model does not refer to the variable of informat1on. 
fakIng all of the autsors together, there emerge three 
central variables: problem, information, and solution (decIsion). 
If·the solut1on and problem types are expanded to 3 (rout1ne, 
I 
inoremental, and 1nnovative) and information to 2 (adequate and 
Inadequate), then a rather extensIve typolog1cal scheme results. 
It is feasible that coalItions be1r~ informal and transc1ent 
that all problems would tend to be innovative, but th1s is pro­
bably only the case durIng the in1t1al phases of the group. 
Oonsequently, problem type rema1ns a vIable factor. If the var­
1able "1nformation" 1s introduced into a typology with the var1­
ables "problem" and "solution," the question arises as to which 
or the two, it not both, does adequate and 1nadequate 1nformatlon 
reter. Braybrooke and L1ndblom appear to be referring only to 
the "change solut1on," Since they do not even diSCUSS the var1­
able "problem." However, whether aotors have adequate knowledge 
about the problem with which they are confronted, as well as, the 
adequacy of the "dec1sion solution" chosen, seem to both bare a 
signlficance In categorizing ~ec1s1on-mak1ng. 
B.' Phas,es: 
Thls section concerns itself with' models which deplct pos­
slble stages through whlch coalitlons pass in their decision-mak­
ing process. Again, this material is of broader applicab111ty 
, than coalitions, but 1 t will be assessed in terms of coali tiona'. 
fwo writings ref'erre'd to under the sectlon on typologies ha.ve 
phase models bul1t upon those typologies ( Gore, and Harvey and 
Mi,lle). Two other works focus on stages or phases of "rational" 
decision-making (Brim and Glass, and Slmon). 
~ typifies 'the overall prooess and interactlon of rou~ 
tine, incremental, and Innovative dec1sions as a rhythmic move­
ment. "The essential rhythm of organizational adjustment is 
from routlne to adaptive to routine; or from routine to adaptive 
to innovative and back to adaptive a.nd eventually to routlne 
again. It 41 
Harvey and )1111s have formulated a sequential Upath-way" 
model to illustrate the stage prooess. Its phases lnclude: "Is­
sue-perception and formation of goals," "search and the use of 
eXpectations, tt "choice of solution," and II redeflnl t10n -" the 
attempt by others to "evade or modlfy such outcomes.'" 42 The 
attached 1llustrative flow chart will demonstrate these patterns. 
It should be mentioned that for both rout1ne and innovat1ve prob­
--
25 
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lem situations "Path 1al 1s usually chosen by well-estab11shed 
,"low-threat" organizations, "Path 3" by precar10usly existing 
"high_threat" organ1zat1ons and "path 2" by organ1zat1ons at an 
1ntermed1ate relation to threat. 43 
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Brim, Glass, et. al, 1dentifyand discuss declsion~procesB 
phases which must be gone through rationally in situations and 
problem areas that are new and not suited to routinized organ1­
zational behavior. They then. delineate six discernible phases 
wh10h they emphasize are applicab~e to the analysis of any de­
cision. They also mention that every decision need not neces­
sar11y involve all of the six phases if some of them have been 
adequately accounted for previously. The six phases in what 
Brim calls their customary "sequence" are; 
(1~1dentification of the problem;
(2 obtainir-g necessary information; 

(3 production of possible solutions; 

4~ evaluation of such solutions;
_ 5 selection of a strategy for performance; andt 6 actual performance of an action or actions and subse­:·~quent learning and revision-. 45 
The same six phases are recognized by Terry Clark. 46 
The second essentially rational model to be summarized 1s: 
one by Herbert A. Simon. He is concerned with rationally account­
ing tor the environment and consequences of decision-makir~. He 
concentra.tes on "means and ends," "alternatives and consequences," 
and "value and possibi11ty. " Simon· cautions sophist1cation in-~ 
dealing with the "means - end" issue. The d1recting principle 
is that "efficiency" demands "attainment of maximum values with 
lim1ted ends ." 47 
"Alterna.tives a.nd consequences" involves speculating about(. 
"behavior alternatives." This includes: (1) listing ot alterna~ 
tive strategies, (2) determining consequences that result from 
each strategy, and (3) comparative evaluation_of these sets of 
consequences. The "time and behavior" var1ables can preclude 
.. 
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certalnalternativas on the basis of time limitations and pre­
vious decisions. "Knowledge and beha.vior" concerns should in­
clude establishing 'sets of expectations for the consequences ot 
difterent strategies. "Group behavior" involves getting to know 
the strategies of the other group members and determining whe­
ther their desired consequences are the same (cooperative sit­
uation) or in oppos1tion(competitive Situation) with one's own.48 
"Value and posSibility" concerns making a determination of 
preterences among consequences: "valuation." This is done on 
values of "utility" (acquiring the best exchange rate) and/or 
the "relation of value, experience"behaVior." This returns the 
1ssue to means and ends; "a means-end chain is a series of a.ntl­
c1patlons that connect a value with the Situations rea11z1ng it, 
and these Situations, in turn, with the behaviors that produce 
them. n 49 
He concludes this approach with a definition of rational­
1ty in decision-makir~j "rationality is concerned with the sel­
ection of preferred behavior alternatives in terms of some system 
ot values whereby the consequences ot behavior can be evaluated." 
Be then relates that the rationa11ty is relative to whose system 
ot values the goals are def1ned by. 50 
Summary: ftbile Gore 1s basically dev1sing a ryhthmic movement ot 
phases, Harvey and Mills' phases are concerned with represent1ng
• 
the poss1ble m1xed comb1nations of innovative and routine problema 
and solut1ons and the1r reconsideration 1n the decision-mak1ng 
process. Gore's model much more closely approximates actually 
distinct phases In dec1s1on-making. 
,The two ratlonal models conta1n phases whlch are qu1te 
sim1lar. It should be noted that Brim, Glass, et. al. consider 
the "ratlonal" model to be applicable In nonroutinized decislon. 
. sltuatlons. The Brlm and Simon models both essentially contaln 
the followlng phases: (1) Some review of informat1on and alter­
natives, (2) determlning posslble solutions and consequences" 
(3) comparatlve analys1s of (2), (4) choice among them, (5) per­
formance of actlons. They differ In that Brim lists an initIal 
step ot problem Identlflcation, and Slmon does not. Yet, 81moa 
includes an analysls by each actor of the others' strategles and 
goals so the group can assess their s1tuatlon as cooperative or 
competitive. Brim does not speclflcally mentlon this stage, 
however/it may be Implled i~ th~ phases which determ1ne and com­
pare different possible stategies and solutions. 
In coalitions" the internal sltuation (cooperatlon or 
competit1on) could greatiy Influence whether a ratlonal model 
w1l1 at all be feas1ble 1n the group's dec1s1on-making process •. 
.l!lALYTICAL.. MODEL 
Thls study wlll next present a theoret1cal model for analy­
z1ng the decislon-maklng process in coalltions In l1ght of the 
above read1ngs. Th1s model Is not an hypothesls to be tested, 
but rather"s scheme dev1sed to ascerta1n its app11cab1l1ty to 
cas.studies as a step in theory bul1dlng and explor~tory res~arch 
in the area ot coalltional Interorgan1zatlonal behavior. The a­
bove 1itera.ture de11neates what other writers cons1der to be the. 
/ 
process of decision-making and power in organizational and 1n­
terorgan1zat1onal behavior by way of observation and hypothesiz­
1ng. "Th1s study will draw from these works to formulate a model 
that 1s regarded to be relevant to coalit1onal 1nterorgan1zatiom­
a1 dec1sion-mak1~~. 
The model w111 be presented according tocategor1cal areas 
essent1ally the same as those ut111zed for structuring the ma­
t,er1al in the rev1ew of t~e 11terature: dec1sion-making power 
"analys1s (theoret1oal, structural, exchange)" and decis1on-making 
process analys1s (typology, phases). 
I. Dec1sion-Making Power AnalysiS: 
.In analyz1ng power as related to the coa11t1onal deo1s1on­
mak1ng field, there are essept1ally three analyt10al areas of 
conoern. These involve theoretical, structural, and exchange 
quest10ns and issues. 
A. Theoret1cal Issues: 
In analyzing the o8sestud1es I an eal!ec'tI1c ,~, a.pproach ...,111 
be taken to .ach1e"i:8"r:. a perspect1ve on what const1tutes the phen­
omena of power and 1nfluence and their exercise. Power w111 be 
defined as' the ability to influence other actors to be in accord 
w1th one's own pos1t1on and the extent to which an actor is able 
to subsequently have h1B pos1t1on accepted. ~hese dec1sion vic­
tor1es w1ll not be based on-a zero-sum basls, but in terms of re­
lat1ve success of members as the result of coalitional decislon' 
arrangements .• 
,~ 
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S1nce th1s proJect 1s utilizing casestudies (ex post,facto 
interview data), the Interpretations ot those intervIewed about 
all issues and actions may have been modIfIed by memory loss,. 
selective recall, "output" but not "Input" and "process" vIew­
poInts, ind1vIdual interests and their outcomes, etc. The posI­
tional method generally lac~s applicabIlity to interorganiz&­
t10nal coalitions, Since they are characterized by minimal Inter~ 
nal formal structures. Furthermore, since the fife-span of coa­
litions is transc1ent, reputational configurations resulting 
from internal decision-making outcomes will be m1nimal, espe­
cially' In:the early decISions of the coalition. Therefore, 
,while 	positions and reputations of member units might be useful 
indices of power configurations, the "deciSional," or historI­
cal, analYSis of issue areas-and decisions seems that It w11~ be 
more appropriate to the type of data involved. Yet, in combin­
ing a modified positional model and a decisional model. the pos­
ition which a unit representative holds in his "parent organi­
zation" and that 'In the coalit~on (it any) and his subsequent 
level of influence in the coalItIon's decision-making could be 
Significant. 
B. Structural Issues: 
1. External: 
fhere are certain. questions which can be cons1dered or 

"sought out" in the case materlal which could help extrapolate 

the power structure of ,the coalitions studied. Members (units) 
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artt part of the coalition voluntarily as autonomous units who 
Joined the coalition in order to expand or protect their domain 
(selt-interest). This may also take the torm of coalitien member­
ship based upon the need to share in the resources ot tellow 
members. It appears that the autonomy of. coalit10n members 1s 
lessened relative to the coalition's control of resources a.nd 
soph1stication of internal organization. 
It appears probable that a,considerable degree of the in­
fluence exercised by one unit upon another could be the conse­
quence ot extra-coalitional relations, as well as, the internal 
structure (minimal) of the coalition. Subsequently, it would be 
useful to compose a network illustration ot member units' inter­
relationsh1ps both within and' outSide (and prior to) the ooali­
tion. It would seem probable, that Since coalitions are con­
cerned only seoondarily with issues outSide ot each unit's cru­
cfal intra-organizat1onal systems, that the preservation and 
promot1on of un1t lnterests (autonomous), including existing 10­
terorganizational relations, would be ot primary concern for mem­
bers ot coalitlons. This could be modified ln lnstances where 
,the issue betore a coalltion relates to the survival ot one or 
more ot its members. 
2. Internal: 
Some internal power structure lssues need to be discussed. 
These should be of minimal signiflcance, lt, 1n tact, units ot a 
coalition invest 1t With little authorlty, leadership, and for­
mal structural 'elements. As a result, tormal coalitional roles, 
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1t they were established, would carry little real power. As 
mentioned earlier, it is important to determine where each unit 
stands within their own organization', because they might only be 
representing a specific interest and segment of that '"parent or­
gan1zation." Special expertise on the part of certain members 
could give them additional authority. and power in the group. 
Members of the coalition will tend to develop a consensus about 
who i8 more powerful in the group. This could cbange consider­
ably over the l1fe time of the coalition, s1nce different issue 
areas will be considered in wh1ch different actors will have more 
influence. Also, if the actors are unfamiliar with each other 
together as a configuration of different interests with differ­
ent degrees and types of influence, only the actual testing and 
sanctioning of power on i8sues:W111 familiarize each unit as to the 
influence and power of each other unit, relative to one another. 
From the above and also since coalitions are informal and 
short term entities, 'it seems probtable that a considerable degree 
of "testing" of one another's power will take place, especially 
early in the coalition's history. after this process, patterns 
. of unequal influence within the coalition should more clearly 
emerge. If there is a single "leader" (forma.1 or informal) in 
the coalition, it would indicate an "imbalance" of power hier­
" 
archically within the coalition. If there are several centers' 
of group leadership, it would indicate a more "balanced"dlstrl­
bution or power among coalition members. 
O~'Exchange Issues 
Ii 
The dynamics of the power structure of coalitions is as­
certainable from the actual systems and operatlons of exchange. 
Wi thln the dynamlcs of exchange a resource Is ,a commodl ty pos­
sessed and controlled by Indlvidual unlt members or actually or 
potent1ally by the coalltlon as a whole, and It 1s valued (or 
sought) by the coalltlon unlts. Influence Is the use of a re­
source of power by one unlt (lnfluencer) upon one or more other 
un1ts(lnfluencee) to alter the lnfluencee~s positlon or actlon 
so as to promote or favor the Influencer's Interests and goals. 
Types of resources can include money, frlendshlps, jobs, 
votes, informatlon, group structural controls, etc. The more 
general a resource Is,.the greater the number of s1tuations of 
influence 1n which it can be ut1l1zed. These resources can be 
operat1onallzed by strategles toward other units of persuas1on, 
ob11gatlon, induceme'nt (reward or pun1shment), structur1ng of 
alternat1ves, manlpulatlon of perceptlon of alternatlves, d1ver­
slon of attentlon, and coercIon. 
The exIstence of a receptor Is.basiC to the exlstence of 
1nfluence, because 1t makes'posslble. the control of one unit by 
another. The more un1ts are dependent upon each other's resources 
for organizational unit goal attaInment, the higher the level ot 
co-ordination and the more frequent the eXChange wlll be charac­
·ter1zed by barga1n1ng. The greater the co-ordlnation and interde­
pendence, the more frequently relations will be characterized by 
mutual eXChange. The greater the slngular comm1tment to 1ndivi­
dual unlt goals the lower the level of cooperation. The grea~er 
the compet1tlon for resources Bought, the greater the group co~ 
fllctl.- this Includes existlng resources and/or expansion of re­
sources. If,he higher the relatlonship between resources avail­
able 'through membershlp In the coalition-and unit goals sought,· 
the higher the level of that unit's involvement In coa11tional 
operations. 
The analys1s of the type or mode of resources necessa~ for 
the dec1sion belng made is a complex question. In terms of gener­
al compos1te coalitional resources, d1fferent issues often de­
, mand different types of resources to be exerCised. The types of 
resource t'costs" that can be incurred by a coalition unit, sub­
group of units, or full coalltional group can include: (1) in­
forma t1on, (2) responsib1l1ty (for taklng a certain posltion), 
(3),1ntergame, (4) dlvls1on,Ofpay-offs, (S) dlssonance, (6) in­
ertia (1nternal restructuring of group)', (7) pressure of tIme,: 
and (8) persuaSion to gain. support of needed vote or resource. 
In addition, certain "dec1sion cost" princ1ples can alter the' de­
gree of cost Incurred: size, unanim1ty, and indispensible member::­
principles. 
Units with fewer of the resources, which are necessa~ for 
a particular deCiSion, than one or more other units can moderate 
their poslt1on of Inabil1ty to influence a decision by overcom1ng 
the advantage of the more powerful. ~hiS can be achieved by al­
ter1ng in desrees the process of indebtedness and control, to a 
Situation of reciproca.t1on and equality. Where the more power~ 
tul do not need the resources of the wea.ker, the potential re­
ceptor(s) ma.y poss1bly involve thelr other resource potent1als a.s 
commodities for exchange. Where ..the more powerful control a re­
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source needed by a potential receptor(s), the weaker un1t may pos­
S1bly seek out alternative resources aside from the stronger coal­
1t10n member un1ts. These are possible phenomena to be observed 
In analys1s of exchange 1nteract1ons. 
Some mor~ spec1f1c ~est1ons could 1nclude: 
1. 	What were the power or 1nfluence resources of each unit? 
'2. 	What were the power or influence resources relevant to 
each decision 1ssue? 
3. 	Who exerc1sed (or attempted to) 1nfluence upon whom 1n 
~ach dec1s1on 1ssue? 
4. 	What wer6~ resources of each un1t reapective to the 
decis10n issue? 
5. 	What was the outcome? 
6. 	What pos1t1on did each un1t take on each dec1sion is­
sue as compared to the outcome of the dec1s1on-mak1ng 
process? 
7. 	What weretne goals of each unit 1n Jo1ning the coa11t1on 
and what was the actual outcome 1p terms of these goals. 
II. 	Decision-Making Process Analysis 
The study will now turn to the development of a model for 
the analysis of the dec1s1on-makir~ process 1n terms of typol­
ogles 'and phases for 1nt.erorganlzational coa11t10ns. 
&.Typolostcal Issues 
One possIble typological scheme for analyz1ng dec1sional 
responses to problem s1tuat10ns 1s from gradat'1ons of organ1za-·­
tional famlllar1ty. Degrees of familiar1ty with problems and 
w1th solut1ons (or decisions) are conceivable wIthin a contin­
uum ot routine, incremental and innovative. A rout1ne problem 
or routIne solut1on would both have a h1gh familiarity rating 
and can be characterIzed by the term task or1ented. Incremental 
has the connotat10n of be1ng adjustment or1ented, whIle Innova­
tive problems and solutions are change oriented. Wh1le routine 
problems are usually responded to with routine solutions, 1ncre­
mental or innovative solutions are also possible. The same is 
applIcable to incremental and 1nnovat1ve problems and solutions. 
It tius model were to be expanded to include the var1able 
ot Informat1on and understanding (adequate or inadequ~te) as to 
the condItIons of a problem situat10n and problem solution a tar 
more complex scheme emerges. In thIs case adequacy would be de­
tIned as sufficient understandi~~ of the demands of the problem 
situat10n and of the consequences of the problem solution for 
what they are: Innovat1ve, incrementa.l, or rout1ne. The model 
would take thiS form. 
PROBLEM SOLUTION'.' 
~, . .... " 
blem ROUTINE INCREMENTaL INNOVATIVE 
uation I NFORMATICN­ adequa.te inadequa.te adequate inadequate adequate inadeouate 
t1ne a.deauate 
inadeQ.uate 
remental adeauate 
inadequate 
-----....­
ovative adequa.te ~ " . .~ 
inadequate 
t 
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The analytical usefulness and praot1cal app11cat1on'of 
such a not1on of "lnformation adequacy" remains dubious, espe­
c1ally 1n terms of casestudy data. Another means of assess1ng 
adequacy would be whether a solution ~as successful 1n solv1ng 
a,problem situation, or 1f there arose many consequences with 
which the 'coa11t1on' apparently was not prepared to cope. 
B. Phase Issues 
The above typology 1nd1cates possible phases 1n app11ca­
t10n to 1nterorgan1zatlonal coa.lit1ons. It seems probable that 
nearly all problem s1tuations and problem soluti.ons w1ll be 1n­
novatlvely or1ented. Th1s w1ll be part1cularly true 1n the early 
stages or the operations of these groups. Th1s 1s the case be­
cause every problem s1tuation w1ll be new to the coa11t1on as a 
group and their response wlll be new for the group. Cnce cer­
tain procedural ground rules are estab11shed and the coalltion 
galns experlence, the other orientations w1ll become involved. 
However, it 1s poss1ble for any comb1nation to result, but less 
probable. 
Certa1n procedures or phases 1n decision-mak1ng seem to be 
relatively cons1stent in most sltu~tions where rationality (as 
well as un1t group lnterest) 1s regarded as s1gnificant by the par­
t1Cipants. These are dec1slon-makir~ steps or phases and should 
not be confused with group developmental stages or:phases. One 
model tOl- compartmenta11zir..g this process as a rat10nal develop­
ment indicates the presence of these steps 1n decis1on-making: 
1. Issue or Problem 1dent1flcation. 
2. 	Informat1on gatherlr~. 
3. 	Listing of alternative strategies and solutions. 
4. 	Determination of consequences of eac.h stra.tegy or solut1on. 
S. 	Comparative evaluat10n ot findings. 
6. 	Oho1ce of strateg1es or solutions. 
7. 	Enactment of strategy 'or solution. 
The app11cab1l1ty of th1s model 1s probably relat1ve to the 
degree ot cooperation or conf11ct ot goals and interests of the 
un1ts comprlsing the interorganizatiqnal coalitlon. Un1t b1ases 
, 
should be expected to exlst in decision-maklng. All seven of these. 
phases should be examined (If poss1ble) from the perspectlve ot 
the make-up of the coa11 tlon.• · However, issue and interest agree... 
ment or d1sagreement among units are both compat1ble w1ththe 
formation of a coalItion. 
OASESTUDY AN~LYTICAL MODEL 
.. )1aln Assertions. 
I. 	Dec1sion-Making Power Analysis 
A. 	 Theoret1cal Issues: 
1. 	Pos1t1onal 

os.. Internal 

b. 	External 
2. 	Decisional - dynam1cs of exchange 
B. 	Structural Issues:' 
1. 	External: 
&. 	 Coalition members join in order to expand or pro­
tect their domain (self-interest). 
1) This may take the form of coalit1on membership 
. based upon the need to share 1n the resources ot 
tellow members. 
2) 	It appears that the autonomy of coa11tion mem­
bers 1s lessened relat1ve to the coa11t1on's con­
trol of resources and soph1st1cat1on of 1nternal 
orga.n1zation. 
b. 	It appears probable that a considerable degree of the 
influence exercised by one unit upon another could be 
the consequence of extra-coa11tional relations, as 
well as, the internal structure (minimal) of the co­
alit1on. 
c. 	It would seem probable, that Since coalitions are u­
sually concerned with 1ssues secondary to each unit's 
cruc1al intraorganizational systems, that the prese%!­
vat10n and promot10n of unit interests (autonomous),
including existing interorgan1zational rela.tions,_ 
would be of primary concern for members of coali­
t1ons. 
2. 	Internal: 
a. 	Formal coalitional roles, if they are establ1shed" 
carry l1ttle real power. 
b. 	Each unit member may only be representing a specific 
segment_ or interest ot 1ts nparent organizat1on." 
c. 	Members of the coalition will tend to develop a con­
sensus about who 1s more powerful in the group. 
1) D1fferent 1ssue areas will be considered in which 
. different actors will have more influence. 
2) 	It seems probable that a considerable degree of 
ntesting" ot one a.nother I s power will take place.,
espec1ally early in the coa11tion's h1story. 
d. 	If there is a single "leader" (formal or 1nformal) 1n 
the coa11t1on, 1t would ind1cate an "lmbalance l1 ot . 
power hierarchically within the coalit1on. 
e. 	If there are several centers of group leadership, 1~ 
would 1nd1cate a more "balanced" d1str1but1on ot po­
wer among coa11tion members. 
: i 
.0. 	Exchange Issues: 
1. 	Cond1tions: 
a. 	The more general a resource lS, the greater· the num­
ber ot s1tuat1ons of intluence 1n wh1ch 1t can be u­
tlllzed. 
b. 	The more un1ts are dependent upon each other's re­
sources tor organizat1onal un1t goal attalr~ent, the 
h1gher the level of c.oordlnatlon and the more fre.­
quently the exchanges w11l be characterized by bar­
galning. 	 ' 
1) .The greater the coordination and 1nterdependence,~ 
the more frequently relat10ns w1l1 be characterl­
zed by mutual exchange. 
c. 	!he greater the singular commitment to 1nd1vldual·u­
nit goals, the lower the level of copperat1on." 
d. 	The greater the compet1tion for resources sought, the 
greater the group ccnf11ct - th1s 1ncludes existing 
resources and/or expans10n of resources. 
e. 	The higher the relationship between resources avail­
able through membersh1p in the coalition and unit 
goals sought, the h1gher the level of that unit's ln~ 
volvement in coa11tional operations. 
2. 	Costs: 
a. 	D1fferent issues often demand difterent types at re­
sources to be exercised~ 
b. 	The types ot "costs" that can be incurred by a coa11­
t10nal un1t, subgroup at units, or full coa11t1onal 
group can 1nclude: (1) information, (2) respons1bil­
ity,: (3) intergame, (4) divis10n of pay-offs, (5) dis­
sonance, (6) 1nertia, (7) pressure at time, and (8)
persuasion. 
c. 	Certa1n" "decls1on cost" prInc1ples can alter the de­
gree ot cost incurred: s1ze, unan1m1ty. and lndispen­
slble member princ1ple. 
-.'" . . .... "" .~; .."':. ~ ­{. 
3. 	Situat1ons:: 
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a. 	Where the more powerful do not need the resources 
ot the weaker, the potential receptor(s) may pos­
sibly involve their other resource potent1als as 
commod1t1es for exchange. 
b. 	Where the more powerful control the resource need­
ed by a potent1al receptor(s), the weaker un1t may
poss1bly seek out alternative resources aside from 
the stronger coalit1on member units. 
D. 	 Analytical Questions: 
There are scme spec1fic quest10ns wh1ch could be applied 
~to 	 the analys1s of significant dec1s10ns of the coalltion: 
'. 1., What were the power or 1nfluence resources of each un1.t.? 
2. 	'What were the power or influence resources relevant to 
each decls10n issue? 
3. 	Who exercised (or attempted to) influence upon whom ~ 
each decision.lssue? 
4. 	What were the resources of each unit respective to the 
dec1s1on issue? . 
5. 	What was the outcome? 
6. 	What pos1tion' did each unit take on each decision is­
Bue as compared to the outcome of ,the decislon-making
process? 
7. 	What were the goals of each un1t 1n jo1ning the coal~ 
tlon;and what was the actual outcome ln terms of these 
goals? 
II. Decis1on~Making Process Analysis:: 
A. 	 TlpolOS1cal Issues: 
1. 	Degrees of tamiliarity w1th problem Situations and solu. 
tions (or decisions) are conceivable with1n a continuum; 
ot routine, incremental, and innovat1ve. 
2. 	While rout1ne ,problem Situations are usually' responded 
to with routine problem solutions, 1ncremental or innov.a. 
tive solutiOns are possible. The same is applicable to 
incremental and i~~ovative problems and solutions. 
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3. 	The variable of adequate or inadequate informat1on is 
related to the suffic1ency of understanding of the de­
mands of the problem situation and of the consequences 
ot the problem solution for what they are: innovat1ve,! 
incremental, or routine. ' 
~. 	Phase Issues: 
1. 	In application to interorganizat1onal coali tions, 1t. 
seems probable that nearly ,all problem situations and 
problem solut1ons-will be innovatively oriented. 
2. 	Once certain procedural ground rules are estab11shed 
- and the coa11tion gains experienc~ the other orien­
tat10ns will become involv~d. 
3. 	Oertain procedures or phases in decision-making seem 
to be relatively consistent in most situations where 
rationality (as well as unit group interest) is re­
garded as significant by the pa.rticipants. 
a. 	The app11cability of th1s model 1s proba.bly relative 
to the degree of cooperat1on or conflict of goals
and interests of the un1ts compris1ng the interor­
gan1zat1onal coalition. 
4. 	In coa11tions, strong unit biases should be expected 
to be operative 1n this process (dec1sion-mak1ng phases). 
5. 	Issue and 1nterest agreement or disagreement among u-­
n1ts are both compatible w1th the formation of a 
coalition•. 
OHAP.TER .2 
Summary of Casestudy* 
"Ohlld Advocacy Proposal" 
The coalltion'was ln1tlated by the Metropolltan Neighbor­
hood Ch1l4 Care Agency (MNCOA) executlve committee through the1r 
executive d1rector Mr. H. Mr. H. deflned the goals of the meet. 
lng as determinl~~ (1) lt local agencles wanted such a program,. 
(2) the geographlc target area, (3) the program proposal. The 
issue developed' out of the 1nterest'and avallab11lty of federal 
funds for a chl1d advocacy program. The 30 representatlves pre­
sent agreed on the importance of the lssue and showed a general 
agreeme~t with the target area of the city suggested by Mr. H. 
(South Clty). Mr. H. proposed that a "plannlng commlttee" be 
. 	 estab11shed to develop a proposal. Those who volunteered were 
people dlrectly concerned with the geographic and/or program 
area 1nvolved with exception of perhaps two organ1zations whlch 
never became actively lnvolved. The most sign1ficant members 
were Mr. g. from the MNCCA and the local citizen neighborhood 
poverty agency South C1ty people's League (SCPl). ~hls became~ 
the dec1s10n-making body. 
There-1mmediately developed a conflict over off1cial spon~ 
sorsh1p of the program with the two most powerful members, the 
chlld care agency and the neighborhood poverty agency, be1ng the 
ma1n contenders. No declslon was made at thiS polnt, but a ~ 
cha1rman was selected, Mr. J., who was an all~ ot the poverty 
agency• 
• For purposes of conf1dentlallty,~ all authent1c personal and o~­
ganlzatlonal names have been concea.led in all. casestud1es used•. 
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Hr. H. at one polnt attempted to lnclude two more members: 
ot h1s ag~ncy in the plar~ing process wlth apparent failure. He 
also tended to allenate the other "plannlng commlttee" members 
'W1 th h1s aggresslve tactlcs of selt l·ntere·st. Two lesser mem­
bers ot the "committee" proposed an admlnlstrat10n separate from 
tte two main members, but th1s'was rejected. 
In the mean tlme, the chlld care agency board became hes1­
tant about overextending its resources by becoming involved In"' 
the llroposed project. Then ln the absence of Mr. H. the "planning 
, 
) 
oomm1ttee" selected a proposal wh1ch des1gnated the nelghborhond 
poverty agency as the formal grant agent. Mr. H.'s alterna~e, 
Mrs. S., ,voted to approve the proposal. The board of the poverty 
"agency later officlally endorsed the proposal, but 1t lacked the 
contact with the federal sponsor1ng body and had to rely upon the 
ch1ld care agency for 11a1son. 
A meetlng of the full coa11tlon was called upon Mr. H's 
return trom talking w1th the granting body. The motion was made 
tor Mr. H. and the poverty agency to write .the f1nal draft, and 
1t was approved. (""."It was also agreed that the .. tlnal draft'be 
sent.to the member organ1zatlons for their support and comment. 
The next day the chlld care agency board met and endorsed 
the poverty agency a.s the gra.nt sponsor. From this point on, Mr. 
H. ceased h1s partic1pation and Mrs. 5 •. 'represented the chlld care 
agenoy but, did not partiCipate 1n writing the flnal draft ot the 
proposai. The coa11tion never met again, and the proposal was 
.subm1tted w1th the members' letters ot support. 
I I 
CASESTUDY ANALYSIS 

"Child Advocacy proposal" 

I. Decislon-Making Power Analysis: 
A. Theoretical Issues: This casestudy is best analyzed in terms 
of 	internal and external positions of its influencial members, 
-
as well as, the dynamics of the dec1s1on-making actors involved. 
The p'osi tional issues will be delineated under an analysis of in­
ternal and external structure, and the decisional variables will 
be scrutinized under exchange issues. The information available 
1n the casestudy substantially limited analysis to. the two pr1n­
cipal actors -MNCCA and SCPL. 
B. Structural Issues: 
B. 1. External: 
B.l.a. Doma1n - the dimension of domain protection or advance­
ment clearly appears to be a central factor in the involvement ot 
the s1gnificant actors. In this 1nstance"a maximum domain expan­
sion of 1100,000 was available. Cnae the initial decision was 
made to restrict the potential receiving area to South City, 
those seriously involved lessened to units that have territor1al 
or program domains within or'encompassing that area. While re­
presentatives from. another poverty group and the local college 
volunteered to work on the program, the casestudy indicates th&.t 
they were not among the "core" comm1ttee me·mbers. It can be Inter­
red that thIS is directly related. to theIr unIt's havIng had no 
selt-1nterest gaIns which cculd result from their .involvement. 
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B.• t.a.1) Resource interdependence - MNCCA (Mr. H.) s~ems to have 
needed the involvement of· other community agenc1es in the pl~ 
ning prQcess in order to fulf~ll application procedures. It de­
t1nitely attempted to ignore their 1nput. Furthermore, the 9th~r 
member units, especially SCPL, depended upon MNCCA's (Mr. H.'s) 
l1aison w1th Washington, as well as, its posit10n of established 
1ntluence '.1n the ch1ld care realm, espectally Mr. H.' s. poSi tiOD 
as looal Executive D1rector for MECCA. 
B.l.a.2) Member autonomy - it appears that the coalit1on' S oon­
trol of the resources was unclear and that the actors tended to 
operate autonomously. 
B.l.b. Extra-coalit1onal relations - Mr.'J.'s prev10usly exist1ng 
pos1tion of relationship with SCPLseems to have estab11shed.them 
as al11es. MNCCA's (Mr. H.'s) relationship with the fund1ng agent 
was the key to his influence within the coalition. 
B. 1 .0. Unit interests - the decision by the Board of Directors 
~f ~~CCA that their primary concerns and goals demanded all of 
their resources to mainta1n their ope~ations and that the new 
proposal was too secondary is significant in its cons1stency with 
the analytical model. 
B.2. Internal: 
B.2.a. Formal roles - internal structural variables show consid­
erable agreement with the model. The two formal pos1t1ons in 
the coa11tion's h1storyheld no s1gnificant power in themselves' 
independent ot the personal1t1es occupy1ng them. Mr. H. br1etly 
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(and ae.1t-&ppolntedly) was "Cha1rman Pro Tem" and Mr. J. was the 
regural cha.1rman by consensus. 
B.2.b•.Rep£!sentativeness - Mr. H.'s inab1l1ty to galn support 
tor h1s Itdecls1on" from h1s own organizat1onal un1t lndlcates a 
clearlnstance of a coa11t1on member's represent1ng only a spe­
c1f1c segment or interest of a "parent organizat1on" and not 1t 
as a whole. 
B.2.c. Cons~nsus - 1t 1s quite apparent that coalitional members 
qu1ckly came to cons1der MNCCA (Mr. H.) and SCPL to be the two 
most powerful group members. 
B.2.c.1) ~ Different1al power - lt becameobv1ouB '. atter conslder­
able testing tha.t SCPL was ~ore dom1nant when 1 t came to ga1ning 
the support of fellow coa11tion members, except tor MNCCA (Mr. H~). 
wh1le KNCCA (Mr. H.) had a dominant pos1tion with respect to 1~~ 
tormatiOnaJ. and organ1zational ties to the funding source. 
B.• 2.c.2) Test11'lS - the testing process was quite apparen:t- espe­
Cially in the early stages of the coa11tion. 
~2.d. and e. S1ngle or mult1ple leadersh1p - the emergence ot 
two centers of real leadersh1p within the coa11t1on demonstrates 
a relatively "balanced d1str1bution of power" between the maln~ 
conteatants. 
c. ExchanS8 Issues: 
C.l. Condit1ons: 
0.1.a. Resource genera11ty - the two main actors, MNCCA (Mr. H.• ») 
and SOPL", had resources of relat1ve genera11 ty which they fre­
quently ut1l1zed. MNCCA's (Mr. H.'s) main resources were lnfo~ 
mation and program l1a1son controls. These resources were em­
ployed in particularly cruc1al decisions, e.g. the tinal vote' ot, 
HNCCA's board. If the board had sanctioned Mr. H. with the full 
use ot his potential resources, it appears that his 1nfluence 
could have been dominant. 
SOPL, on the other hand, relied upon the resources of 
fr1endsh1p and votes. Mr. J. was closelyal11ed w1th SCPL., and 
the "planning corr~1tteen voted 1n SCPL's favor. These resources 
were rel~tively general and effective for 1nternal coalit10nal 
dec1s1ons, but MNCCA' s (Mr. H.' S~) external resources tended to at 
least be potentially decisive 1n that realm. 
In add1tion, MNCCA (Mr. H.) had an estab11shed program do­
ma1n 1n child care, while SCPL.. had established terr1tor1al do­
main 1n South C1ty. 
C.l.b. Resource dependency - the degree of mutual dependency ~ 
mong this coa1it10n I s members 1s somewhat.. vague1n view of the 
above. SCPL and MNCCA (Mr. 'H.) appeared to be interdependent l , 
especially SCPL vis ~!1!. MNCCA.(Mr••H~), yet the two were 
clearly in open conf11ct. If the assert10n of the model is vi­
able, it may requ1re certain modifications to expla1n the dyna­
mlcs ot this casestudy. One possible solution is that SCPL and 
the other coalition members, exclud1ng MNCCA (Mr. H.) tunction. 
ed 1n an apparently consensus manner. ~hls could be based upon 
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their mutual dependence for internal coalitional resources. On 
the other hand, MNCCA (Mr. H.) was self-sufficient in external 
resources and never attempted to bargain w.1th the other members 
in terms of actually making the proposal application, other tha.n 
pseudo consultation. MNCCA (Mr. H.) did not involve itself in: 
the 1nternal workings of the coa.lition, apparently view1ng their 
re,sources' as unessential to attainment of its interest goal. 
SCPL however, did attempt to bargain direotly with the MNCCA board 
because of SCPL's position of considerable dependency in the area 
of external resources to effectively 'influence the attaInment ot 
Its goal. 
O.1.b.1) Mutual exchange - the greatest mutual exchange took 
place between SCPL and the other ooalition members, except MNCOA 
(Mr. H • .>. Wh1le the mutuality of the interdependence'might pe 
questionable, there appeared to be a genuine mutual ,exchange 
between the MNCCA board and the' "plannir..g coromittee. It The board 
endorsed SCPL, while the .l pl annlng commi ttee" provided a vehicle 
whereby MNqCA would not over burden its own oommitments and, at 
the same time, permitted it to promote community ohild care ser­
vices. 
0.1.c. Unit goals - SCPL and MNCCA (Mr. H.) both clearly demon­
strated exolusive interests in attemptIng to expand their organ­
izational domains, through seeking to obtai%?- program control,tor 
each at their respective organizations. This resulted in a low, 
level at· cooperation. 'Two members with a lower degree of com­
m1tment, Hr. A. and Mr. B., attempted a cooperatIve compromise 
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ot establishing a separate adm1-nistrati9n,' but were un1nfluen­
01&1 and unsuccessful. 
C.l.d. Resource competi tion - Again, SCLP and Y1NCCA (Mr. ~.) con­
st1tuted the main contestants in competing for the potentially 
available resources, and this provided the principal basis ot 
the conflict w1th1n the coa11t1on. 
0.1.e. Member profit - SCPL's main access to the program tunding 
was 1n1tlally through the coalition" and later wi th the KNCeA· 
board, and SCPL's coa11tional involvement was considerable. How­
ever, Y.iNCCA's (Mr. H.'s) best 'access to the'resources was from 
outSide of the group and, ,consequently, 1ts actual involvement, 
1n the coa11tion's operations was minimal and often token. 
0.2. Costs: 
0.2.a. Differential resource issues - as indicated above, C.1.b.• , 
there appeared to be two ~r1ncipal areas of resource utilization 
1n this casestudy - internal a.nd external. Those dec1sions whIch 
. . 
wer~ 1nternally oriented, demanded the use of internal coalition-
al resources, and the member who had predominant assets in that 
area (SCP~) was most successful in those Issue areas. On the 
other hand, external decisions required external resources and 
the dominant member 1n that dimension, MNCCA (Mr. H.), was main­
17 Buccessful in those decisions (until Mr. H. lost his sanction 
to ut111ze those resources). 
C.2.b. Costs incurred - the main "costs" incurred by MNCCA (Mr. H.) 
\ I 
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were 1ts "responslbility costs" and nintergame costs" tor ac­

tions taken outslde ot the coall t1en 1tselt, whlch qulckly lost, 

internal support tor its posltlon. SCPL's maln "costs" were "in"", 

formatlon" a.nd "lnter-game tt 1n 1ts dependence upon MNCCA(Mr. H.) 

tor access to the fundlng source. 

0.2.0. P'r1nclples - the t'unanlmlty pr1nc1ple" was operat1ve 1n 

th1s coal1tion In that there ultImately was requ1red group con­

sensus about the proposal to be submitted. FuxJthermore, the tlin~ 

d1spens1ble member principle" was apparent with respect to MNCOA 

and the pos1tion of its Board. 

0.3. Sltuatlons: 
0.3.&. Resource independence of powerful - while the Informatlon: 
. ·ls insuffic1ent frcm the casestudy, 1t could be speculated that 
the weaker coalition members sought to somehow influence the co­
alIt1on's opera.t1ons through the use of theIr main resource,. 
Yotes, and d1d th1s by jo1ning forces w1th the weaker of the two 
most powerful coalition'members, SCPL, who was substant1ally depen­
dent upon theIr resources, and whom they could more readily In­
:fluence. At,the, same t1me,SCPL externally weaker than MNOCA (¥r. H.) 
utIlIzed 1ts maln resources - control of coalltion votes, :friend­
Ship, and territorial domain - to match the resources of KBCCA ~ 
(Mr. H.). 
0.3. b. Resource control by powerful - where MNCCA (Hr. If.) oon­

trolled access to informat1on and the funding body, SCPL attemp­

ted to ,go d1rectly to the MNCCA board to usurp y~. H.'s basls of 

! 
resource sanction. When the group chose SOPL'to be the formal 
grant agent, it was suggested that SCPL's director be in contac~ 
with' Wash1ngton, as well as, Mr. H. In the decis10n to choose 
a committee to work on the f1nal draft, Mr. H. seems to have u­
t1lized the non-planning oomm1ttee members to vote to include him 
(interred trom casestudy data). Also, after the meeting in which 
Hr. J. was seleoted chairman, Mr. H. took it upon himself to call 
another meeting and sent the notice to the "planning committee" 
and to two MNCCA off1cials - possibly an attempt to call upon,. 
more resources. 
D. Analytical·Questions: 
. 
D.1. Power resources: 
MNCCA (Mr. H~' and Mrs. S ~ ) SCPL Others~ 
Information: Friendsh1p Votes 
Crucial external contacts Territorial doma1n Program domain: 
Program domain' Vote 
Vote Control of votes 
D.2. Main ooalition decis10n issues and relevant resources: 
MAIN ISSUES RELEVANT RESOURCES 
1. Target: area 
2. Plapn1ng Committee 
3. Cha1rman 
4~ Separate admin1stration 
5. Formal grant agent 
Votes, in1'ormatio.n· 
Votes, members, information, 
program domain,territor1al 
domain 
Votes, fr1.endship, control of 
votes 
Votes, territor1al doma1n" 
program domain, friendship· 
Votes, fr1endship, control 
ot votes. 
.. 
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6. 	F1nal draft comm1ttee Votes, information, crucial 
external contacts, control of 
votes, fr1endsh1p 
7. D1stribut1on of final draft 	 Votes, program domain 
D.3. 	Influencer(s) and Influencee{s): 
DECISION ISSUE: INFLUENCER{S) INFLUENCEE(S) 
t. 	Target area 
2. 	Planning Committee 
3. 	Cha1rman 
4. 	Separate Adm1nistrat1on 
5. 	Formal Grant ~ent 
6. 	FInal Draft Committee 
7. 	D1stribution or F1nal 
Dratt 
MNCCA(Mr.H. ) 
SCPL" 
Others(ttp.1an­
n1~ commit­
tee ) 
MN:DCA(*r.H.) 
SCPL 
Others 
MNCCA(Mr.H. ) 
SCPL' 
Others 
(Mr.A and 
Mr. B.' 
SCDL 
KNCCA(Mr.H. ) 
sept&..
Others 
KNCCA(Mr.H. ) 
Whole group
Whole group:. 
Whole group 
Whole group
Whole group 
Whole group" 
SCPL and o.thers 
HNCCA (Mr •H. )
and others . 
SCPL and MNCCA 
(Mr. H.) 
MNCCA(Mr.H.), 
SCPL, Others 
-2 
Others J XNc.cA 
(:tIrs.a) 
Whole group
Whole group. 
Whole group 
Whole group 
D.'4. Issues acd relevant member resources: 

DECISION ISSUE:-	 RELEVANT MEMBER. RESOURCES 

1. farget area 	 MNCCA(Mr.H. ) Vote, . into%!:"­
mat10n 
SCPlL Vt>te 
Others Votes 
Whole group(o- . 
ther than above) Votes 
2. 	Planning Comm1ttee MNCCA(Mr.H. ) '. Vote, 1nfor­
mat1on, PrCSram. 
doma1n 
3. Chairman 
4. Separate Administration 
5. Formal Gra.nt Agent 
6. ,Final Dratt Committee 
7. Distr1bution of F1nal Draft 
SCPL 
Others 
MNCCA(l-1r .H. )
SCPL_ 
others 
MNCCA(Mr.H.) 
SCPt;, 
O"thers-2 
(Kr.A. and 
Y...r.B~. ) 
SOPL. 
Others 
MNCCA(Mrs.S.); 
MNCOA(Mr.H. ) 
SCPlL 
Others 
Whole group 
KNCCA(Mr.H~) 
Whole group 
Vote, terr1­
tor1al domalln 
Votes. program
doma.1n 
Vote 
Vote, friend­
ship, control 
ot votes 
Votes 
Vo..te, . program 
doma1n~ 
Vote , terri,. 
torial domain,.
tr1endsh1p
Votes, pro­
gram domain: 
Votes"prograDl
domain: 
Vote,; fr1end-, 
sh1p" Con1iro l .. 
ot votes 
Votes 
Vote, Program 
Domain,: crucial 
contacts 
Vote, infor­
m&tlolt'1, cru­
c1al external 
contacts 
Vote, control 
ot votes,. fr1end~ 
ship 
Votes 
Votes 
Vote, program 
domain; 
Votes, "pro­
gram domain: 
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D·5· Outcome: 
DECISION· ISSUES DECISION CHOICE 
1 • Target Area South City 
2. Planning Committee Volunteers 
3 • Chairman Mr. J. 
.4. Separate Adminlstratlon .Rejected 
5 •. Formal Grant Agent 
6. Final Draft Committee 
5CPL, 
MNOCA(Y.r.H. ) and SCPL_ 
7. D1stribut1on of Final 
Dratt Whole Group. 
D.6. Member Pos1tion on Issues and Actual Outcome: + =1n·'tu'or" 
- = against, ? =not known. 
DECISICN CHOICE MEMBER POSITION~ 
1. South City 
.' 
2. Volunteers 
3. Kr. J ..• 
4. Rejected 
kNCCA(Mr.H.) + 
SCPL., + 
Others + 
Whole group(o- + 
ther than above) 

. MNCCA(Mr.H.) + 

. SCPL. + 

Others + 

Whole group 
MNCCA(Mr.H. ) 
SCPL. + 
Others + 
MNCCA(Mr.H.) + 
SCPL~ + 
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DECISION CHOICE MEMBER POSt TION 
Mr. A and 
Mr. B 
Others 	 + 
,­
• 5. SCPL. 	 MNCCA(YJ.rs. s. ) + 
SCPL + 
Others + 
6. 	MNCCA(Ya-.H. ) and 5CPL )iNCCA(Mr.H. ) + 

SCPL ? 

Others ? 

Whole group + 

7. 	D1str1bution of' F1nal Draft,_, MNCCA(Mr.H. ) + 

All C.thers + 

. D.7. Kember Goals Compared ~1th Final Outcome: 
KE}IBER PINAL... OUNCK& 
KNCC.t.\.(~lr.H. ) 	 KNCCA Grant Agent SCPL... Grant.:. Agent... 
SCPL... SCPL.. Grant Agent 

O:thers Not Known 

Whole Group Bot Known 

II. Dec1sion-Mak1ng Process Analysis: in order to assess the 
casestudy in relat10n to typological and pha.se issues' as·sertlon~" 
each ma1n dec1sion (using above sequential numbers) will be placed 
1na table and discussed later. 
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PROBLEM SCLUTION, 
ROUTINE, INCREMENTAL­ IBB.OVA'HYE 
BW-i 
U4.TION Information adequate inadequate adequate inadequate adequate inadequate 
TINE. 
RDiEN-
OVA,.. 
e 
adequate 7 3.6.'5 
Inadequate 
adequate 2' ,, , .. , . 
1nadequate 
adequate 4 t 
1nadequate I 
! 
EXPLANi\.TICN: 
:f;
1. The colce of a target area was an entlrely new problem for 
"­
this group and the select10n of South Clty was 1nnovative. Since 
that section of the city had never had such a program. 
2. The establishment of a planning commlttee is a problem wh1ch 
. ,
developed (1ncremental) from the planning demands of ~ proposal. 
The solutlon w~s adaptive (incremental) based upon those becoming 
1nvolved hav1ng a terrltorlal ~nd/or program 1nterest. 
-3. ChoosIng a. cha1rman Is a r.outine 'occ'urrenc"e' '." ~~, of th1s 
group's process. The cholce (Mr. J.) reflects an adaptatIon (1n­
cremental) to the Interests of the core plannIng commIttee mem­
bers. 
4. The proposal for seek1r-g a separate adminlstration ra1sed 
an lr.novat1ve problem, ~ whlch was dealt with 1n a routlne manne%": 
(rejection) with respect to the clearly ident1fled member inter­
ests and resources. 
5. The problem of choosing a formal grant agent 1s a 'pr'ec.ed~ 
'P~~~, .(~~ut1n1~edl ;,; Q.u.t.c~.$:, -of the plannlr..g process and the 
,solutIon 1s 'an aq.aptatlcn tlncremental) of the formation of a 
8ubcoalitlonal voting and interest block - as well as an adaptIv:e 
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response to Mr. H.'s absence and the position ot the HNo:cA board.•. 
There does seem to be a degree of 1nformational 1nadequacy wlth 
respect to tal ling to know that the MNCCA board had not offici­
ally flnalized thelr pos1tlon. This inadequacy of information: 
with respect to the problem sltuation and solution does appear, 
to be marginal in this 1nstance. 
6. The problem of appointing persons to develop a final pro­
posal draft .tends to be a routine situation. The solution of 
, sele~ting MNCCA (Mr. H.) and SCPL seems to be an outgrowth (ln~ 
, oremental) of their mutually necessary resources for this ta.sk 
(1nformation and contact, grant agent). 
7. The problem of d1str1but1ng a document is a routine matter, 
and deciding to include all parties concerned is a routine solu­
t10n w1th there being an adequate recognition of both dlmens1ons. 
A. Typological Issues: 
A.1. Problem fami11arity - these categor1es seem to be relevant 

tor class1fy1ng the above dec1s1ons and problems wlth the one 

condit1on that there needs to be a distinct10n w1th respect to 

whether degree ot familiarity 1s to refer to each 1ndividual 

member unit or to the group as an ent1ty. 

A.2. Patterns - thls casestudy appears to haye a predominance 

ot instances where'incremental problems were responded to with 

incremental declsions, but.~3:QUt .ot:7 where s1tuation and solu­

tion-types were the same. 
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A.3. Informat1onaladequacy - seems to be a relatively insign1tl­
, 
cant~ (and d1ff1cult to assess) va.r1able 1n~th1s casestudy. 
L Phase Issues: 
B.l. Innovat1on - mos~ ot the problem s1tuations were incremental,~ 
and" the solut1ons were 1ncremental• 
.B~2. Divers1ty - once the f1rst ma.jor dec1sion,was made (1nnoVA­
tive - lnno.vat1ve)" the other o.r1entat1ons appeared to be exclu­
s1vely 1nvolved. 
&.3. Rat'1onal phases - the casestudy 1nformat1on 1s not- adequate. 
to. determ1ne to what;,. extent.. rat1cnal dec1s1on-mak1ng steps were­
involved 1n~ each dec1s1on, wh1le certain dec1s1ons do reflect-_ 
some ot the sta.ges. The over-r1d1ng var1able 1nfluenc1~~ deo1sion. 
mak1ng appea.rs to be self-1nterest and not.. ra.tional1ty. In: this:­
sense, rat1ona11ty could ha.ve proba.bly determ1ned calculated in­
div1dual member dec1s1ons of selr-1nterest, but there was no~ & 
rat1onal, .. comppehens1ve' .rev1ew of alternat1ves 1n an unb1ased m&nl--­
nero by all. members jo1ntly. 
&3.a. Relat1ve appl1cab1l1ty - in:: cons1derat1on ot the above men­
t10ned lack of casestudy 1nformat1on, 1t_1s d1fficult to assess the 
1m~c~or coalit1onal cooperat1on or conflict upon the uti11za~lDn 
o-r rat10nal dec1s1on-making steps" except. that.. contllct:. d1d ex1st-" 
while ratlonallty was not '- very ev1dent:. 
&.4. Unit. bias -a constant var~able 1n~dec1s1on-mak1ng in.all 1nt­
stances seems to be the member un1 t!s bias of selt-·lnterest. a.nd do­
ma1n protection and/or expans1on. th1s seems to be espec1a1lr the 
. case with the deciSions ot the. n core" plann1ng committee that.. 1n.­
, . 
v.olved the members with the greatest vested 1nterests. f.Q this ex­
ten~;their decisions tended to be less rational in the obJectiv.e 
sense, buti.. quite rat10nal in l1ght ot the1r own organ1zat1on's> 
interests. 
&5:. C:oalit1onal cohesiveness - 1ssue a.nd 1nterest, agreemen~ and: 
disagreement seem to be marginally oompat1ble w1th coa11t1on' for. 
mation 1n":thls oase. ,Those who essent1ally agreed were act'ively 
involved 1n the coa11tion (SCP~ and Others). Ye~ their ma1n~&n­
tagon1st:" MNCCA (Mr. H.), tended to be only per1pherally 1nvo~-v;ed 
with the coalit10n. This appears·to be based upon where each of 
the two str.ongest~members had the dominant resources: scpn.-. 1nter­
nally" ,MNCCA (Hr. H~) -' externally.' 
C~QUB: The analyt10al model seems to have had a general applioa­
bility to th1s casestudy. Generally speaking" the tlP.ower Analya1s" 
se~ent·.was more usetul,~ wh11e the "Process AnalYSis" port1on 'tended 
to be dlftloult,_ to apply,. pr1marily because off 1 ts use of': tBrms wl:ilch 
require further operatlonalizat1on and/or revision'. 
Mo~speclfioally,-there developed trom this case a need to dls~ 
tinguish between Internal and externa~ coalit1onal resources, and whQ 
ls', most dominant., in eaoh and how th1s" 1n turn,) atfects the coall~ 
t10nal process. It: also raises the questIon it th1s alters whether' 
a coa11t1onal group is ot a consensus,~barga1n1ng" or dissensus o~­
entation. alsO,jthe role ot conf11ct as de11berately ut~lized bf 
coalition~. members 1s not... tully acoounted for 1n the model. 
Also, the disparity between" Mr•. H. fS posit1ons a.nd tr.at of! li1s 
~p_arent organizat1on,:' makes 'quest10nable whether a coalitiona~ ··p!iLn~ 
entL orga.nizaticn" can be tully identif1ed with 1ts lndiv~idual 00&11-,· 
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tionaL r,presentatlve. It not~, this inconsistency needs to be: 
observed and analyzed. 
!he eventual decision-making outcome (SCPlL'S be1ng the gran~ 

agent .. w1th MNCCA endorsement) ln this casestudy raises the ques­

tion whether Polsby's notion of "plurality" is not more meening~ 

ful' in this case than an' elitIst.. model. }!NCCA dld 1n~ tacti~ agree: 

not: to fully employ i ts organ1zatl~nal resources ot 1nfluence ~o 

broa.den 1ts doma1n, but;, rather,~ decided to advocate- and promote a 

shar1ng of resources wlth a weaker organizatlon (~Cp.L.). Th1s does 

,not mea.n,~ however,:. tliat MNCCA dId notip.rofitwfrom~ thls sharing ot 

resources. I.t .. is conceivable that It .. was necessary that they en­

courage such a project 1n order to mainta1n their position-: as the 

, local promoter a.f' child care' in the eyes of the fund1ng a.gent. A~ 
the same time,. they could not afford to deploy any of their own: ~e­
sources to d1rectly seek the resources to be funding agen~ themselves • 
. Wlth respect to the "process Analysis tl model, the vagueness ot 
term definitions and the tentative class1fication' of decisions-
raises doub.ts as to whether coalitioJ?al problem Situations and 
solutions are predominantly innovatlve (II.B.1.). The 1ssues of' 
internal and external resources and involvement (based upon~case­
study information) make questionable whether coa11tlon~ formation 
is independent of issue and interest agpeement~o~ dlsagreemen~ 
(ILB..5). · 
CHAPTER 3 
Summary of, Casestudy 
"Black Coalit10~' 
Th1s coa11tion ot black organizations was the outcome of 
rac1al and subsequent pollee inc1dents at a metropolitan high 
sChool. The local War on Poverty citizen organization 1n the 0-, 
black community Equal Oppo,rtunity Now (EON) alterred an already 
scheduled meeting to take up the school issue and invited par­
ents of the school children and moderate and mi11tant black or. 
ganizat1ons. This was the start of the coalition. 
Eventually a cha1rman (black poverty organization repre­
sentative) was selected by the coalition. They adopted the sug­
gestion by the principal black militant group (Brothers) to boy­
cott the schools and decided to establish an alternate school to 
be run by the same m11itant group and a black studies program 
from a local university. They also chose to hold a community 
rally to 1nform and unite the black community. at the rally, 
the earlier coalition decisions were approved by the 600 com­
munity people present. 
The bas1c method of internal procedure was agreed to be as 
a un1t, but w1th a division of labor. After awhile the chairman 
had to resign, because be was an employee cf the school d1stric~ 
and was under pressure. ThIs also '.~as: the case w1 th two other 
active coalition members, who were also employees of the local 
federally funded community action agency. The coalition's new 
r' 
,chairman, Rev~. C., was a representative of a ministerial organ1­
zation Unl~ed~Christian Front (U.C.F.) and was selected because 
.~ ., ~ ....
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of.h1S moderate image among blacks in a hope to unity the com­
munity. Two militant organizations claimed mutual leadership 
w1th the new chairman evidencing a widening internal rivalry. 
The community school became 1mmersed 1n problems. It 
lacked transportation, lunch, and teacher resources. The two 
ma1n mi11tant groups then attempted to conduct the teaching ­
a11enating many parents. 
The boycott was used by the coalition to make demands u­
pon the school board. The board responded by setting up a coun­
ter group. Dissension set into the coalition with disagreements 
over what step to take next. The moderate chairman, under pres­
sure from the main mi11tant organization called for a citYWide boy­
cott. The strategy was to penalize the school its state aid mon­
ey. The boycott and coalition were rapidly dying. Some members 
met secretly with the school super1ntendent w1thout informing the 
x-est of the coali t1on. The community school closed and several 
coalition members 4ropped out. Without inform1ng the militant, 
member, the boycott was called off by the chairman afterit was 
about 21 weeks old. 
The main accomplishments of the boycott were an end to ra­
clal trouble at the high school, a cbanged curriculum, increased 
.respect by wh1te students, and the first effective unification 
ot the black community. 
CASESTUDY ANALYSIS 
"The Black Coalition" 
I. Decision-Making Power Analysis 
· 
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A,. Theoretical Issues: 
The internal and external positions and structures of the 
members ot the Black Coalition had considerable- impact in this 
casestudy and an an&11811 of them would be useful. 'The deci­
sional approach als'o has considerable, analytical meri t. especi­
ally wIth respect ,to exchange and process 1ssues. 
B. Struc,tural Issues: 
B. t., External 
B.t.a. Domain.- all of the organizations involved tn the coa.11­
tion were based in a metropol1-tan black community and were con­
cerned with protecting the interests of their people 1n the high 
school.rac1al dispute and with protecting the1r organ1zation's _ 
legitimacy in the black community. This was domaIn protectIon, 
but it 'was also domain expansion when it came to their list of 
demands wh1ch sough~ to expand, as well as protect,; black in­
fluence 1n the metropolItan school system. 
B.t.a.t) Resource interdependence - there was .. conslder able.1n:terUEJ;8'1­
dence among coalition members in face of the school system be­
cause of 'ttheir position of relative weakness in resources a.s com­
pared to theIr adversa.ry. Th1s external imperative seems to have 
necessItated a united front. 
B.t.a.2) Kember autonomy - once the coalition began to operate 
1t revealed l1ttle internal control of the needed resources, 
whlch were most often based with external authorities e.g- com­
/ 
munity action agency's withdrawal of school buses because of a 
fear of suspension of its funds. Also the internal organization: 
of the coalition was not sufficiently sophisticated to assure 
the group's autonomy. Instead, it was victimized by internal 
power struggles, w~~ch weakened the coalition in face of the re­
latively monolithic organizational authority 'structure. 
B.t.b. Extra-coalitional relations ,- probably the three most 
influencial coalition members were the UCF,.the Brothers,~ and 
81mba. A considerable degree of their influence was based upon 
the1r extra-coalit1onal relations w1th d1fferent segments of the 
black community. UCF's constItuency and image was moderate; the 
Brothers! and Simba's were mi11tantly based. These were also 
the centers of the coalition's real leadership: Rev. C. (UCF) 
. ­
was coalition chairman; the Brothers and Simba conducted the com­
munity school. 
B.1.c. Unit interests - the impact of coalItion members attempt­
ing to protect and promote their extracoalitional and unit in­
terest's was an extremely crucial factor in this coalition. Some 
of the examples of how this greatly limited resources and cru­
clal membership will be given. Mrs. S. had to assume a "behind 
the scenes" involvement, because she was employed by a federally 
funded program. The original chairman, Kr.ll. J had to reSign that 
position, because he had been accused by the school system (his 
employer) ot being in vlolat1on of his contrac~. Hr. D. also 
w1thdrew from active support (providing SChool buses), because 
he teared a loss of federal funding for the community action 
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agency, of whIch he was executIve director.' Many blaok teaohers 
-
who were to teach in the community school dId not, out of fear ot 
losirig theI'r' jobs •. 
B.2. Internal: 
B.2.a. Formal roles - the few formal roles wIthIn the Blaok Coal­
ition carried little real power.in themselves. The group's first 
cha1rman, Mr. L. of EON, exercIsed little real power in the coali­
tion. Yet,~the second chaIrman, Rev. C. of the UCF, was quite in­
fluent1al. The organization and oper~t1on of the community sohool 
seemS to have been deleg~ted to the local university Black Studies 
~rogram"S1mba, and Brothers. While each played a role, the Bro­
thers were most 1nfluencial In'its operatIon. Consequently, the 
formal role was not as sign~fIcant as the power and Influence of 
the unit fIlling 1t. 
B.2.b. Representativeness - most of the unIts appear to have re-­
presented accurately the interest of their "parent organizatl'on," 
with .o·me exceptIons. Mrs. S. and Mr. D., Communi.ty actIon agenc1.,. 
represented .only a segment of their organIzation and its inter­
ests. ~hiS was largely responsIble for the~r wIthdrawal from 
oovert support. Rev. C., in decidIng to expand the boycott,) ex­
tended himself beyond the interests and support of his-moderate 
organlzatioI.J,. 
B.2.c. Consensus - from an aggregation' ot many organizations, 
thre~ emerged as being recogn1zed as the most powertul and were 
delegated more formal and intormal authority than the rest. or 
these three - UCF, Simba, Brothers - the UCF and Brothers were 
61, 

the most dominant. 
B.2.c.1) D1fferent1al power - when it came'to be1ng able to ap­
peal to broad community support, lea.dersh1p by UCF personnel was 
more lntluenc1al. However, when deal1ng w1th more cont11ctual 
1ssues - rallies, the" r1val school - the Brothers and 51mba 
were more influential. 
B.2.c.2) Test1ng - early 1n the coalit1on, EON!s role as leader.' 
wa.s eroded by 1 ts lack of genu1ne influenc,e and power resources. 
While the UCF gained control of the cha1~an's posit1on. the Bro­
thers cla1med they also le~d the coa11t1on. Th1S challenging of 
each other's power by the two pr1nc1pal units cont1nued through­
out the coa11tion's h1story and was not confined to the in1t1al 
period. 
B.2.d. and e. Single or mult1ple leadersh1p- - the concentrat1on'~ 
of most of the power 1n essent1ally two members resulted 1n a 
part1albal&nc1ng of pO,wer 1n the coa11 t1en between the moderate 
and m1l1tant overall factions. 
c. Exchange Issues: 
0.1. Cond1t1ons: 
0.1.a. Resource genera11ty - the Brothers' and Simba's main re­
source was an emotional and 1deological appeal. This resource 
was effective in stirr1ng up support at rall1es, but lt was In­
effective' 1n organ1z1ng the commun1ty sChool. The1r main re­
source was not general enough. The UCF had a moderate 1mage 
6.8 
which gave it broader community appeal (its ma1n resource), bu~ 
it"failed to be able to ,move' the commun1ty to radical and unified 
m1l1tant, ~ ~trike action in boycott1ng the s'chools a.nd dealing 
with the~ with conflict tactiCs. Their main resource,~conse­
quently, was also too narrow. 
C.l.b. Resource dependency - the member units were very muoh de­
pendent upon each other' s resou~ces to achieve an effective boy­
cott. Th1s appeared to only partially and temporarily prompt the 
leaders of the two factions ~ UCF and the Brothers - to involve 
themselves in coordination and bargaining. The UCF took broad 
coalitiona leadership, and the Bro'there assumed author1 ty over the 
,community SChool. 	 They both proved ineffective in~their respec­
tive areas. Their ideologies were also allen to one another 
and made coordination basically impossible. 
G.1.b.l) Mutual exchange - there was little coordlnation, much 
interdependence, and relatively inconsequential mutual exohange ­
the early dividing of authority between, the UCF and the Brothers 
belng the only real occurrence. 
0.1.0. Unit goals - there was considerablecommltment to indiv­
Idual un1t goals and ideologies and a low level of cooperation•. 
e.l.d. Resource competltion - there was considerable conflict 
between the UC~ an~ the Brothers and 51mba to be recognized as 
the prino1pal leader and spokesman t~r the: black community and for 
the poss1ble expanded role of centrol of the sohool system. 
O.l.e. Member profit - there was a definite relationship between' 
ga1ning control of the coalition's existing and potential re­
~, t
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sources and power through membership in a unified black movement, 
and the goals of the t·wo key 'uni ts and fa.ctions to. be the bilack 
oommunity's spokesman, and the high level of involvement in~the 
coalitlon's operations by the UCF and the Brothers. 
0.2. Oosts: 
0.2.&. DIfferential resource issues - the decisions of the Black 
Ooalition demanded different types of resources. In illustra­
tion, the issue of choosing a chairman required an internally 
noncontroversial figure acceptable to all members,if possible. 
fhe issue of conducting a rally required the resource capacity 
,to emotionally stir the community to support the decision to 
boycott against a. common adversary. 
0.2.0. C~sts incurred - the Brothers and Simba suffered the "re­
sponsIbility costs" for the outcome (failure) of the community 
school, as did the UCF for their effort '(failure) to forge and 
lead a viable black coalition. Some coalition members became 
Involved in the school system's own committee and this resulted 
in heavy "lntergame costs" for the coalition. Dlvldl!"..g up of 
the coalition's leadership functions - the administering of the 
community-school and the chairing of the coalition - resulted ~ 
ineffiCient "diviSion of pay-offs costs.1t Perhaps the main coal­
Ition decision costs were those incurred from 'its internal "dla-
Bonanae." 
C.2.c. Pr1nciples - because of the Black Coalition's posltlon of 
weakness, relative to the school system, they needed to attain: 
a unanimously united front. The aotual result was that this 

"dec1s1on cost pr1nciple" - essent1al' to the coal1tion's po­
", 
tent1al success - was not atta1ned. 
C.3. S1tuatlons: 
0.3.a. Resource independence ot powerful - 1n terms of external. 
issues, the school system.d1d no~ need the" Black Coalit1on's re­
sources ot emotional and ideolog1cal appeal 'and moderate black 
co~unity support. However, through the boycott, the Black ao­
"alition sought to undermine the f1scal support rece1ved by the 
school system for the number of students and the days they attend. 
By this, <the coalit1on was utilizing alternate resources as com­
modit1es tor exchange. 
C.3.b. Resource control by powerful - the SChool System control­
led the schools with theIr author1ty to teach and to graduate or 
not graduate students. The coal1tion sought to develop an alter­
nate resource through its "commun1ty school." 
D. Analytical Questions: 
D.l. Power Resources: 
Un1ted Christian Front Brothers (and other mIl1tant 

(and other moderate units)

units) 

Membership Membersh1p' 

Votes Votes 

Following of moder- Following of m1litant segmen~ 

ate segment of black ot blaok: community
community
Black 	parental support Contacts and rapport with high
school and college blaok 
students 
Consensus appeal Emotional appeal
School transporta.tion Contact with (potential)
teachers. 
Abllity to identify enemy 
D.2. Main Coalition Decision Issues and Relevant Resources: 
RELEV~NT~RESOURCES 
.­
1. 	Choice ot a chairman 
2. 	Whether to boycott. 
3. 	Children's education 
4. 	Inform and unite 
support of black 
community 
5. 	Function ot Rally 
6. 	Internal Unit Operation 
7. 	Need for new chairman 
8. 	Extent of boycott ­
9. 	Discontinuance (dur­
'ation) of boycott 
Votes, broad (consensus) coalltional 
support.
Votes,.membersh1p, black parental
and student 'support" consensus (in­
ternal) appeal and emotional appeal.
Votes, membership, following of 

moderate segment of black commun-· 

1ty, black parental support,: con.. 

tact with potent1al alternate ed­

ucational resources. 

follow1ng of moderate and mi11tant 

segments of black commun1ty,

black parent and student support:,

membersh1p, votes, consensus ap­

peal, emotional appeal, and al­

ternate educational resources. 

Same as issue 4 with much more em­

phasis upon emot1onal appeal and 

abi11ty to ident1fy enemy_

Consensus and compatib1lity of mem­
ber un1ts (consensus appeal).
·Consensus (internal) appeal, votes~ 
, support ot moderate and militant 

member units. 

Same. as 1ssue 2 above. 

Same as issue 2 and 8 above. 
D.3. Influencer(s) 'and Influencee(s): 

DECISION 'ISSUE INFLUENCER(S) INFLUENCEE{S) 
1. Cholce of chairman 
2. Whether to boycot,t, 
_. -
3~ Ch1ldren's educat10n 
Not given in casestudy
Brothers Rest of Coalition 
No more given in casestudy (unan1mlty
inferred) _ 
Black parents Rest of Coalltion 
72 
DECISION ISSUE INFLUE,"'NCER(S ) INFLUENCEE(S) 
4. Inform and unite 
.rest of blac~ 
community 
5. Functlon ot 
Not given in casestudy (unan1mity
inferred) • 
Rally
6. Interna.l unit 
Black Coa11 tien· Black communit,. 
operation 
7. Need for new chairman 
Not given in casestudy (unanim1ty
inferred) • 
UCF Coa11t1on 
(Not.g1ven in casestudy but, Bro­
thers oPPosition imp11ed).
Brothers Coalition 
8. Extent of boycott Brothers 
Students 
Black Coalit1on 
Black Coalition 
9". Discont1nuance (duration): or' 
boycott UCF. . Coa11 tion' 
D.4. Dec1sicnIssues and Relevant Member Resources: 
DECISION. ISSUES RELEVANT ~WER RESOURCES 
i. 1. 	Choice of chairman UCF 
Brothers 
2. Whether to boycott 	 UCF· 
Brothers 
3. Children's education 	 UCF 
Brothers 
Votes, consensus 
appeal
Votes 
Votes,; member­
ship, black~ 
parental sup­
port., consen­
sus (internal)
appeal.
Votes, ' members ,; 

black student. 

support, emo­

tional appeal.

Votes, membership, 
. following of 
moderate seg­
'ment of black 
commun1ty,~ blaok 
parental support, 
school trans­
portation.
Votes, membership, 
contact with' 
potentia.l tea­
chers. 
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DECISION ISSUES 	 INFLUENCER(S} INFLUENCEE(S) 
4. Inform and unite 
rest of black 
community 
5. 	Function of Rally 
6. 	Internal unit,. 

opera.t1on 

7. 	Need for new chairman 
8. 	Extent of boycott
9. 	Discontinuance (dur­
ation) of boycott. 
D.5. 	Outcome: 
DECISICN ISSUE 
UCF Following ot mod­
erate segment 
ot black com­
munIty, black 
parental sup­
port, member­
ship, votes" 
consensus ap­
peal, 	school 
transportation.
Brothers Following of mil­
1tant black 
community,
black student 
s\1pport, mem_ 
bership I . votes, 
emotional ap­
peal, potential
teachers. 
Same as issue 4 above but with much 
more signif1cance to Panthers' re­
sources of emotional appeal and 
ability to ident1fy enemy. 
UCF Consensus appeal
Brothers Militancy (liabi­
l1ty)
UCF Consensus (in­
ternal appeal, 
support ot mod­
erates, votes. 
'Brothers Support of mil1­
tants, irot~s. 
Same as issue 2 above 
Same 	 as issue 2 above 
DECISleR· CHOICE 
1•. Choice of cha1rman· Mr. L. 
"'2. Whether to boy­
cott:. Coa11tion affirmation to boycott
3. 	Children's edu­
cation 	 Community SChool. 
DECISION ISSUE 	 DECISION CHOICE 

-4. 	 Inform ~nd un1te 

rest of black com­

mun1ty Rally

5. 	Function of 
rally 	 Community endorsement of dec1sions 
1-3. 
6. 	Internal unit 

operat1on Operate .as a. un1 t . 

7. 	Need for new·chairman Rev. C. 
8. 	Extent of boycott City wide boycott.
9. 	Discontlnuance (dur-~, j 
ation)L6f boycott Boycott termination' 
D.§., Kember Position on Issues and Actual Outcome: + =1n-tavor--;, 
~ =agaInst, ? = not known. 
DECISICNCHCICE 	 MEMBER POSITICN 
1 • MR;L. 	 ? (unanIm1ty 1nferred +)
2. Coalition at­
flrmation_' to 
.boycott 	 ? (unanimity 1nferred 
3. Community school 	 -1 ~unanlmltY inferred 
4. Rally 	 1 una.n1mity inferred :}
5. 	CommunIty endorsement 

of dec1sions 1-3. Bla.ck Coalit1on + 

~. 	Internal unit 

operation ? (unanimity inferred +)

7. Rev.C. 	 UOF + 
8. Clty wIde'boy­
cott 	 VOF -. 
... 	 Brothers + 
9. 	Boycott termination UCF + 
Brothers - (but not pre­
sent. for dec1­
slon~) 
D.7. Member Goals Compared W1th Final Outcome: 
GoALS 	 PINAL, OU~CME 
. UCF' Protect black End of school. 
students and trouble,: curr1.­
expand. own or­ culum cha.nges " 
gan1zation's in-. some new respect
tluence in.. school_ by wh1te students 
system and com­ of blacks, and 
munity' • 	 f1rst effect1ve 
un1ty of blacks. 
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e_MiXBEll'. 	 GOALS FINAL CUT-COME 
aQ,thers 	 Protect '_ black 

students and 

expand own organ1­
zat1on's influence 

'1n school system 
and commun1ty. 
II. Dec1sion-Making Process Analysis: 1n order to asses the cas.­
study 1n relat10n to typological- and phase issues I, assertions:; each: 
ma1n decis10n (us1ng above sequential numbers) w1ll be placed 1n: 
a 	 table and discussed later. 
PBOBLEM SOLUTION,; 
blem 
uation 
t1ne 
remental 
:;,vative 
; 
. 

Explanation: 
1. The need for a chairman seemed to be a~-.procedural:r~sponse~ (»ou­
,t1ne) 	to the group's emergence as a coa11tion seeking to organ1ze. 
The choice of Mr. L. appears to be a consequence of the coa11tion's 
need for broad support from the black community. Their assess­
ment ot the Situation as requiring a chairman reflects adequate 
1nformation, but their selection of Mr. L·. seems to have been in­
adequately based in v1ew of Mr. M.ls subsequent res1gnation-be­
cause 01' his Job's l1ab1l1ty. 
2. Cons1der1ng and affirming the strategy and program of boycot­
t1ng the high school was a definite departure trom the usual gr1e­
Routine Incremental Innova.tive 
Informa.tion 
~dequate 
adequate inadequate ade~uate inadeQua.te 
1 
adequate ina.dequate 
~nadequate 
ad.equate 
inadequa.te 
5.7.9 : "fi 8 
adeqU8-te 4 
lnadequate ;c ,rj' 
.. 
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vance processes. Their fallure to recognize the community's In~ 
ternal dlssension and lack of unity in carrying-out an effective 
boyoott was not adequa.tely reoognized in the situation and solu­
tion assessments. 
I 
3. The slt.uation of providing a satisfaotory eduoational alterna­
t1ve and the development of a community ~ohool were innovative. 
As in number 2, the assessment of community resources was highly 
1nadequate. 
4. Using a rally (solution)" to unite and inform the black com­
munity (Situation) was unusual. The recognition of such a prob~ 
18m Situation seemed valid and the oholce of a rally as & means 
appears marginally ade"quate. 
. 	5. The tunotio~ of this rally a.s a means to also galn community 
endorsement ot the coalition's decisions seems to be an outcome 
ot the1r recognition of the need for broad pub11c support and 
pub11c acceptance ot their representativeness. The Situation 
and solution seem to have been adequately appraised. 
6. The s1tuation of needing'an internal structure for operatlr~ 
and the solution of doing this as a Single unit are a conse­
quence (inoremental) of the groupls development as an organ1za­
tion. The need 1s an adequate observation, the solution is 1~ 
adequate 1t the nature of thIs groupls members had been accur­
ately recognized. 
7. With the res1gnation ot Mr. L. a new chairman needed to be 
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chosen to adapt (1ncremental) to this s1tuat1on, and the selec­
t10n of another moderate was a result of the ear11er pollcy and 
a recogn1t1on of the coalition'~ need for unity. The situat10n 
'and solut1on analysis seemS perceptive. 
8. The need for a new strategy developed (1ncremental) from the 
c,oalition's difficulties, but the solution of extending the boy­
cott to c1ty-wide was radical (innovative). ,Seeing'tha~ the si~ 
uation required a new strategy was accurate (adequate), but, 
when. the coalition was beginning to collapse from ineffective­
ness, expanding its demands was an inappropriate assessment (in­
adequate) and response. 
9. The subsequent fa1lure of the new strategy necessltated (in­
cremental) a reconsideration, and the solution ot terminating 
the boycott seemed an appropriate consequence (incremental) to 
confirm formally what had already occurred in tact. ' These both 
reflect accurate analysis and adequate information. 
A. Typolos1cal Issues: 
A. 1. Problem familiari ty - the categories in the 'above table' 
seem to be useful but require a degree of arbitrariness 1n ap­
plication. 
A.2. patterns - sevea of the nine main issue areas had identical 
problem s1tuation and solution types. 
A.3. Informational adequacy - the concepts ot adequate and 1n­
adequate information added clar1ty in interpreting the main~de-
78 
c1sion~ issues and choices. 
R. Phase Issues: 
.... 
R.l. InnoY&t:1on: - only_ three out of nine of the main coalitiona~ 
. .­
pro_b~em situations and solutions' were innovatively oriented._ 
B.. 2. D1versity - of the maln- 1ssues cons1dered" none were regard­
ed as routine. Decisions 2, and 3, and 4 were innovat1ve, and the 
rest. were incremental. There appears to be someth1ng of a trend 
from innovative to the other or1entat1ons. 
&.3. Rational phases - this casestudy manifests little use ot a 
rational dec1sion-making model. This is reflected in poor as­
sessment ot alternatives and consequences of' strategies and pro­
grams. Decisions were made without exploring whether the coali­
tion had the resources neces~a.ry for successful decision execution-. 
bo examples are the commun1ty school and the expansion of the 
boycott. There were other goals (e.g. changes ill! schools" un1~-
1ng black commun1ty), however, which were achieved raising the 
issue of whether these were-perhaps the main goals of' a rationally 
used conflict strategy. 
B.. 3.a. Relative applicability - this group was characterized by 
_internal conflict~and a lack of ratlonal-decislon-maklng. 
B.4. Unit bias.- un1~ b1ases were apparent_throughout this case­
study and were s1gn1f1cant 1n the coa11tion's relat1ve lack of 
- success-. The coa11 tlon process was marked by internal dissena1ol.t" 
e .8. Brothers c la1med the cha1rmanship along with the DOlt even! 

though the UCF's Rev.C.• was the only elected offioer. 
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B.S. Coalitional cohes1veness - the degree of 1ntere8t~asreemena 
and d1sagreement varied,with the issue, but_the basic s1tuation: 
ot 1nternal d1sagreement tended to dissolve the coa11t1on. 
Crit1que: The a.nalyt1ca l modells use of decis10nal analysic 
presented some lim1ta.t10ns 1n-the way 1t could be uti11zed w1th 
the casestu~y available. Th1s restr1cted the dec1s1ons to be 
analyzed "to the ma1n' 1ssues,. and this d1d not lend 1tself to. 
1nterpreting routine coa11t1on problems. This 1s more o~ a 11­
m1tat1cn of the data than the 'model • 
. ~he c'asestudy reveals that there is no necessary connec­
tion between those in pos1tions ot formal and 1nformal power. 
However, as the group developed, those with real power did 1n 
fact control actual f'ormal aut~orlt,y (UCF. and Brothers). It seems 
to have also been the case that when a formal leader was also an 
1nformal leader,' then the formal role provided access to addit1on­
al power (UCF and Brothers). However, when the for,ual leader 
had few1nformal power resources, then the formal leadersh1p pos­
1t10n had little power (Mr.n.). 
Part1ally in exception 
w 
to assert10n (1.B.• ~.Q.2)" the mem­
ber un1ts were testing each other thr~ughout the coal1t1on's 
history. 
Ass&rt1ons I.B.2.d. and e. (leadership d1str1bution) can' 
poss1bly be comb1ned 1n analyz1ng casestud1es. 
~e f1ndings seem to 1ndicate that this coal1t1on's main: 
issue areas and decis10ns were not overWhelm1ngly 1nnovatively 
or1ented" challenging assert10n II .•B. 2. 
The f1nd1ngs also appear to contradict assert1on-II.B.S. 
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1n~ that substant1a.l 1nterest: (and 1deolog1cal) d1sagreement. 
served to tragment_ and destroy the Black Coa11ticn-: 1n-stead ot 
be1ng compat1ble- w1th its existence. This did,; however, prov'ide 
tor a test1ng of the pos1tions of one another among members ot 
the black community and ot the use of a black coalition. 
CHAPTER. 4 
SUMMARY OF CASESTUDY 
~est End Community Mental Health 
Center Plann1ng Project" 
·,·The West End Commun1ty Mental Health Project Coa11tion. 
grew out of earlier unsuccessful attempts to find 1nnovat1ve 
alternat1ves to the present approach to mental health 1n a 
metropo11 ta.n area. There was also c.oncern about the state t s 
lOBS of federal funds 1n mental health, becaus-e of a lack of 
proposals. 
The key leaders, ttold steer1ng comm1ttee," of this pre­
vious group eventually sought to 1n1t1ate a proposal by.com­
mun1ty based agenc1es. They called together key West End a­
gency execut1ves who agreed on~develop1ng the propoaal and t~ 
send1ng the1r own representatives to that undertak1ng. The "old 
steer1ng comm1ttee" leaders, on their own, pre-selected a cha1r­
man and vice-cha1rman, who were later nom1nated and elected by 
the coa11tion. The deference of the" new members to these lead-­
era was alao evident 1n the1r acceptance of their plan for pro­
ceed1ng, the1r working model, and their organ1zat1onal format. 
The coa11t1on later chose to 1nclude the P. d1str1ct 1n 
the project. They also agreed to the need and requ1rement to 
include commun1ty involvement, and set up a committee to eval­
uate th1s. 
A crucial planning conference was selected as a means of 
organ1z1ng and prepar1ng the project. There was a move by the 
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'"old" leaders to restr1ct attendance, but the 1nsistance of the 
other coa11t10n members led to the open1ng of it to all members. 
The "old" leaders organ1zed the tasks and the d1scuss10n groups 
for the conference, as well as, cha1r1ng all the d1scussion groups. 
The conference chose a set of goals and pr1nc1ples, on organiza­
tional struoture, and a plan for commun1ty 1nvolvement. 
There was later on an expans10n of the execut1ve comm1ttee 

trom three of the "old steer1ng committee" members to 1nclude 

"task force" leaders 1n the new group. 

A t1nal draft of the team' plan was also subm1tted. It 1n~. 

corporated many of the pr1nciples agreed upon at the planning 

conference. 

CASESTUDY ANALYSIS 
"West End Commun1ty Mental Health 
Center Planning Project" 
. I. Dec1s10n-Making Power Analysts 
A. Theoretical Issues: 
Because ot the apparent ,unan1m1ty on most de01s10n 1ssues 
and the substant1al use of formal internal structures, this case­
study will requ1re cons1derable emphas1s upon pos1t1onal analysis 
and struotural issues. DeciSional analys1s and exchange dyn~ 
m1cs, however, will also be of considerable analytical userul~ 
ness. 
R. Structural Issues:· 
83 
B.t. EXternal 
B.l.a. Domaln .. all of the members of the coalltlon were elther. 
based or Involved In the West End sectlon of a metropolltan area 
in the fleld of soclal servlce, expeclally mental health. All of 
these agencles had the posSlbl1lty of acqulrlng addltlonal statt 
members or fundlng through 1nvolvement In the proposed federall!, 
funded community menta.l health center project. The best way to 
assure thelr involvement would be through influencing the plan­
nIng of the program. Not to be a part of such a program could 
even dIminish their exlstlng communi ty role by their belng out,­
performed by a more comprehensive and effective program. 
B.1.a.l) Resource interdependence - the members of the coalItion 
were unable to achieve the project's development, approval, and 
goal wIthout the resources of the other members. The orig1nal 
-steering comm1ttee" planners (Mr. R., Mr.Y., Dr. S, Mr. M., etc.) 
had been unable 1n the, past to develop,_ a successful program, and 
they needed the resources, ideas, and comm1tment of trkey" commun... 
1ty (West End) agenCies to esta.blish-this program•. At the same 
tlme, the agenCies did not hav~ the background and contacts of 
the "steerlng comm1ttee," nor the Individual resources (most mem­
bers were narrowly speciallzed, e.g. residentia.l treatment for 
dlsturbed chlldren, visiting nurSing care, 'etQ) ·to sponsor a 
oomprehensive community men~al health program by themselves. 
B.l.a.2) Member autonomy - the Internal organizat10n of the 00-­
alltion was h1ghly formal and sophlst1cated. It made consider... 
able use of "task force" committees, marathon work sessions, and 
a very d1rect1ve executive committee. Thls seemed to ccns1derp 
ably lessen member autonomy. The coa.li tlon collect1vely contro.l­
led extenslve community social resources with no apparently com~ 
pletely domlnant or ~elf sufficient (as regards the project) mem­
ber or members. The potential resources of federal fund1r.g were 
completely attached to coalltional membership and activity •. 
B~ 1.b. 'Extra-coali tional relations - the relatlonships of the ori­
ginal "Steering Commlttee ff group which existed pr10r to the West.. 
End coallt1on"were cruc1al 1n determlnlng the "core" of leaders 
1n the actual coalition. Those 1n thls previous, and continu1ng, 
relatlonship were: Mr. O. (Community Councll), Mr. Y .• (State M~H~ 
, .' 
Dept.), Mr. R. (County Mental Health Bureau), Dr. S. (State Ked-­
lcal Affairs Assoclation), Mr. M,. (Nelghborhood Action Center -
NAtt), and Mr. G. (Metropo11ta~ Chlld Care Cllnic). Even during 
the cruc1al coalitlon planning meeting at the Sunray meeting 
grounds, these prior relatlonshlps contlnued - the planning 
group dlscussion leaders were: Dr. S.t~Mr. Y., Mr. G. and Mr. R. 
The extra-coalltional relations of the other organlzatlon mem­
bers were not eVident 1n the casestudy materlal, however such 
organlzatlons as public welfare and C'ommun1ty Nurses are cert-a1n 
to have previously existing relationsh1ps, but to what extent 
these contacts had upon the 00&11t1on' s process 18 not ev1dent:. 
trom the casestudy data. 
B.l.c. Unit interests - there was evidence that at least some ot 
the coalit1on's part1cipants clearly regarded their 1nvolvement 
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as secondary to their unlt interests. Charlty Hospltal was cau­
tious ln reviewing how their commltment to the program would re­
late to their over'all program and goals. The chairman, Dr. S., 
appears to have regarded this coali tion as a secondary matter t:o 
hls own interests as indicated by his posslble lessenlng of In. 
volvement upon his appointment to a new posltion with the State. 
ot more apparent evidence is the concern with the promotion ot 
unlt interests by the coalit1on's members. probably the best 
and most comprehenslve illustration of th1s was the pattern of 
volunteers for the commlttees on the areas of concern tor the 
projec~. People volunteered for the comm1ttees wh1ch concerned 
their organization's lnterest, e.g. Mr. J., Alcohollsm and Drug. 
Services; Rev. N. t Geriatr1c Services, etc. They were thus seek­
lng to prlmarily promote ana protect their organization's inter­
ests inlleu of a' perlpheral concern. 
B.2. Internal: 
B.2.a. Formal roles - the formal roles in this coalltlon were 
extremely important and influent1al. Dr. S.'s becom1ng chalrman 
sign1ficantly lnfluenced the ~ower structure of the coalltion. 
It was not only h1s formal positlon, however, but how he defined 
and utilized it ("d1rective" leadersh1p) which resulted in 1ts 
belng a position of power. The vice-chairman, Mr. G., was In.a 
simllarly lnfluential positlon, but of less impact. Their ac­
tlvlt1es and pos1tions w1th the "Steerlng Commlttee" enabled 
them to set up thelr own elections by the new coa11tlon. They 
also determ1ned the major 1nit1al input of members (letters by 
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participants). At the secend meeting, it was their meeting pla~ 
and organizational format (committees to study program areas) 
which determined the course of action. Dr. S. also established 
the tour main tasks to be achieved at the Sunray conference. 
Dr. S. and.Mr. G. were also responsible for drafting the "comll!ll 
munity team" model to be completed by a special commlttee. They, 
along w1th a few others, were appolnted to ~n executive committee 
that;,.had the power to act between meetings ln the program plan!--" 
ning. 
The, other important formal coalitional positlons were var­
ious comm1ttee chalrmen and members. They signif~cantly deter­
mined the components of the proposal. The entlre process work­
ed within a "highly structured system ,cf an executlve comm1ttee.. 
and task force committees. 
B.I.b. Representativeness - the "parent organizatlon" of some 
members was· somewhat nebulous, e'.g. County poverty Agency, 
County Mental Health Project, County Famlly Mental Health Bureau" 
and County Publlc Health Bureau. Whether thelr "parent organ1za­
tion" was the dlvision, clinlc, etc. or the oounty determines it 
these people represented the county as a whole (whatever th~t_i8) 
or that divlsion, etc. The tendency would 'probably be to pro­
mote the lnterest of' the lower level segment, but evidence 1s 
lacking 1n the casestudy to clar1ty th1s. There did seem to be 
a mov~ment at Sunray to seek out the County's relatlonship w,l th 
the project, lncluding the possibllity of lts belng the tlscal 
agent. For the coalition generally, there is no clear ev1dence 
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indIcating unIt representatives substantially d1gress1~~ from 
"parent 'organization" 1nterests., 
'B.2.c. Consensus - to the date that the casestudy covered, the 
most powerful members of the coalition tended to be recogn1zed as 
those in formal coa11t10nal roles, e. g. cha.irman, v1ce-cha1rman,: 
and task force comm1ttee cha1rmen. This was espec1ally th, case 
w1th the c~a1rman and vice-chairman. There was also the recog­
n1tIon of Char1ty Hosp1tal as a powerful member, since 1t was re­
qu1red as the 1npatient fac11ity 1n the proposal. 
B.2.c.1) D1fferent1al power - .the structural a.nd procedural 1s­
sue areas were dom1nated by the two elected off1c1als. The 1s­
sue ot agency inclus10n in the plann1ng process (comm1ttees and 
Sunray) were greatly influenced by all concerned coa11t1on agencYI 
and cit1zen members. 
B.2.c.2) Testing - Since no substantive doma1nc.1ssues had as yet: 
arisen, l1ttle testing had occurred within the coa11t1on. One 
except10n was the conf11ct over part1cipat10n at the ,cruc1al 
Sunray, plann1ng seSSion 1n wh1ch the "leaders" attempted to re­
str1ct attendance and coalit1on members Bought an open meeting 
and won. There was also the conflict by the c1t1zen based groups 
over Q1t1zen-1nput. 
B.2.d. Single leadership - the formal coa11t1cnal lea.dership.-was­
essent1ally controlled by one (poss1bly two) person, Dr. S. He 
also controlled the process of the group 1n a d1rect1ve manner. 
While the formal leadersh1p wa.s "1mba.lanced," the 1nformal lead­
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ership had not as yet emerged (hypothetically it might never 
emerge) - so the structure of that dIstrIbution of power had no~ 
yet become apparent. Some pOSSIbIlIties of other canters of PO-· 
wer~· include Charity Hospital, the State, the .County, CitIzen parr­
ticipation organlzat1ons, resident1al and out-pat1ent faci11ties. 
All of these members have substant1al resources. 
B.2.e. Multiple leadership - the formal group le~dership is 
somewhat centra11zed and Imbalanced, however the dIstr1bution:o~ 
info'rmal power resources among several part1cipants indicates a 
posSibility of the future development of several centers of group 
leadersh1p. 
c. ·Exchange Issues: 
0.1. Cond1tions: 
0.1.a. Resource generality - the resource of formal organ1zation­
al centrol of the coalit1on was a very general resource frequen~ 
17 and effectIvely used by the formal coalition leaders. The 
applicab1l1ty of thIs resource would probably tend to decrease, 
once the stage of concrete proposal make-up and proposed projeo~ 
subcontractIng was InItiated. Informal power resources would 
then probably tend to be domInant. Coa11tIon members w1th more~ 
specIfIC resources wIth lower genera11ty include CharIty Hospi­
tal's control of the only viable inpatl~nt faCility, and its re­
lat1ve oontrol of that port1on of the proposal. Another Illus­
tration is the centrol 'of the c1tizen participat10n segment by 
those agenc1es and reSidents with that organizational and per­
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8~~al interest. There was also program and knowledge control bJ 
agencies specialized 1n certa1nproblem areas. 
~.1.b. R~8ource dependency - the process of this coalition has 
generally been characterized by cooperation. This has largely been 
determined, by the pervas1veness of the project which requ1res the 
resources of a broad divers1ty of local West End ,communityagen­
cies. The result 1s that the members of the coalition' need the 
resources ot each other to successfully attain the overall pro-­
posal's acceptance wh1ch is constituted by program components 
concerned with member interests. 
0.1.b.1 ).Mutual exchange - there appears to be a relat1vely high 
level of member co-ordination and interdependence, as well as" 
apparent mutual exchanges. ~heBe exchanges have occurred 1n 
task torce comm1ttee deployment accord1ng to volunteers. Th1s 
allowed those with special interests in certain program top,1c 
areas to help determine the outccme of that segment of the pro-·­
Ject. While' structured by the leadersh1p, the Sunr,ay work con­
ference d1d include all those interested - after membe~s pres­
sured that leadership. The leaders were st1l~ to determ1ne the 
conference structure, while all members were allowed plann1ng 
1nput. The product of that conference was also the result of a 
mutual exchange of 1deas and 1nterests. As part of 1ts l1st ot 
13 priorities, 3 specifically protected the mutual role of ~ 
Yolvement for ex1st1ng West End community 'agencies. It also ~ 
~luded prov1s1ons to~ and spec1ficat1ons o~ "spec1a11zed services" 
which the community "teams" could draw upon. These 1ncluded ma~­
ot the program areas of member agenc1es, e.g. "1npat1ent services" 
· - Charity Hosp1tal, "childrenls res1dent1al ca.re" - Children's: 
Home, but did not spec1fy the contract agenc1es. 
O.l.c. Uq1t goals - there appeared to be comm1tment to unit 

goals~(degree to which not clear~ ~ to th1s p01nt, atta1nment 

ot those g.oals required cooperat10n as 111ustrated by the Sun .. 

ray conference plan wh1ch broa.dly prov1ded for the involvement. 

of most of the concerns of the member agenc1es. 

e.l.d. Resource compet1t1on - the coalition was not as yet h1ghly 
character1zed by considerable competItIon for resources and sub­
sequent group conflIct. This could be because the areas of re­
source compet1tIon and allocatIon were st11l latent and had not 
as yet become man1fest. 
C.l.e. Member prof1 t ~ sInce the coali tion 1s the veh1cle for 
mt,mber part1Cipation and determ1nation of resource distributI0'n,< 
they seem generally to be Intimately Involved 1n 1ts process, espe­
c1ally in the plar~1ng portions which directly concern the1r agen­
cy's area of interest. 
0.2. Costs: 
0.2.a. D1fferential resource issues - this coa11t1on gives evi­
dence.of d1rferen~issues demand1ng different resources. EX&m~ 
ples include Mr. Y.'s posItion w1th the State as provIding him 
with the key resource of assemb11ng the coa11tIonal participants. 
Dr. S. and Mr. G.ls resource of program area familIar1ty and 
prior acceptance by old I1 s teering comm1ttee" members greatly 
enabled them to secure the central formal leadership P9s 1tIons or 
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the coa11tion. The issue of who was to attend the Sunray confer­
ence was by no means. a si tuation that control of the formal (,oal­
1tlona1 structure could determine; it requIred full 1nvolvement. 
of all the community agencies with their respective cruc1a1 pro-· 
gram resources. Subsequently, the conference was opened to all 
ooa11tion members. 
C.2.b. Costs incurred - some of the costs incurred by this co­
. 	ali t10n inc lude tf111fonnatlonj" controlled by old' "steering com­
mittee" members; "intergame," need to approach the County about 
1ssue of f1scal agent; "d1vision of pay-ofts, II (somewhat poten­
tIal) inclusion of provisions 1n proposal for services prov1ded 
by coa11t10n members; "dissonance," inclusion ot all members in:: 
planning conference; and "pressure of t1me," October 1" dead11ne 
and other future deadlines. 
0.2.0. Pr1nciples - certain "decision cost" principles seem to 
have been opera.tive 1n thls group. "Slze" 1s a factor to the ex­
tent that the "minimum w1nning" member number Is large,) because 
ot the requirements of the proposal. This large number of re­
quired part1Cipants, because of their crucial resources, seems 
to have demanded rela.tive "unanlmity t. of group members. This 
also has meanlng for an "1ndispensa ble member,« slnce sO'many, 
agency resources are cruclal, e.g. "old steerIng committee" 
knowledge and crucial 1ia1son, Char1ty Hospital centrol of only 
viable lnpat1ent facility, etc. 
0.3. Situations: 
92 
0.3.&. Resource independence of powerful - in'·this coalition-: 
the weakness and strength of most members 1s relative to the sit~ 
uatlon·at hand. The tendency seems to have been for the agencies 
to be most influencial 1n areas of thefr own interest. So the 
outcome was essentia~11 one of exchange among relatively equal 
members, by each having cons1derable control-over the1r interest 
area through task force. committees. In the instance of who was: 
to part1cipate in the Sunray conference, the leaders had con­
trol of arranging the conference and determining attendance. 
The reaction of the other coalit1on members, holding key program 
resources, forced recons1deration and eventual inclus10n ot 
them. 
C.3.b. Resource control by powerful - alternative resources were 
sought by the members who d1d not hold formal leadersh1p pos1­
tions by going outside of that group, in essence, and mutually 
sought to cha~e a tentat1ve attendance dec1sion·for the confer­
enoe. 
D. Analytical Questicns: because of the extremely large number of 
partiCipants (approximately 50), the part1c1pants will be refer­
red to in more collective terms unless the issue specifically in­
volved a limit~d number of identifiable acotrs. The main:categor­
les will be "old steering comm1ttee and "agency representatives. It 
D.1. power Resources: 
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"OLD STEERING COMMITTEE" "AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES" 
Crucial liaison with 
funding a.gents . 
Knowledge of proposal
requirements
Control of formal 
coalitional 
positions 
otficia~ standing ot 
leadership and author­
ity ona broad com­
munity or governmental
base 
Votes 
Relative neutrality in 
possible agency fund­
ing
Previous experience with 
project 
Cruclal proposal component re­
sources, e.g. (1) staff, (2) fa­
c1lities, (3) programs. Exam­
ples of (1), (2), and (3) in­
clude professional personnel,
knowledgable citizens, hospital,)
residential care facilities, 
homemaker programs, community·
participation functions, etc~ 
Votes. 
D.2. Maln coalition decision issues and relevant resources: 

MAIN· 'ISSUES RELEVANT RESOURCES 

1. 	Need to coalesce 
main West End 
community re­
source agencies'. 
2. 	Whether to pro­
ceed on a coor­
dinated basis on 
a proposal.
3. 	Assurance of agency
cooperation and in­
fluence on proposal. 
4. 	"Old steering com­
mi t tee It seekir.g to 
control coalition 
leadership. 
5. 	Coalition's need 
tor formal leader­
ship. 
6. 	Need for proposal
planning and inltial 
organizational struc­
ture 
Prest1ge sufficient to assure a 
response from key community re­
source representatives. 
L1aison w1th funding agents,

knowledge of proposal require­

ments, crucial proposal component 

resources, votes. 

Crucial proposal component re­

sources, liaison with funding &­

gents,. knowledge of proposal

requirements.

Liaisen with funding agents, know­
'ledge of proposal requirements, 
relative neutrality in possible 
agency funding, previous exper­
ience with project,~votes. 
Liaison with funding agents,
knowledge of proposal requirements, 
relative neutrality 1n possibly 
agency funding" previous experience
with project, votes. 
Knowledge of proposal requirements,~ 
relative neutrality,~previous exper­
lence with proJect, control ot formal 
organizational positions. 
7. 	Need to staff 

"task force" 

committees. 

8. 	Whether to in­
clude P. district. 
9. 	Need to develop
effective com­
munity participation. 
10. 	Attendance at cru­

Qial plann1ng con­

ference. 

11·. 	C.ontrol of conference 
Decision-issues 12 - 14 were 
1.2. 	'Goals and operational
principles. 
13. 	Organizational 
structure (Board, com­
m1ttees, fiscal agent,
staft, Mental Health 
Team, additional ser­
vices). . 
14. 	Oommunity

involvement. 

15. 	Need for expanded
leadership of coali­
tion. 
Crucial proposal component re­

sources, control of formal or­

ganizational positions.

Crucial proposal component re­

sources, knowledge of proposal

requlremer.ts. 

Crucial proposal component re­

sources (c1tizen participation),

knowledge of proposal require­

ments. 

Cruc1al liaison with funding a­

gents,. knowledge of proposal re­

quirements, control of formal 

coalitional positions, relative 

neutrality, previous experience

with project, crucial proposal 

component resources. 

Control of formal coalitional 

positions 

products of the planning conference. 
Knowledge of proposal require­
ments, relative neutrality, pre­

vious experience with project,

crucial proposal component re­

sources, votes. 

Sam~ as number 12. 

Orucial proposal component re­

sources (Citizen participation)"

knowledge of proposal requ1re­

ments. 

Knowle~e and control of the co­

alition s crUCial proposal compon­

ents. (new resource). 

D.3. Influencer (s) 'and influencee (s): 
DECISION~·ISSUE INFLUENCER(S) INFLUENCEE(S) ; 
1. Need to coalesce 
main West End com­
munity resource a­
gencies. 
"a.ld steering
comm1ttee" 
Main West End 
community re­
source agen­
cles 
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2. 	Whether to "old steer1ng C.ommun1ty resource 
proceed on~& committee" agenc1es
coordlnated 
baSls on: a. 
proposal. 
3. 	Assurance of "Old steer1ng Agencies 

agency cooperatlon comm1ttee" 

and influence on' . Indlvidual &­ COalitlon 

~roposal. §encies

4. 	 O~d steerlng Old steerlng Agenc1es

comm1ttee" comm1ttee tt 

seeking to con­
trol coa11tlon 

leadersh1p.

5. 	Coallt10n' s "Old steerlng Agencles

need for formal committee" 

leadershlp.

6'. 	 Need.for proposal "Old steer1ng Agenc1es

planning and lnl- comm1ttee" 

tial .. organlzational (especially c. 

structure. and v .-0.)

7. 	Beed to staff' Indlv1dual &- Coa11t1on 
"t~Sk force" '. genc1es "old Agencies 

·commit tees. steer1I".g com­

"I m1ttee"(esp. c. 
and v.-c.)
8. 	Whether to include . Indivldual agen- RestL ot C.oa11t1ott 
P. 	dlstrict. cles wlth 1nter­
ests 1n P. (1nferred) 

9. 	Need to develop Ne1ghborhood Ooalit1on 

effective commun- poverty pro.­
ity part1clpation. ~ram 

10. 	Attendance at cru- Old steer1ng Agenc1es and res1­
c1al plannlr.g con- comm1ttee" dents 
terence. Agencies and "old steerlng
residents comm1ttee" 
11 ~ Control of confer­
ence It'Old steer~ng Coa11tion. 
comm1ttee tt 
12. 	Goals and op­ Not given in'casestudy
eratlonal pr1n­
ciples.
13-. 	 Organ1zatlona.l Not g1ven in casestudy 
structure (Board,:
committees,)fls­
.cal agent ,staff" 

Menta.l Health '.ream, ~ 

addit10nal serv1ces). 

14. 	Community involvement. Ne1ghborhood po- Rest ot coalit1on 
verty programs (e)
and residents 
Agencies Citizen advocates 
15:~ 	 Need to r expanded Not given in', casestudy but infer,~" ' 
leadership of·co­ red:: 
&,11t1on. Bew leaders(com­ ,Rest ot ooa11­
.,' mittee chairmen) tion'~ 
Old leaders Rest .of ooa11­
tiolr. 
D.4. Decision1ssues and relevant member resources: 
, . 
DECISION. ,ISSUES RELEVANT MEMBER RESOURCES 
1. 	Need to coalesce "Old steering Standing ot leader­
ma1n West End committee" ship and author~tl 
'communi ty re­	 ~" : " 'on governmenta~ , 
. ~source agenc1es., 	 ! ,:base. 
2. 	Whether to pro­ "Q.ld steering Lia1son with 
ceed on a coor­ committee" funding agents,
dinated basis on Knowledge of pro­
a proposal posal requirements" 
votes. 
Crucial proposal 
component resources" 
votes. 
L1a1son with tund­
1~~ 	agents,: Know­
ledge of propo.sal
requirements.
Crucial proposal 
component resources •. 
Lialsonwith fund­
ing 	agents,. know­
ledge of proposal 
requlrements~ re­
lative neutrality,·
in 	possible agency~,­
fund1ng J" preylous 
experience with project.
Same as number 4. 
Knowledge ot pro­
posal requ1rementsJ~ 
relative neutrality,~
previous experience 
w1th proJect,; COn­
trol of' formal 
organizational 
" 	 posit1ons. 
DECISICNISSUES 	 RELEVANT :ME~IBER RESOURCES, 
7. 	Need to~'start 

"task force" 

committees. . 
8. 	Whether to in­

clude P. d1strict. 

9. 	Need to develop

effective com­

munity partici­

. pation. 
10. 	Attendance at 
cruc1al plan­
ning conter­
ana'e. 
t 1. 	Oontrol of 
conference 
12. 	Goals and operat1on-'
al principles. 
13. 	Organizational 
structure. 
14. 	Community in­
volvement 
15. 	Need for ex­
panded leader-, 
ship of coa11-. 
t10n 
Indiv1dual Crucial proposal com­

agencies ponent resources. 

"Old Control of formal 

steering organizational

comm1ttee" positions. 

(~Bp. c •. and 

v.-c.).

Individual Crucial proposal con. 

agencies ponent resources.,. 

with inter-' ....... " ,-"" 

ests in P. 

"Old steer- Knowledge of proposa~ 

ing committee'f, requirements. 

Neighborhood 
poverty 
program 
"Old steer­
ing 	comm1t­
tee" 
·nOld steer­
ing commit-' 
'tee," (esp. 
c. and v. - e • ) 
"Old steer­
ing commit­
tee" 
Agencies 
Crucial proposal com­
ponent resource (Cl~­
izen partic1pation). 

Knowledge ot proposal

requirementB.,cruc1a.l

liaison with funding 

agents, control of for­

mal coa11tional pos1­
tions, relative neu~ral­

ity,:prev10us experlenoe

w1th proJect,:cruc1al

proposal component re­

sources. 

Control of formal co­

alItional posit10ns. 

Knowledge of proposal

reqUirements, relative 

neutrallty,:prev10us

exper1ence with pro­

Ject, votes. 

Crucial proposal compo~ 

nent resources. 

Same as number 12. 
NeIghborhood Crucial proposal com­
poverty :pro­ ponent resources (citi­
grams (2) zen" participation)"
and resi­ knowledge of proposal
dents reqUirements, votes. 
Agenc1es \GoUnter resources of 
centrol otcomponent 
resources, and votes. 
Ex1sting Knowledge and contro~ 
leaders of the coa11tions pro­
and main­ posed components. 
existi~..g 
comm1ttee 
cha1rmen 
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D.S. 	Outcome: 
DECISICN' ISSUE DECISION:CHCICE 
1. 	Need to coalesce 

main West End com­

mun1ty resource a­

genc1es.

2. 	Whether to prooeed on 

a coord1nated bas1s on 

a proposal.

3. 	Assurance of agency
ooopera.t1on and 1n­
,fluence on proposal.
4.' "Old steer1ng comm1 ttee tt 
,seek1ng 	to control co­
a11t10n leadersh1p.
5. 	Coal1t10n's need tor 
formal leadersh1p.
6. 	Need for proposal

plann1ng and 1n1t1al 

organ1zat1onal 

structure. 

7. 	Need to starf "task 

force" comm1ttees. 

8. 	Whether to include 
P. 	d1str1ct. 
9. 	Need to develop et­

fect1vecommunlty

part1cipat1on. 

10. 	Attendance at cru­
cial plann1ng con­
terence. 
11. 	Control of con­
terence .. 
12. 	Goals and op­
erat10nal pr1n­
c1ples. 
13. 	Organ1zat1onal 
structure. 
Oal11ng of meet1ng by Mr. L ot 
State'M.H. Dept. 
Proceed on" a coordinated pro­
posal. 
Each agency to send one or two 
representat1ves. 
pre-select Dr. S. cha1rman and 
Mr. G~. 	 vice-cha1rman. 
Dr,. So. 	 and Mr. G. nom1nated and 
elected same as in number 4. 
Acceptance of Dr. S. and Mr. G.'s 
plan 	of procedure, Dr. 5.'s pro­
posal 	model, and Mr. G.'s organ­
1zational format (task force com-' 
m1ttees). . 
Volunteers from agency represen­
tatives to committees relevant 
to 	their knowledge and, above all" 
1nterest. 
Inclusion of P. d1strict. 
Acceptance and apPointment ot an 
ad 	hoc comm1ttee to study (made 
up of 	c1tizen part1cipation ori­
ented 	program representat1ves).
All 	members of coa11t1on and re­
Sidents • 
"O~d 	steering ccmmittee tl members 
to 	lead discussion groups, chair­
man to 	determine agenda and tasks. 
A.pproval of same. inc ludll'..g 3 
(numbers 1.7,8) which spec1f1­
cally 	1nvolve serving the i"nter-­
ests 	of the existing agenc1es.
Creat10n of: a board made up of 
,1/3 residents. 1/3 agenol people"
1/3 	"community-at-large;1 standing
operat1ng comm1ttees; fiscal a-. 
gent (non-:prof1t corporation or 
,the County);~executive staff; 
ne1ghborhood mental health team 
(at 	least one psychiatrist, plus 
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DECISICN) IS8UE 	 'DECISION CHOICE 
-.... -	 -. 
14. 	Community in­
yolvement. 
15. 	Need for expanded
leadership of 
coalition. 
other profess1onals and para­
professionals, additiQnal spe-­
cia11zed and extended services 
including many'dlrectly related 
to functions ofcoalitlon agen­
cles, e.g. lnpatient faclllty"
resldentlal treatment, alcoho­
l1ctreatment"etc.).
1/3 of board members (not con­
trol), a "Communi ty Review Com­
m1ttee" - advlsory only.
Steering Comm1ttee formed from 
Old Execut1ve Committee (Dr. S." 
Hr. G., ~ Mr. Q.; sec.) and "Team" 
Oomm1ttee chairman Mr. E., Man- . 
'agement Commlttee chalrman Mr. ~'., 
and two poverty program person­
nel, one belng chairman of Com­
munlty Revlew Commlttee Mrs. ~ 
D.6. Member Pos1tion on Issues 'and Actual Outcome: + =ln' favor,,, 
- = aga1nst, ? =not known 
", 
DECIS,ION CHOICE POSITION 
• ... .. ' _. ~ ... • 4> ' 
1. 	Call1ng of meeting by
Mr. Y. of State M.R. 
'Dept.
2. 	Prpceed on a coordinat-. 
ed' proposal
3. 	Each agency to send one 
or two representatlves
4. 	frs-select Dr. S. chalr~ 
, . 
? (unanimity 1nterred+)
"Old steering commlttee lt members 
? (unanimity inferred +) 
? (unan1mity 1~~erred +) 
t (unan1mity interred +) 
man and Mr. G. v1ce-cha.lr- "Old steering comm1ttee" members 

man 
5. 	Dr•. S. and Mr. G. noml~ 
nated and elected the 
same as ln number 4. 
6. 	Acceptance of Dr. S. and 
Mr. G.ls plan of procedure,
Dr. S.' s proposa.l model,~ 
and Mr. G.ts organlzatlon-, 
. al format «(task force com­
. mlttees).
7. 	Volunteers from agency
representatlves to com­
m1ttees relevant to thelr 
knowledge and, above all,: 
interest. 
? ( unanim,l ty lnre rred +)
"Old steer1ng committee" members 
? (unanimity lnferred +), 
? (unanimity interred +) 
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DECISION CHOICE 	 MEY.J3ER 
8. 	Inclusion' of P. ?~I (una.nimity interred +)
d1strict. 
9. 	Acceptance and ? (unanimity inferred +)
apPointment of 
an ad1 hoc com­
m1ttee to study
etfect1ve com­
mun1ty particI­
'patlon (made up 
ot cItizen particl­
.R8.t1on 	oriented 

program repre­

sentatIves). 

10. 	All members 'of coa­ - "Old steer1r.g comm1ttee l ' 
lition and res1dents + Agenc1es and res1dents 
.11. 	"Old steerl.ng com­ ? . (unanIm1ty 1nferred +)
m1ttee" members to "o.ld steering committee" members 
lea.d discusslon 
·groups, . cha1rma.n to 
determine agenda
and tasks. 
12. 	Approval of goals ? (\1nanimity inferred +) 

~nd operatIonal 

principles.

13. 	Approval of organ- 1 (unan1mity 1nferred +) 

1zational structure 

.14. 	Approval of plan ? (unanimity inferred'tattsr 
for' community in­ ,comprom1se +) 
volvement. 
15~'. Expansion of ex­ ?~ Unanimity interred +)

,cutlve comm1ttee 

The three most controversial and signifl.cant declsions ha.d 
not as yet been made by the coalition: (1) speciflc fiscal agen~J' 
(2) spec1fic initial serVices, and' (3) specific service subcon­
tractors. 
D.7. Member Goa.ls·ComparedWlth Final Outcome: 
GOALS 	 FINAL. OUTCOME 
.. 
"Old steering Development and Flna.l outcome ot 
commlttee" fundlng of a.n inno­ this coalition was 
~atlve communlty not as yet attained. 
.. mental health plan It had completed an. 
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MEMBER GOALS FINAL OUTCOME:~ 
tor West End ot overall outline 
Agenc1es 
Metropo11tan
Area. 
Protection and 
promotion of 
own agency in­
terest and do­
main~ 1ncludlng
provisions for 
funding tor 
these agenc ies, . 
1ncluding, ac­
cording to in­
dividual agency
interest,. resi­
tor an innovative 
commun1ty mental 
health plan tor 
West End Metropo­
litan Area, with 
provisions cover­
l'ng and promoting
essent1allyall:of
the member agency
interests. 
dential treat­
ment. alcoholic 
treatment, inpa­
tient care,. etc. 
II. Dec1s1on-Making Process analySiS: in order to assess the case­
study 1n'relation to typological and phase lss,ues' aS8ertion~" 
each main decision (using above sequential numbers) will be plac­
ed in a table and discussed later. 
PRCBLEM SCWTION,. 
blem 
uatlon 
,tine 
emental 
vatlve 
lnformatlon 
~dequate 
~nadeJiuate 
ade~uate 
inadeguate
adeia ua te 
inadequate 
ROUTINE INC.RElvIENTAL INNOVATIVE
adequate ina.dequa.te '~dequate lina.dea ua te adeguate inadequa.te
11 r7.•5.l2~13t 14 
6~8.2 ,,3.,10 _,,±~,15~ 
1~2 
EXPLANATION: . 
1. The "old steering committee's" assessment ot the situation as 
requiring an unprecedented move (innovative) of calling together 
. . 
all West End community mental health resources seemed to be an 
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adequate solution response to the s1tuat10n. 
2,. The assessment of the a1 tuation as warrant1ng a coord1nated 
effort (g1ven the level of agency 1nterdependency) just1fied 
the1r aff1rmat10n of that solut1on. Th1S s1tuation and solution 
were very innovative for the 'soclal serv1ce agencies involved.' 
3., The realization of the need, to assure coa11tion member cooper.­
ation and influence seemed to be a reasonable outgrowth (incre­
mental) and assessment (adequate) of the Situation. The dec1s1on 
-
to send representat1ves was also a reasona.ble dec1sion and an 
accurate assessment. 
4. The de,sire of the "old steer1ng committee" to develop a plan 
to mainta1n leadersh1p was an adaptat10n to the ex~ans1on of t~e 
coa11tion and an accurate realization from their perspect1ve. 
Thedec1s10n to apparently pre-plan the elect10n was an 1nnova­
tlve response to this s1tua.tion and demo,nstrates a clear analy­
Sls of the group and the probab1lity that their solut10n wo'uld 
be successful. 
5. ~he coalit1on's recognit1on of a need for formal leadersh1p 
was a procedural oonsequence "trout.1.ne ), of the ne~d to or­
. 
ganize the new coalit1on. The solution of elect1ng the hand­
picked "old steer1ng committee" members was a logical solut10n­
and outcome,' because of the new members' own lack of exper1ence,. 
liaison', etc. The1r understand1ng o,f how the election was man­
1pulated was apparently non-existent. 
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6. The coa11tlon's reallzatlon ot a need tor a plan tor proce­

dure was a result (incremental) of thelr seeking to develop a 

proposal. Their response of deferring to the flold steerlng com­

mittee" plans had become somewhat routlnized at thls pOint, and 

reasonably so •. 

7. The reoognltion of the need to statt the committees, whlch 

were part of the plan accepted ln declslon 6, seemed routlne and 

accurate. The declsion to allow those to join the commlttees 

wh1ch they were Iflnterested" and knowledgable ln seemed to be 

an adaptive and adequate response to the problem s1tuatlon of 

need1ng to till the posl tlons BDi havlng peop~e of matchlng In;.. 

terests in the group (also a good way to assure the ,sallency of 

the project to coa11tlon members). 

8. The fact that the P. dlstr1ct had not been automatlcally In­

cluded in:the project area, indlcates that the problem of whe-· M 

ther to lnclude it was an outgrowth (incremental) of the effort( 

to be comprehens1ve geographlcally, as well as, program wIse. 

The recogn1t10n of the need to resp~nd seemed to be accurate. 

The declslon to 1nclude the P. distr1ct appears to be routlne itt 

vIew of the lnclus10n of other areas. Thls seemed to be an ade­

quate analysls. 

9. The 1nformatlon about the requlrement of cltizen partlc1patlon~ 

1I.a8 a result (lncremental) of the coalitlon I s app11catlon for fed­

eral funding (1nclu41ng their regulat1ons), as well as, lnternal 

'pressures. 	 The' establishment ot an ad hoc committee seemed to 

be a routlne response for thls coalltion, which already had es­
104 
tab11shed this method as 1ts bas10 procedural approach.. The' 1m­
oluslon of c1t1zen partlc1pat1onoriented comm1tteemembers 
seemed reasonabl~ •. 
10. The problem of Whom.to 1nclude at the "oruc1al plann1ng con;.. 
terenoe" was a oonsequence (1noremental) of the expanded agency 
1nvolvement and influence. The coa11t1on leaders d1d not recog­
nize th1s; the agency members d1d. The final dec1sion to 1n­
oiude all coa11t1on members was a reasonable way ot adapt1ng (in­
oremental) to the new-s1tuat1on. 
1t. The situat10n ot dete~ining the leadership for ~he plann1ng 
conference was a routine matter of having deoided to hold the 
sesslo~.and there seems to' be"· recogn1 tion of th1s. The deterrence 
to' the "old steer1ng committee" (espec1ally the coalit1on's exe­
cutive leaders) was a routin1zed solut1on for the coa11t1on by 
now. Th1s seemed a reasonable react1on. 
12-14. Hav1ng e~tered a oommun1ty plann1ng and federal proposal 

writ1ng proJect, there are oertain rout1ne, rat10nal procedures 

. wh1ch are requ1red. The estab11shment of goals and operat1onal. 
pr1nc1ples, organizational structure, and community 1nvolvement 
prov1s1onp are rout1ne procedures, wh11e the manner and content 
of how th1s coa11t1on solved these requ1rements was h1ghly adap-­
t1ve (incremental) to its pecu11ar organ1zational compos1tion 
and its network of 1nterests •. The1r observations and solut1ons 
seemed qu1te adequate and accurate. 
15. The need tor expanded leadersh1p was an outgrowth (1ncremen­
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ta~) of t~e increased complexity of the project components and 
the division of labor. This was recogn1zed in ra1sing the 1s­
sue of the need to expand the leadership. The dec is ton to do 
. so might seem incremental, but it was more probably incremental 
1n~view of the "old steering committee's" here-to-tore monopoly 
of formal coali t1ona.l leadership and the impact thiS' could br1ng 
to the leadersh1p of the group. The .solut1on does seem to be 8. 
reasonable response to the demands of the changed Situation. 
A. Typological Issues: 
A.1. Problem fa.m1llar1ty - ~he categorles seemed to be helpful. 
There d1d seem to be an appllcab111ty ot the dec1sion types" 
w1thout belng overly arbitrary • 
.~ 	 A.2. Pa.tterns - seven out of the f1fteen ma1n'dec1s1on issues 
'h.ad 1dent1cal problem ai tuatlon· and solution types. 
A.3. Informatlonal adequacy - the applicability of the variable 
of adequacy of 1nformation seemed to be limited, because it was 

. never really cr1t1cally employed in analyz1ng th1s casestudy. 

B. Phase Issues: 
B.1. Innovation - there were only two instances· out of f1fteen 
ma1n dec1s1on 1ssues 1n which both the problem situation and 
problem solut10n were 1nnovat1ve. There were add1tional issues 
wh1ch had incremental s1tuat1ons and innovative solut10ns. 
B.2. D1versity - the f1rst two of the fifteen problem s1tuat1ons 
a.nd solu,,!lons were both inno\tative, and after them both 1ncre-­
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mental and routine (mixed) orientations entered into the process. 
.These later insta.nces did 
, 
apparently occur ina ra.ndom fashion 
from 1ncremental, rout'ine, and even innovative (solutions only»). 
There were, after the first two 1nnovative - innovative areas,~ 
tw.o:·.. -.:· incremental - incremental, one routine _. routine,;. three 
incremental (situation) - routine (so~ution.), t~ve routine ­
inoremental, a.nd two increme'ntal - innovative. 

B.3. Rat10nal phases - there seems to ha.ve been a general use 
and reliance upon rationality in decision-making in thiS case­
study, eve~though selt interest was clearly operative. A trac-­
ing ot the stages or phases ot a rational process model in this 
casestudy in an overall perspective could include: 
(1) 	Issue or problem identification: need for improvement or 
community mental heaith through an innovative, comprehen­
s1ve neighborhood program. 
(2) 	Information gathering: ass1gnment of If task force" commi­
ttees. 
(3) 	L1sting of alternative strategies and solut1ons, 

-
(4) 	Determination of consequences, 
(5) 	Comparative evalutat1on, and 
'(6) 	Oho1ce of strategy or solution: the "crucial planning 
conterence" allowed for thiS process. 
(7) 	Enactment of strategy and solut1on - not to date of case-­
study_ 
It should be noted that many indiVidual dec1sions could be 
assessed in a s1milar format of the rational phase model. 
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B.3.• a • Relative app11cab1lity - this coalition was marked by a 
high degree of cooperation and consensus, with definite instances 
of bargaining and exchange. It also used a rational,process me­
thod. 
B.4-. Unit bias - unit b1ases were very much 1n ev1dence 1n th1s 
coalition trom the pattern of volunteers tor the "task force" 
commit'tees relevant to a uni t' S interests to the 1nterest laden: 
propoeal,Model,which resulted from the 'plann1ng conference. An: 
illustration is the strong role taken by the cit1zen based pover­
·ty program. to be the chief advocates for citizen participation. 
B.5. Coa11tional cohesiveness - this coalition had members who 
- . 
had issue and interest differences and d1sagreements (relatively 
mild), but this did not preclude the possib1l1ty of form1ng a 
-
workable and workingcoalit1on. 
Critique: The usefulness and applicab1l1ty of the decisional me. 
thod seemed to be of rela.tively lessened value, largely because 
ot the lack of more specific casestudy dat~ on'al11gnment of mem~­
bers on lssues, and the fact that the coalition had not as yet 
finalized its work. 
A more specific criticism concerns assertion I.B.2.a., 
which maintains that formal coalitional roles carry little real 
ppwer. The aasestudy material 1nd1cates that the coa11t1onal 
leadership poSit10na of the "old steering cO.mmi ttee lt members were 
instruments ot considerable influence. 'rhe coalit1onal "ta.sk torce" 
committee chairmen also had considerable 1mpact on the plann1ng 
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process and th1s eventually assured them pos1t10ns on the execu­
t1ve commIttee. 
Another crit1c1sm is of assertion 0.1.c., which maintains 
that the h1gher the commitment to indiv1dual unit goals" the less 
the cooperation. The casestu~y implies a defin1te commitment.. by 
un!ts to the1r goals, but .. oooperat1on did take plaoe beoause ot" 
unIt.1nterdependence. ThIs poss1bly indicates that.interdepen.­
dence may preclude. at_least .. blatantLpursu1t:.of self interest. A­
noth~r po~s1ble motIve for .thls ,degree of apparent cooperat16n: 
could have been for external goals of coal1t1on-, members. Being 
a member of the coa11 t1on' In. 1tee If could have 
, 
been a resourc.e 
sought among other poss1ble goals~ e.g. enhanoement o~ resources 
1n another a.oa11tion·' or 1n the eyes of oonst1tuents. 
Wh1le assertion II..A.2. maintains that problem, situatlon~ 
and solution' types are usually Ident1oal"the data from the 
. oasestudy revealed that only' 6 out of 15 of the dec1sion' Issues 
were of thIs type. Subsequently, they were not the usual case. 
the var1able of informat10n adequacy II.A.3. was of l1ttle 
use 1n:th1s casestudy. Th1s, however,; may be more attributable 
toethe lack of casestudy data than-to a derect~1n the model. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Summary of Caseatudy 
"Project Rap" 
This coalition was developed by representat1ves of social 
service agenc1es around the 1ssue of estab11sh1ng a preventive 
program for pre-alienated youth in a metropo11tan area. The 
coalition arose from the merger of two previously separate at­
tempts in the area. One was an attempt by a drop in center for 
alienated youth through the public schools (which rejected the 
proposa.l). The second sroup was initiated by Family Service· 
. . 
Agency A •• ~·which involved three other Family Serv1ce agencies. 
,.. ... 
This group then asked the Drop in Center representative to meet~ 
with them and later was asked to jo1n the group. 
The coal1tion eventually dec1ded upon a focus for a pro­
posal to the school system for setting up a preventive program 
tor pre-al1e~ated youth. The dec1sion' was made to divide the 
responsibil1ty accord1r~ to member interest: Drop in Center was 
to tocus on drop 'in centers for youth and Family Service agenCies 
" 
on drop in centers' for the parer..ts • Initially, Some concern a­
bout the consequences upon community support by including the 
controversial drop in center member was expressed by the Fam1ly 
Service members. However, it was Boon recognized that the Family, 
Serv1ce AgenCies needed the Drop in c.enter's rapport with youth" 
. ­
and the Drop in Oenter needed the Family Service Agenoies· rap­
port with other itestablished" agenCies and their public image of 
respectability in order for the program to work. 
The proposed plan was accepted by the coalition atter each 
member's respective "parent organization" approved 1t. Family 
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Serv1ce Agency A. cha1red the group and the Drop 1n Center re-­
presentat1ve largely wrote the proposal w1th ass1stance from a 
member of Agency A. 
The proposal was rejected by the school board wh1ch was a~ 
the t1me fac1ng a bon~ elect1on, and whose super1ntendant was 
under pub11c cr1t1c1sm tor h1s proposed reorgan1zat1on of the 
school d1str1ct. One cr1t1c1sm ra1sed by the board was the 
fa1lure to 1nvolve Bchool counselors 1n the project. 
The coalit1on developed a six week, summer p1lot project 
through the park dep~rtment, wh1ch they dec1ded was a fa1luve 
because of 1ts poor 10cat10n and shortness of time. 
The coa11tion then init1ated an 1ntensive 10bby1ng etfort.. 
with school board members. ~he controvers1al representative from, 
the Drop 1n Center d1d not participate 1n this eff'ort 1n order 
to avoid further hiS alienating ot the school board members. 
Shortly after this, the proposal was resubm1tted and was ac­
cepted by the board. 
This was followed with the ooalition's establishment of a 
decision-making execut1ve board and an implementing project co­
ordinator. 
The members of the coa11tion felt that generally the group.' 
was cooperat1ve. There was considerable d1screpancy among re­
source contributions of the members. The FamIly ServIce Agency 
A., one ot the other Fam1ly Service AgenCies, and the Drop 1n. 
Center contr1buted the most. The only area of internal conflict. 
arose over the type otpub11City and image given the 'project once 
it was under way_ The Drop in Center representative and seve~al 
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other coalition.members felt the focus had been switched from" 
eduoation and prevention to problem cases. The contention was 
rais~d that this was a consequence of shifting program author­
ity away from the professional agency staff to lay execut1ve 
board members. Th1s is challenged by the fact that the exe­
cutive board members were the same people 1nvolved 1nthe ori­
ginal p~anning committee. 
CASESTUDY ANALYSIS 
, . 
·project Rap" 
I. Decision-Making Power Analysis:' 
A. Theoretical Issues: Th1s casestudy can be, analyzed with.re­
ference to the internal and external positions of each of its 
members. This is especially' eVident in the external and inter­
nal structural issues of this coalition. The assessment .. of de­
cisional dynamics also is sign1ficant and the nature'of "ex_ 
change" appears to be directly influenced by.the structural is­
sues of this case. 
B. Structural Issues: 
B'.1. Ext'ernal 
-B.l.a. Domain - both initial proposals (Drop in Center [Mr. A.] 
and the agency!sponsored one) were concerned with expanding pr~· 
gram domains iAto ,the area of "pre-alienated youth." 
B. 1.a. 1) Resource interdependence - the internal resource~ of 
each of the two proposa.l groups was regarded to be inadequate 
without the inclusion of the other. The established agencies 
.... ,.. i :'. .::...­
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needed the Drop 1n Center"s (Mr. A. 's) rapport w1th a11enated 

youth, statt t1me, and.tunds. The Drop 1n Center needed the a­

genoy resouroes of'pub110 respectabIlity, staff time, and funds. 

B.1.a.2) Kember autonomy - the ooa11tion does not seem to have 

restricted the usual operations. of 1ts members. The ooaliton 

itself utilized very limited internal and external resouroes 

, . . 
and had no real organizational:sanotions upon its members. 
B.l •b. Extra-ooalitional relations - a oons1derable degree of the 
.. 
. tntluenoe exeroised by the Drop in Center upon other ooa11tion 
·members was based upon 1ts extra-coa11tional relations with the 
metropolitan alienated yo·uth. On the other hand~ the estab11sh­
ed.agenc1es based much of their influence in coa11tional act1v"" 
ity upon their extra-coalit1onal relations w1th the "establish-­

ed" commun1ty and as being a "respected" member of the community. 

B.l.o. Un1t interests - membership 1n the coalition does not ap-· 
pear to pose a threat tQ any exlstir~ 1nterests and inter-orsa~-
1zat1onal relat10ns ot its members. There 1s referenoe to some 
1n1t1al degree ot ooncern by the established fam1ly serv1ce a­
gency members about including a ccntroversial program such as 
Drop 1n Center 'as a member. Th1s was based upon the tear ot 
lOSing oommun1ty support from suoh an al11ance. 
B... 2. Internal: 
B,2.a. Formal roles - there did not appear to be o'onsiderable lm:­
tluence vest'ed 1n formal ooa11 tional roles. The real power seem­
ed to res1de in resource control and use. There was some 1nfluence 
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1n that Fam1ly 5e~vIce Agency A. controlled the pos1tion of cha1r­
man and was intimately oonoerned about the formation and d1rec­
tion,,'of the project. The Drop in Center was also responsible for 
draft1ng the proposal ..w1th aome assistance from, Agency A. 
B.•2.b. Repres'entativeness - the'members involved appeared to be 
without internal conflicts with respect to accurately represent~ ! 
ing the ove~ all interests of their "parent organizations" ~ 
this project• 
. B·~2.c. Oonsensus - while this case is generally characterized 
by group consensus and cooperation, there developed a ~ecogni­
tion of degree~ of influence amor~ coalition members. 
B~2.c:.1) Differential power.- in the issue area of having con­

tact with the client populations (prealienated youth and the1r. 

pare.nts) J there wa.s a recognition that Drop in~ Center had more 

influence with the former group and the fam1ly service agenc1es 

with the latter.' In addItion, the family service agenCies clearJ..1;" 

emerged as more influential overall by their capability of dealing 

w1th cruoial external organizaticns (school board). 

lL2.c".2): Testing ---there was an early testing of member power and 
influence in ··the ooa.l1tion around the issues of mutual dependence 
and resource capabil.i tles in the main areas of decision Influen. 
c Ing (B. 2. c. 1 ) • 
B';'2.d. and e. Single or multiple ·leadership. - the coallt1on.~is 

composed of several leaders of cons1derable internal influence" 

1l~ 
but the. serv1ce aSency group1ng tends to be more frequently in­
fluent1al and dominant. The distribut10n of power appears to ba 
balanced w1th respect to internal 1ssues and 1nfluence and 1m­
balanced w1th respect to external 1SBUeS and 1nfluence. Drop in: 
Center,and t~e agencies are balanced 1n the former, and the agen­
cles are,dom1nant 1n the latter. 
C~ Exchange Issues:: 
C.• l. Oonditions : 
O.l.a. Resource genera11ty - all o'f the coa11t10n's members sha%!'­
ed the general resources of staff time and money. Wh1le these 
were comm1tted w1th varying degrees by the coa11t10n's members, 
they were at lea~t~. potent1al resources for exchange. Another 
common resource wasorgan1zat1onal endorsement. The more spe­
clf1c resources included commun1ty respectab1lity and 1ntera­
gency contact by the serv1ce agencies and youth rapport by Drop 
in Center. 
C.l.b. Resouroe dependenoy - the oasestudy ind1cates that ooa11­
t10n members olearly and openly recognized their pos1tion of 1n­
.terdependenoe for resouroes needed for goal a~tainment. ~t the 
seoond meet1ng of the agency group, the oasestudy notes "1t was 
agreed that none of the agenc1es could provide an outreach pro-·· 
gram on 1t8 . own, '. because ot a lack of funds ,and staft." It: was 
notes that later when Drop in Center became involved in the coal­
,it1on; 	that it became apparent that it wa.s ident1f1ed with "drug 
users" and "street people." Furthermore,. the fam1ly serv1ce a­
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gencles were ldentifled as part of the "establlshment tl byyounS_ 
people. The consequence was that these other coalltion members 
had resources which could compensa.te for each other's de:t'1c'len- , 
cles. fhe subsequent dlvis10n of labor in the1r proposal in­
d1ca~es the result of.bargaln1ng: Drop ln Center was responsl­
ble for youth drop in centers and the family ~enc1es for a par­
ents' drop ,ln center. 
0.1.b.1) Mutual exohange - the high degree of co-ordination and 
. ,­
1nterdependence of the units seems to have been manifested 1~ 
themutuallty of the exchange in the planning phase. However, 
when resources were actually committed only three of the coall-. 
tion members contributed 1n any substant1al way. 
O.. l.c. Unlt soals -'the goal'of the ooal1tion~seems to have beexr. 
directly related to the different units' main areas of concern" 
let were an expansion of them. Furthermore, the two maln~tac­
t10na, ,Drop in Center and the Famlly Serv10eAgencies, s~ugh"b_ to 
,promote their areas of special interest wlthin the broader ooa1i-,· 
tional goal. ThlS, however, dld not result In': a situation of ]o,w 
cooperatlon. Aotua~ly, there was a high degree ot compat1billty" 
contrary to assertion 0.1.c. 
e.l.d. Resource oompetitlon - thls coalltion was not charaoterized 
by competit1on for resources, nor group conf11ct. 
C.l.e •. Member profit - there was definltely a discrepanoy 1n de­
grees 01' lnvolvement among Seme 01' the coalit10n's members, and 
this was d1rectly related to the amount of resouroes contributed 
by each member. Those who contr1buted more resources 1n th1s 
case, also ga1ned more resources 1n that their statf were able 
to ut1l1ze pub11c school tac1l1t1es, as well as, the complemen­
tary resources (1nclud1ng reputat1ons) of the other more active 
members. The members wh1ch also were act1ve in leadersh1p also 
contr1bute"d and shared 1n more ot the benefits ga1ned. 
0.2. Costs:: 
0.2.a. Different1al resource 1ssues - this casestudy demonstrates 
how d1fferent 1ssues often require different types of resources. 
The 1nternal planning process reveals how the two main segments 
of the coa11t1on ut1lized their spec1al resources to obtain the1r 
part1cular goal's approval 1n the proposal. Drop 1n Center had 
the resource of rapport w1th youth and got a youth drop in cen­
te~·accepted. Fa.m1ly service agenCies had the resource of com.. 
mun1ty respectabi11ty and had an adult drop in center 1ncluded 1n: 
the proposal. They all had the common resources ment10ned ~ 
C.l.b. In add1t1on, the fam1ly servIce agenc1es lobb1ed the 
sQhool board due to the1r good contacts w1th "estab11shed" a­
genCies, wh1.le Drop 1n Center's Mr. A. temporarily dropped from_", 
act1vity. 
0.2.b. Co'ste 1ncurred - the group members incurred the "d1v1sion 
cr+ pay-offs" costs atte'r the, program had been d1vided up betwee~ 
Drop 1n Center and the serv1ce agenc1es and later when the pro­
gram actually began. "Respons1b1l1ty" costs were 1ncurred by the 
'Execut1ve Board of "Bap_U" for their controversIal publiCity pro­
gram. "Intergame~ and "persuasion" costs resulted from the co­
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alition's lobbying of the school board members. 
C.2.~. Principles ""7 funotioning as a consensus type of group the 
"unanimity princ1ple" seemed to be operative in attempting t~ 
maintain a moderate process. Drop 1n Center was an "indispen­
sable member " to the service agencies and vice versa. i\s an 
external unit, the school board'w~s clearly an " indispensable 
member." While the school board did not participate (nor was 
requested to do so) 1n the on-going coa11tional process, 1ts de­
cls10n ultimately ~etermlned the fate of the groupls program and 
goal. In thiS sense, the board's vote of approval was "indis­
. pensable." , 
c.~~ Situations:. 
0.3.80. Resource independence of powerful - there are perhaps tw;o 
apparent 1ncidents of the more powerful' not need1ng the resources 
of the weaker, arid where the weaker employed other commodit1es 
for exchange. In the first example, the school board d1d not 
believe it needed the resources of the coa11t1on (1t was a 
, 
threat), but the coa11t1on changed 1ts tact1cs and used their 
resource comlXlodity of good public contacts and persuas10n to 
ach1eve their goal. Another illustrat10n 1s when Drop 1n Oen­
ter'a Mr. A. felt himself to be unable to deal with the schooi 
board, he reduced h1s status 1n front ot the other members. 
Possibly to co'unt.erac.t th1s,: Mr. A. ra1sed the issue about pub­
l10ity to rega1n a role of 1nfluence as an 1ndispensable manager 
of how the work should be done. 
l1tl . 
C.3.b. Resource control b;y 120werful - 1n this casestudy, the 
coal1tion remained within the process of attaining resources 
from stronger (school board) or essentially equal (a.ctive ooa11­
t-lon members) units. One example of seeking alterna.te resourcea 
vas the e.st,a.bllshment of a summer program utilizing park depart. 
ment tac,111tles after the1r proposal was first rejected by the 
school bo~d. 
I). AnalYtical Questions: 
D.l. Power resources: 
DROP IN- CENTER FAMILY SERVICE AGENCIES 
Starr time Start time 
Funds Funds 
Bapport with Rapport with estab11shed agencies:: 
_ youth Image of respectability
Vote(s) Votes 
D,,2 •.Kain coalition decision issues and releva.nt resources: 
KAI.N·ISSUES HELEV~NT RESOURCES 
.". 
1. Project ,-goal
and focus 
2. Acceptance of 
proposal 
3. Presentation or 
plan to school board 
(extra-coalitional
dec1sion) 
4.- .Summer program 
5. Presentation of 
plan to SChool board 
(extra-coalitional
decision) • 
Votes, staff time •. funds, rapport wit~ 
:routh, image of respectability.
. - ­
Votes and resources relevant to the 
plans make-up (not given in casestudl). 
Respectable image, inclUSion ot school 
board, 1nformation,_ staff tlme,~funds.; 
promote public image of schools rap~·­
port with schools. 
Votes, fac1l1ty. staff, funds. 
Respectable image, inclusion ot board, 
information, promote public image ot 
schools, rapport with schools. 
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KAIlt ISSUES 	 RELEVANT RESOURCES 
6. program Votes, maintenance of coalit1on mem~ 
atruc:ture ber in-put (resource and policy). 
D.3. 	Influencer's) and Influencee(s): 
DECISION.. ISSUE INFLUENCER(S) INFLUENCEE(S) 
1. Project

goal 

2. Acceptance of 

proposal 

3. Presentation to 
school board 
4. 	Summer program 
-5. Presentation to 
school board 
. 6. Program 
structure 
Drop 1n Center Agencies
Agencies Drop in Center 
Not given 1n.casestudy 
Coalition School board 
Not 	given in casestudy 
Coalltion(agency School board 
members· only) 
Hot given 1n 
r 
casestudy 
D.4~ Decis10n issues and relevant member resources.: 
DECISIeN'ISSUES RELEVANT MEMBER RESCURCES 
- 1. Project goal Drop 1n Center Vote:, funds, statt 
t1mel, ra.pport wi th 
l outJl • 
. Agencies Vote. J funds, sta.tt 
rappbrt with estab­
11shed agencies,i­
mage ot respectability_ 
2. Acceptance of Not given in casestudy but above resources 
proposal (1) would be relevant again. 
3. 	Presentation to 
school board Coalition 	 Rapport wj "'.h sc hools 
(partia.l; exception­
Drop in Center), fUnis, 
statt time. 
4. 	Summer program Not given in casestudy but above re­

sources (1) would be relevant again. 

120; 
DECISION ISSUES RELEVANT MEMBER, RESCURCES 
5. Presentat10n to 
8choo·1 board 
6. Program 
structure 
D.5. Outcome: 
... 
DECISICN: ISSUE 
Coa11t10n (..a­ Respectable image t~ 
gencl members statf time, funds, 1n­
only) format1on, 1nclusion 
ot Board, rapPJrt
w1th schools. 
Hot g1ven 1n:casestudy but votes and 
ma1ntenance ot coalition member in~pu~ 
(resource and policy). 
DECISION CHOICE 
....... .,." . 

1. Project goal 
2. Acceptance of 
proposal. 
3. Presentat10n to 
sohool board. 
4. Summer program 
5. Presentation to 
sohool. board 
6. Program structure 
D.6. Member Posit1on on 
Format1on of drop 1n centers tor pre-­
alienated youth and drop 1n centers ,for 
the1r parents. 
~f1rmat1ve - drop in center plan. 
Rejected 
Aff1rmat1ve - park department fac1l1ty 
~nd coalition staff and funds. 
Aff1rmative - ,drop 1n center plan through
the schools. 
Dec1sion-making execut1ve board and a 
·proj~ct coord1nator. 
Issues and Actual Outcome:,.+ = in:,fav,or." 
=aga1nst, ? =not known. 

DECISION CHOICE V.tEMBER POSITICN 

1. Format1on of drop D~op in + 
1n center plan. Center 
Agenc1es + 
2. Affirmat10n ot , (unamin1ty inferred +)
plan 
3. ReJeotlon by Coalition 
­
scbool board SC)hool board., + 
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.• DECISICII CHelCE MEY~ER PCSITICN 
-",' ... ' 
4. Atf1rmation of sum­ ? (unani~1ty inferred +) 
mer program 
5. AffirmatIon by 
schoo~ board of 
Ooalition 
School_board 
+ 
+ 
plan tor drol' ·1n 
centers 
6. Executive 
board and pro­ject cO.ordinator 
.1 . (unanim1.ty inferred +) 
D.7•.Membe'r Goals Comparedwl th FInal Cutccme: 

C-oALS FIlIAL OUTCCYlE 

Formati.on of Formation at drop 1n 
drop 1n cen­ centers in hlghschools 
ters in'hlgh- for (apparently) tl pre_ 
'schools for alienated" youth and 
"pre-alIenated" their parents with a 
youth with an focus on problems •. 
educationa.l 
toous. 
Agenciss 	 l?ormation of 

drop 1n centers 1n 

high schools for 

fam11ies of "pre­

a11enated" youth

with an educational 

tOCHS (latter point

implIed by casestudy). 

II. ROQis10n-Making Process Analysis: in order to assess the case­
study in relation to typological'and phase issues' assertions" 
. each ma1n decision (using above sequent1al numbers) w111 be 
placed in a table and discussed later. 
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PROBLEM SCLUTICN 

InnovativeI NCRElI..ENTALROUTINE 
blem 
uat.lon 
lriforma:tlon adequate inadequate a.dequate 1nadequate adequate inadequate 
t1ne. 
IJ.dequate
inadequate 
r:-emen1;a.l adequate
inadeaua.te 
6 2.5 4t 
:lovatlve adequate 1 
:1 na.nequate .~ 
, 
1. The problem of dealing with, and providing social service for,: 
·"pre-aliena.ted" 	youth a.nd their families'was a new area for all 

coa11tion members. The proposed .solu41on~ a plan.. for drop-in 

. 	 centers in highachools for this segment of' the population,.; was 
an untr1ed method in this.area. Their overall information ap­
peared to be adequate. 
2. The problem of decid1ng on the wr1tten proposal was a natural. 
outgrowth (incremental) of the overall group process. The solu­
tion was also an outcome (1ncremental) of an earlier consensus 
about the coalit1on's goal. The information seems adequate i~ 
l1ght ot the above. 
3. For the coalition as a whole, except. for Drop in Center which' 
had already subm1tted a Similar plan to the board, the Situation 
ot present1ng the plan to the school board was a new (1nnovativa») 
approach. Their lack of' tactiCS and awareness of dealing with 
the school board 1nd1cates 1nadequate informat1on and situat10n 
assessment on the1r part. The solution or choice of the board 
in..reject1ng the plan was an adaptation (o.ncremental) to their 
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earlier decision on a s1milar plan and on adaptat10n to their 

political s1tuat1on. The1r 1nformation and assessment seems 

quite aceurate and adequate. 

4. The reJ~ct1cn of the plan by the board forced the coa11tion: 

into a situation of ~a~ing· to adapt (1ncremental) to the1r al­

ternatives. This seems to have been a correct (adequate) as­

sessment. T~ solut1on of developing a p1lot project through 

the park dep~rtment and their own resources was a new (lnno~a-
, 
tive) move by the group. The deployment and outcome of that 

plan was assessed as a fa1lure, indicat1ng a lack of 1nforma­

tion 1n the solution plan they developed. 

5. The re-presentatlon of the plan to the school board, w1th 

considerable persuasive ground 'work, was an adaptation( inore.­

mental) or the earlier reject10n and reflects an accurate as-· 

e8sement and view (adequate) of the s1tuation. The board's 

. , 
solution ot aff1rmat1on'was a developmental result (1ncremental) 
ot their changed po11tical s1tuation (also need for add1t1onal 
resources) and increased understand1ng (adequate 1nformat1on); 
'ot the program. 
Q. The need to estab11sh a program governing structure 1s an adap-­
.tat1on (1ncremental) to the plan I s acceptance and 1ts need for 
1mplementat1on. The coa11t1on seems to have been aware (ade­
quate) 'of th1s. The actual compos1,tion of the executive board 
was merely a rout1ne re-namlng of the plann1ng group. From the 
casestudy, several (especially Drop 1n Center) of the. coalit1on 
members were not aware (1nadeqijate) ot the consequences of th1s 
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solut10n upon ho~ the program would actually be conducted (pub~ 
.licity disagreement). 
A. Typolog1cal Issues: 
A~l. Problem fam1l1arity - the categor1es of problem situation 
and solution tend to be applicable and provide greater clarity 
1n ana11~1ng the dec1s10ns. A distinct10n between total coa11­
" 
t10n membersh1p and 1nd1v1dual members would be helpful. 
A.2. "Patterns - there appearfitd to be no. clear relationsh1p be­
-

tween the type of problem s1tuatlon and solution be1ng the same... 
Th1s was the case w1th 3 of the 6 ma1n dec1sions analY,zed. 
A.3. Informat1onal adequacy - 1nformat1on adequacy or 1nade­
.... ~ . " .~ ~ 
quacy was useful in analyzing the coa11tlon's dec1sions. Th1s 
was especially the case 1n 1nstances of 1nadequate information 
(problems 3,4,6), wh1ch helped make the process more understand­
.. 
able. 
B. Phase Issues: 
B.• 1. Innovat1on - only problem 1 was an 1nnovative sltuaticr. w1th 
" 
an1nnovative solution. T.he most common problem s1tuations (pro-­
,blems 2,4,5,6) and problem solutions (problems 2,:;,5) were 1ncre-­
mentally or1ented with numbers 2 and 5 hav1ng both an incremen­
tal s1tuation'~nd solution. 
B.2. Diversity - ,of the ma1n 1ssues, there wa.s no gravitat10n to­
ward routine orientations, but 1ncremental or1entations became 
1~5 
p,edomlnant atter dec1sion 1 (innovative -'innovative). 
B.3. Rational -chases - the formation. of the coa11tion seems to 
have tollowed rational phases in decision-making. Both of the 
pr1ncipal coalit1onal segments, 1dentified the problem (rational 
model step 1) as "pre-alienated youth." There was an effort to 
gather 1nformation (step 2) from those 1nvolved about the pro­
blem. They then listed two possible alternat1ve strategies and 
solut1ons (step 3), parental drop 1n centers and youth drop ln~ 
cent.ers. They determined the consequences of each (step 4) ,. 1m. 
yolve p~rents and family agenc1es only or 1nvolve youth and Drop 
In:".Center only. They made a comparat1ve evaluation of the 
findings (Step 5), 1ncomplete alone •. They then selected a solUp· 
" ~,!! ~ ~ ..) , • • 
tlon (step_ 6 ), combin1ng !,. the twe. They i~inaliy sO\lg~t- to enacto. 
the solution by (step 7) presenting.lt to the school board for 
approval. 
this same process seems also to be evident in the co&11­
, . 
tlon's decision a.nd process of re-applying to the school board 
With an alternat1ve strategy. The decisions based 'upon inade­
quate information (problems 3,4,6) indicate a .lack of. rational 
deCiSion-making steps. Inadequate situat10n assee~ment (dec1­
alon 3) 1nd10ates poor problem identifica.ticn (ra.tional step 1). 
Inadequate solut1on assessment (problems 4,6) 1ndicates poor so­
luUon.pl&nn1ng and enactment (rat1onal steps 2-7). 
13.3.&. Relatlve apn11cab111tr - thls coalition appears to have 

demonstrated the variables (1n certa1n instances) ot ratIonal 

. deCiSion-making and internal cooperat10n and consensus in goals. 
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It. should be noted, however, that those dec1sions wh1chfollow­
ad the rational model we're the result of rat10nal cooperat10n. 
In tb1s casestudy the rat10nal process was apparently the inde­
pendent var1able and cooperation the dependent var1able. Th1s 
1s indlcated by the fact that the 'coa11tion's lrrat10nal dec1­
slons (problems 3,4,6) were apparently ~nan1mous'dec1s1cns (co­
operat1on and consens,us) but did not follow rational dec1s1cn­
making steps. Cooperation does not necessar1ly cause a coallt1on. 
, to decIde rat1onally. Rationa11ty does apparently necessItate 
cooperation and consensus. 
B~4. Ur~t bias - unit blases were evldent in the declsion-mak1ng 
process, espeCially 1n goal and program setting (decisions 1,2)~ 
and the school board votes (decisions 3,5). 
B.S. Coa11tional cohesiveness - th1s casestudy·s coalition wf1,S 
characterlzed predom1nantly by 'issue and 1nterest agreement and 
consensus w1th sllght va~iance of main focus between Drop In­
Center (youth) and the Famlly Agencies (family), but these were 
,closely lnterrelated. 
Critlque; The analytical model generally was useful ln inter­
preting the casestudy. There were, however, problems with scme 
speclfic aspects of the model. 
One diff1culty arose from the need to analyze the role Qr 
the schoo~ board in the case. If it 1s an external unit, 1t ls 
dlfficult to assess the transactions betw,een it and coalItion 
within the existing analytioal model. The model falls to ade­
quately take into account coalit1onal relations w1th extra-coali­
, -: 
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tlonal units, espec1a.lly those crucial to goal attainment. If 
the Board were to be considered a coalition member, it is dif­
ficult to rationalize, since it was not involved in internal 
coall'tional operations and policy decisions. 
As mentIoned a.bove 1n the analysis of the "Rap" coa11tion" 
assertIon~I.C.l.c. appears to be contrary to the casestudy find­
ings. There appears to have been a consIderable degree of com­
mitment to 'individual unit goals, as well as"a high level of 
coa11tional cooperatIon, instead of low cooperat1on as I.C.l.c • 
....... 

contends would result. 

Another model.weakness 1s 1ts 1nab111ty to account tor 

l1ab111tIes, as well as, resources. This issue ar1ses from 

~ . 
Drop in Center and the ~gencles' lia.bil1t1es. In assessing the 
fIrst decis10n of the school board" Drop in Center's controver­
s1al 1mage was a liability, but the model makes no specif1c re­
terence to the role of liabilit1es 1n analyz1ng dec1aion~making. 
An .dditicnal model deficiency develops from its emphasis 
upon maIn Issues and decisions. This results in biaSing a nearlyy 
, exclusive analysis of innovatIve and incremental dec1sions. 
-.the outcome .1s a f'a11ur.e -to analytically 'account for routine dec1..­
!10n situations and ·solutions.-.. This. could be altered with a 
more deta1led casestudy, however, and is not necessariiy an in­
herently model based detect. 
Also w1th reepec't to decls10n types, it would b~ helpful 
1n classlfyir.g casestudy d'ecisl~ns if these -decisions' were analy­
zed for theentlre coal1tion as an ent1ty. Otherwise, conf'u~lon: 
in class1fication could result f'rom decisicns like number 3, 
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where the s1t.uation was innovative for the coalition as a whole" 
but.1DC~enta~ for Drop in Center, which ha.d ence before sC?ne' 
that :route. A possible deficiency also under "Typological 1s­
suean 1s found with assertion II.A.2. The. _findings do not reveal 
that the m&-tchlng of .the same "problem 8ituation and- solut"9n!types 
1s necessar~ly.the general rule. 
Aasertlcn II.B.3.&. seems to be inconsistent with the find­
ings ab.out the '''Rap'' coalition. Instead of cooperation deter­
min1ng whether rational decisions are possible, ratlen~lity ap­
pe&%-S to require cooperation 1n this casestudy. However, the 
latter is not necessarily valid. since all of the decisions were 
cooperat1on and consensus oriented, and no evidence is provided 
by thls case as towhetter rational decisions occur in conflict.. 
decision processes. 
. . 
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CHAPTER 6 
Summary and Conclusions 
Ha~1ng app11ed the analyt1c~lmodel to four casestud1es,~ 
an across casestudy assessment of the usefulness and relevancy 
ot''Lhat model w1ll be employed to glve a broader evaluation and 
summarization. This ..,ill be done through the use of a scallng 
model app~ied to each assertion or propos1tion of the analytlcal 
model for each casestudy. Following this wlll be. a summary state­
ment on the findings for each of these assertions. 
The terms used for sca11ng were chosen on the basls of ex­
pressing whether the findir~s were in keeping wlth assert1ons. 
In numerous assertlons, a result contrary to the assertion 1s 
possible, so the scallng te~s had to account for the possibi. 
lity of that phenomenon. AS a result, the baslc terms "Identical" 
and "OPPosite" were selected for scaling purposes. "Identical" 
.refers to the sameness of the assertion, and what was found in 
the casestudy. "Opposlte" refers to the contrariness of the as­
sertion, and what was found in the c~sestudy. Both terms will be 
utilized on a Bc.ale increasing in degree from "s11ghtly f II to "es_ 
sentially," to "very. 'I "Ambiguousn will be used as a term in­
termediate of "identical'" and "oPPoslte J tt to express a. lack ot 
clar1ty or certalnty about the scaling of a f1nding. 
The assertions will be scaled accordl~~ to the casestudy 
,
f1ndlngs, andtbis will be followed by comments on individual 
assertlons and then on the entire model and study. 
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Very 	Identical Essent1ally Identical Slightly Ident1ca.l Amblgul)uS 
3 2 1 0 
S1ghtly Cpposite EssentiallyOPPoslte Ve17 Oppos1te
-1 -2 -3 
CASESTUDY FINDINGS 
iCh1ld uSlack "Mental ":project
Assertton Advocacy" Coa11tion" Health" Rap" Total Mean 
1 • .1.1. 
I.A.2. 
I.B.l.a. 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
12 
12 
12 
3 
3 
3 
I.B.1.a.~J 
I.B.1.a.2 
I.B.l. b•. 
I.B.l.c. 
I.B.2.a. 
I.B.2.b. 
1'.B.2.c. 
1.B.2.C.l~ 
I.B.2.c.2 
'I.B.2.d. 
I.B.2.e. 
I.O.l.a. 
I.C.l.b. 
I.Q.l.b.l)
1.0.1.e. ~ 
I .. O.l.d. 
I.O.l.e. 
1.0.2.&. 
I .. 0.2.b. 
1.. 0.2.0. 
1.0.3.a. 
I.C.3.b. 
I.D.l. 
I.D.2. 
I.D.3. 
I.D.4. 
I.D.5. 
I,.D.6. 
I.D.1. 
3 
2 
3 
3 
2, 
3, 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
3 
3 
33' 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
1 
2 
3 
3 
2 
0 
2 
3 
-2 
0 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
1 
2 
2 
.3 
3 
2 
3 
3 
2 
3 
" 3 2 
,3 
-3 
0 
3 
2 
-1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
-3 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
1 
2 
;
'2 
3 
2 
~ 1 
0 
l 
~ 
2 
1 
2 
3 
3 
2 
-3 
0 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
2 
3 
3 
2 
3 
-
12 
10 
11 
11 
~~ 1 
,'5 
10 
1 1 
'5 
-5 
8 
11 
7 
7 
'0 
7 
12 
12 
1 1 
.8 
8 
',~ 
12 
10 
12 
12 
7 
1 1 
3 
2.5 
2.15 
'2.75 
.25 
1.25 
2.5 
2.75 
1.25 
1.25 
2 
2.75 ' 
1.75 
. .1 .75: 
0 
1.75 
3 
3 
2.75 
2 
2 
2.25 
3 
3 
2.5 
3 
3 
2.50 
2.75 
': 
11.1..1. 
11.A..2. 
II.A.3. 
II .B,. 1 • 
II.B.2. 
II..B.3. 
II.B.3.a. 
II ..B.. 4. 
II.B.5.. 
fOUL 
2 
1 
0 
-3 
2 
1 
2 
3 
1
-95 
2 
3 
3 
-3 
1 
0 
2 
3 
0 
85 
2 
-1 
0 
-3 
1 , 
3 
3 
3 
2 
75 
2 
0' 
3 
-3 
1 
3 
-1 
3 
2 
75 
8,
6, 
-t2 
5 
7 
.6 
12 
5 
330 
2 
~.~;, 
-3 
1.25' 
1.75 
1.5..:; 
3 
t,2S'2.5 
, . . 
"Child "Blaok "Kental "Pro iect..l 1}1 
Advooaoy" . Coa11 t1on" Health" Rap" ~.tal Mean: . 
2.32 . 2.07 2.01 
Oomments on Case study Find1ngs 
I.A.1. Th~ assert10n that a positional analys1s would be a viable 
method of assesslng the power and 1nfluence of ooali tioD:" members in:! 
decis10n-making was very useful 1n the casestudles reviewed. Th& 
data ln the casestud1es was generally adequate in enabllng the eftec.­
tlve use of thls analytical method. Problems did exist in that_there 
were data gaps because the case stud1es were no~.compi1ed orls+nally 
to~nor accord1ng to the needs o~,thls model. 
I.A.2.·The assertlorr:advooatlng that a dec1s1onal analysis was a re­
vea11Xlg' and useful method of assessing coali tional decislon-mak1ng . was 
basicallYJ8ubstant1ated 1n this study. Th1s was especially the 1m­
stance with "exchange 1ssues" and also w1th the "analyt1c.al questions,," 
exce;pt that the casestudy da:ta was frequently 1nsu'ffic1ent to fu~ly: 
ut1lize the potentia.l of the analytical quest1ons. The def1ciencies: 
were clearly more in the lack of data than lnthe quest1ons o 
I.B~_~.a. This a.ssert1on -was highly substant1ated by the f1nd1ngs of 
'th1s study. "Domain" protection and expans10n 1s a s1gnit1cantt 
. 
coa11t10nal analyt1cal var1able e, 
I.B.t.a.l) Interdependency a.s an organizat1onal motive tor tonrdll6 
and join1ng coa11tions to promote doma1n protectlon or expanslon=ls 
a salient,_dynam1c of coa11t1onal behavior. 
I ..B..l.a.2) The assertion: that the autonom;r ot coalit1onal members 
i8 relative to the degree: ot coa11tional oontrol of resources and 
8Qphlst1cat1on of 1nternal organizat1on was a useful p~oposit10~ 
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in- analyzing the casestud1es. The use of the not1on: of membe%!"- au.. 
tonomy shoul.d be clar1f1edas referr1ng. to member coalit10nal behav­
lor -·b8hav10r w1th respect to coa11t10nal act1vIties and concerns. 
I.B.•;1.b. The assertion that the extra-coa11t1onal' relations orcoa­
l1t10lr'members can ,be a source ot a cons1dera.ble amount;.. ot thelJl' 
influence w1thin: the. coa11t10n: 1s strongly 1ndlcated to be the a1.\.­
uat1an: in. the tour casestud1es assessed. P:ro.bably,. a related as­
sertion would be useful wlth raspect,.to~ the extra-c:oa11tlonal rela­
tlons of the coalltlon-as a unlt as belllg a s1gnlf1cant facton In:the 
coalltion-'s degree of lnfluence In- ach1eving its goal or.-· program. 
:l.B.l.c. The proposition-that slnce coalltions are usually; concern­
ed only wlth lssues secondary to each un1~ls lnuerests" thatt these 
unit;'s primary concern wlthin the coalitlon~ wlll be to protec1L and. 
promote 'its prlmary lnterests ls: substantia.ted! In- the cas8study 
material. Thls phenomenon" was apparent:. in: two forms:" (~) curtail­
ment or abstens1on: from Qertaln.~ or a.ll aO.allt.1onali" operations.. wheJt 
a.contllct:between: \lnlt. and: coa11t10nal act1vltl.es:: arose and (2) in'!'"' 
vo~vemenu, In' coa11t10nal.areas whlc-lt were sp~oirieally. relevant. to 
member.. unit_lnterests. 
LB.2.a. The assertion" that~rormal coallt10nal roles carry lltUe 
real power was not clearly substant1a.ted- by the casestudy data., 1.t:. 
ls' possIble that it;:. could have increased'the external lnfluence 01' 
indIv1dual members.' Att best" the result 1s amb1guous. The SCOl!1ng 
system may have added- some contusion- Since 3 of the 4 casestudles 
'rated' the assertion- as related to the data" but the 1 exceptlo!I! was a... 
stro1'J811. dltrerent~,result. Since no. clear result ... ls apparent" thIs 
&ssertlon:requ1res addltlonal testing and perhap~ a reassessmen~ 
.. ' 
1}3 

oft'data materia.l. 
I.B.2.b. The proposltlon that member units may onlY,be represen~ 

1ng a segmen~ ot 1ts "parentt.organlzat1on" seemed to have only 

sl1ght value. In.1ts statement 1t exoludes the pO.ss1b111tf o,~ an: .... 

opposite f1nd1ng by use of' the word Ilmay.~1 Ltl. only asserts that. 

there is the posS1b1l1ty that some un1t members may not;. tully:: 

representthelr "parent organ1zatlon." 

1.B.2.c.1) The assertion~that d1fferent aotors w1l1 be more do~ 
m1Dant~1n;d1tferent 1ssue areas was very well supported by the 

-
data. Th1s app~ars to have a clear- relationship with the 1ssue 
ot member'1nterdependency - units Join together to benef1t from: 
the resouroes ot each other. It may also have detrimental ef~ 
teots relat1ve to the weaker unlt(s) 1n~certain ot these instances. 
1.B.2.c.2) The assertlon- that"a ocnsiderable amount of testing ot 
one another's power. resources w1ll ocou,r" espec.1ally early 1n' a c::o­
allt1on:-'s operatlon-wa~ only part1ally substantiated by the analysla; 
of the casestudles~ This 18 somewhat mislead1ng In'' that 3 out. of the: 
~. cases demonstrated "th1s phenomenon" while one, ~"Mental Health, II re~ 
vealed a small degree of testlng, and this occurred relatlvely late 
in:-the c?alitlon's operatlons. Th1s group_ had not as yet entered 
trul, confllctual lssues whlch were to ar.:1se. Up to the p01nt ot 
when the case was written, it had operated predomlnantly as a c.cn­
sensus'coallt10n, whloh seems to have minimlzed testing. It:~is abo 
'poss1ble that prior external relations among memhers made member,:' 
power resources known. 
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I.B.2 •.d. !he asssr'ticn that if a single leader (formal or in­
tormal) emerges in a coalItion, that this ind1cates a h1era.r­
chical "1mbalance-' w1th1n the coal1t1on was slightly-evident in 
the casestudy ma.terial. Th1s assertion is similar to I.B.2.b.,~ 
in that it has no oPPosite, s1nce 1ts conditions are internal, 
1.e. when ~ere 1s a single leader, there 1s imbalance. 
I.B.2.e. The assertion that if there are several coalition 
leaders, this indicates a. "balanced" d1stribution of power re­
sources, seemed to be in keeping with the findIngs. This asser~ 
tion 1s llke I.B.2.b. and I.B.2.d. in its internal validity, i.e •.. 
it there are severa.l leaders, thiS indlcates "balanced'· power. 
As.sertions I.B.2.d. a.nd I.B.2.e. could ·be combined in that a 
coalition's leadership will be e1ther singular or d1stribu-' ...... 
~ed, and this 1s indicative of imbalanced or balanced control of 
.resources respectively. This should a.lso be assessed sepa.rately 
tor formal and informal leadership and resources and then possi­
bly together as an overall view of the ccalition's leadership 
struoture. part of the confUSion with the findings fer these 
two propOSitions was that coalitions could have both ba.lanced and 
imbalanoed leadersh1p and resource distribution depend1r~ upon 
whether the reference point was formal or 1nforn:al leadersh1P. 
and resources. 
I.O.l.a. The proposition that the more general a resource lS,· 
. , 
the broader its appl1cability was well supported by the case-
study data. This 1s somewhat an indisputable assertion,.but 
serves well the function of highlighting a signif1cant variable 
of potier analysis o:t coal1tional behav1or. 
I,.C.2.b., The proposition that resource dependency fosters coord1~ 
atlonand exchange .by means of barga1ning was essentially substant1­
&ted by the data. There ,was one marked exception; "Black voa11t10n. " 
whleh ~ ah1gh degree of internal conf11ct. It could be argued 
l,hat l,hls wasessent1ally an 1deolog1cal conflict. whic·h was imp8%!­
.vious t,c pragtuatlc resource dependency. Itt. was also the case that. 
ne1~her'lead1ns memb~r had resources sufficient_for 1ts own tasks: 
thus resulting ~~a loss of leadersh1p confidence i~eachothen,. 
which would also. undermine supposed dependency. It..\.. is also possi­
ble tha.t thelrgoal was coord1nated by the use of' conflict- taeMas. 
I.C.l .b. 1) The assertlon- tha.t., the greater the coord1natioa and In. 
terdepe~dencet the more relat10ns w1ll take the form of mutual ex-, 
change was well supported by'the research findings. The only excep­
t10D::was'the "B1a.Ck Coal1t10n" to which assertion: 1.0.1 .b. 1) is nou. 
really relevant" because 1t was characte:rized by little ooordlna.­
t.ion.' and considerable oonflict. The 'tChild Advocacy" case also 
had elements of conflict, and lack of cooperation. , 
I.C.l.c. The proposition that the grea.ter the commitment to unitt 
goals, the lower the level of cooperation- was not s'ubstant1ated nor.. 
re~uted by the casestudy data. Ambiguity was the outoome. There 
seems to be a more basio issue 1nvolved for wh1ch th1s a8se~-
tlon.tal1s to account:. The real issue 1s whether a unit!s goals~ 
are cons1stent with those of the coalItion. If they. are., and 
the un1t'~ls h1ghly committed to its interest.,ln~those goals, 
then the member w1ll be h1ghly;cooperatlve,~ e.g. the "Mental 
Health Center." and "project Rap" casestud1es. If' a unit!s go_ala 
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are contrary to the coa.11tion's goals and the unit 1s highly 
committed to 1ts own, ther. the membe~ will engage 1n a low level 
of' cooperation (posSibly even _conf11ct). 
I.C.l.d.. The assertion that the greater the competit1on for re­
souro-es. the greater' the conf11ct was substantiated by the case~ 
s~udy mater1al. Th1s assertion 1s bas1cally concerned with cor~ 
rel.&tlng -resource competition and conf11ct, and where they d1d 
occur it was relevant, but where they d1d not, noth1ng was estab11sh­
ed:nor refuted•. 
I.O.l.e. The'proposIt1on that the greater the relationsh1p be­
. , 
tween the rescurces a.va1lable through coa11tional membersh1p and 
the unit's goals, the higher the level of the un1t's involvement 
in the coa.11t1on was well eStab11shed by the casestudy data. 
This exchar~e assertion 1s closely related to the external struc~ 
tural issue assert1on-, ~ I .B.1 .a., wh1ch deals wi th doma1n'; concerns 
as prompt.~ng un1t coa11t1onal membersh1p. 
I.C.2.a. The assertion :that different 1ssues often require the 
exe-rolse ot different resources is well Bupported by the case­
study data. This has clear 1mpl1cat1ons for the relat1ve 1n­
fluence ameng those who control these resources. 
I .C.2 .b. The proposi tien that there are d1fferent type-s of' costs ­
. . 
which can be 1ncurred by a coa11tional unit, subgroup, or full 
coalltlon(and the types of costs suggested) was well susta1ned 
by the casestudy ma.terial. Of all of the "cost" types found ln~ 
the data, three were most common: "respons1bi11ty," "inter-game," 
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and "d1v1sion ot pay-otts." 
1.0.• 2.0. The a.ssertion-: tha.t there are certain- "dec1sion cost~ 
pr1nciples which can alter the degree ot the cost,. incurred (s1ze" 
unan1m1ty, and 1ndispensable member) was substant1ated by the a­
nalys1s of the cases. The frequency ot each pr1nciple 1n-all 
tour cases was s1ze (1), unan1m1ty (4), and indispensable mem­
ber C3). 
1.0.• 3.&. The proposition that ln cases where the 'more powerful do 
not need the resources of the weaker,. the potential receptor(s), the 
weaker, may employ 1ts other resource potentlals, 1nclud1ng external" 
as commod1t1es for exchange was upheld by the results. Th1s was 
clearly a poss1ble response which was resorted to by weaker coali­
tion members in at least two instances 1n: each case.§tudl. 
I.C.3.. b.. The propos1t1on that ln instances where the more power. 
tul control the resources needed by a potent1al receptor(s)" the: 
wea~er un1t may try .. to develop alternatlve resources as1de from 
the stronger un1t was sustained by casestudy eY1d~nce. Th1s 
was a power strategy that was present ln each casestudy. 
It 1s conce1vable tha~.assertlons 1.0.3.&. and b. could be 
11sted under tt condlt1ons" 1nstead of "situatlons," slnce they 
const1tute bas1cally exchange "cond1tions" of 1nequallty. Another' 
possibillty would be to reclass1fy some .of the assertions curren~ 
11 under "cond1t1ons" wh1ch are descr1b1ng s1tuat1ons of 1nter­
depe.ndency and mutual eXChange and categor1ze them under "situa­
t1ons." 
-

1.•1). The I.D. series of seven "analytical questions" will be 

rated on the same scale as the rest of the material but with the 

. altered meaning of the terms "1dentical" 'and "opposite" to refer 
to the degree of continuity between the question and the degree 
of relevant material 1n:the casestudy. If the question is rele­
vant and useful for analysis, then there is an identicalness·of 
the question and the material. 
LD. 1 .-7~ There was cons1derable case material available for all 

of the analytical questicns. The two questions wh10h had the 

least data were 3 (t1who exercised or attempted to in·fluence whom 

In' each decision issue?~) and 6 ("vlhat pos1tion did each unit 

take on~:each decision issue as compa.red to the outcome of the 

decis1on-making process?") Both of these questions were highly 

useful analytioally when the data was available. The problem 

. was in t.he occaSional lack Of. ca'sestudy" data, not jjl the analj7t1cal. 
questicns. These quest10ns explicated the 'data and. key decision­
al and power issues so clearly that it would be more product1ve 
to have them proceed section I.C. "Exchange Issues" 1nstead of 
follOWing it. Th1s would help clarify the data to be assessed 
by the "exchange" assert1on~. 
II.A.1. The assertion that the degrees of fam1liarity with pro­

blems and with solutions are conce1vable within a continuum of 

routine, 1ncremental, and 1nnovatlve'was_ supported by the case­

study results. It should be clar1fied that in th1s assert10n 

the fam1l1ar1ty ot the ooa11tion as an entity is what 1s be1ng 

measured, not that or each unit member. The app11cation of th1s 
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assert10n does require a certain arb1trar1ness, but 1t should be 
done w1th caut10us rationality. 
II.A.2. The assertion that problem s1tua.tion and solut1on types 
are usually 1dentical was slightly supported by the data. In tac't." 
one case 1nd1cates the opposite; while one case indicate the 
two variables as identical; and yet two:·casesare ambiguous. A 
bro~der sa~plins may be necessary to further :afl~~1'S the basis 
for th1s d1screpancy, but it does appear that a more viable as­
sertion might be ftwhile problem situation a.ndsolut1on types 
may be 1dentical"any combination of types can, :and frequently 
does occur." 
II.A.3. The assertion that the variable of informational ade­
quacy was useful as related. ~o the sufficiency of understanding 
ot the demands of the problem situation and of the consequences 
lot the problem solution for what they are: innovat1ve, 1ncre­
mental, or routine had mixed support from the caseatudy mat.er­
ial. It was very helpful 1n the cases where obvious inadequacy 
ex1sted in problem 'sltua.tio:Q.S and solutions, a.nd the concept 
helped clarity the case material. In the cases where no lack 
ot 1nformation was apparent, the notion seemed to be of no 
obvious value. Actually, its value cculd have been that it· 
specifIed that the informatIon was adequate. This notion does 
seem to have analytical value. 
II.B.l. The assertion that in application to 1nterorgan1zational 
. . 
coal1t1ons, it is probable that nearly all problem situations and 
solut10ns·w1ll be innova.t1vely or1ented was overwhelmingly un­
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s~bstantiated by the casestudy data. Out of all of the 37 case­
study dec1sion issues classified, only 8 were consistent with 
the assertion and 7 of these occurred quite early 1n coa11tional 
operat1ons. This ind1cates e1ther a 'faulty application of the 
assert1on, or 1nadequate and/or inaccurate casestudy material, or 
an invalid assertion. These concepts tend to be d1fficult to 
apply"bu~ the extens1veness of the data's refutation of the as­
sertion as 1t 1s stated makes its valid1ty highly questionable 1~ 
the least. The assertion seems to have failed to account for 
the predominance of routin1zed ~nd adaptive dimens10ns of a co­
alition's decision issues. A coal1t1on appears to quickly ac­
qu1re" 1 ts own modus operand1 and purpose' as 'an erganlzat1on". 
II... B.2. 	The proposition that once basIc ground rules are esta­
. . 
b11shed and the coal1tion galns exper1ence, the other orienta­
tions (incremental and routine) will become operative was s11ghtlr 
supported by the analy:sis of the data. The results were "slight" 
1n their confirmation of the assertion; because, while the extreme-­
ly early decision( s) ot each coa11 tion was innovat1ve-ir.novative" 
very few 1nnovat1ve-innovat1ve 1nstances took place and an ins1g­
nificant number of routine deciSions. The latter is, however, 
probably the result of the analytical model's bias ot asses­
s1ng "main decisions" which tends to preclude rout1ne problems. 
In additIon the case materia.l tended ~o be, cur~gry,which failed 
to relate minor details and routineoccurrencea. The assertion" 
subsequently, seems to have vIability and relevance, but add1­
tional analysis of 1t would be helpful. 
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Ii.•B.3. The propositlon~ that certain procedures or phases in: dec1­
81o~making seem to be relatively cons1stent_1n most sltuat1ons:where 
ratlonallty is regarded as s1gniticant by the partic1pants was re­
latlvelywell substantiated by the data. The relativeness ot-the: 
,..,substantiation is the result ot the tact that those cases ln whlch 

part1c1pants valued rat10nall ty d1d demonstrate cons1stent phases­
·or steps ln decis1on-making. At the same time, those two cases 

whlch lnd1cated low participant valuat10n ot ratIonality could 

1ndlcate nothlng about the vall~ity ot an assertion whlch only 

assesses 1nstances ot a rational process. 

ILB.3.'s.. The assertion that the appllcabil1ty of the ratlonal 
model 1s probably relat1ve to the degree ot cooperation ot con­
tllct of-goals and 1nterests ot the units comprising the inter­
organizational coal1t1on was supported by the casestudy tindlngs. 
fhe evidence 1ndicates that interes~and goal cooperation and con­
" -tliet.., are cond1tions, but> not;~ the causes, ot whether ratlonal' 
dec1sion-making takes place or not. Th1s is 1ndleat.ed by. one 
casestudy whlch was a predom1nant~y consensus operation., but~ whlch 
1n several 1nstances used lrratlonal decis1on-mak1ng procedures. 
Whlle cooperat1on', existed 1 t d1d not necess1tate or cause ration... 
allty, lt Just made 1t poss1ble. Interest and goa~ oontl1ct 
tend to make.. the rat10nal de,cls1on-mak1ng_ phases imposslble,. be­
cause coalltion alternat1ves are viewed w1th min1mal objectivity. 
th1s does not~mean,~however, that an individual unit's goals are 
not rational.1n terms ot lts selt interest.1n a rational sense. 
II.B.4. The assertion that 1n coal1t1onsJ~strong un1t blases 

should be expected to be operat1ve in the deo1s1on-making phases 

was extremely well supporte'd 1n'the casestudy results. This is 

.: 
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not. 1nconsistent with the findings related to assertion II.B.3.a., 
becauee units can be seeking to protect and promote their domain 
and bias, but can achieve this in a rational process under con­
d1t1ons of cooperat1on and 1nterdependency. 
II.B.S. The proposition that 1ssue and 1nterest agreement or 
disagreement among units are both compatible w1th the format1on 
ot a coalition was only "slightly" confirmed by the casestudy 
data. The problem is primarily; that, while both interest. and 
; . 
issue agreement and disagreement are compatible w1th coal1tion 
formation, serious and fundamental disagreement may not be com­
patible with the maintenance of the coalition. Th1s ambigu1ty· 
needs to be olar1fied and can be w1th the add1t1on of the asser­
tion:: tII.B.5.a.): "rundamenta~ and serious issue and 1nterest 
disagreement tends to be 1ncompat1ble w1th the ma1ntenance and 
cont1nued ex1stence of coal1t1onal membersh1p,:especially 1f 1t.. 
1s 1n confl1ct w1th the member's goals. 1f 
-: '". . . . "" .' ~ _ ; r-' ,:.~ ~ ", r ~. . .\. 
... 
. -' 
Cummulat1ve Mean Scores:- 1nd1cate a s.lgn1f1cant degree ot oonststen­
cy. and ldent1.ty: between the analyt1ca'! model and the casestudy :r~ings. 
Summarz of Recommended 
Analytical Model Mod1fications 
These recommendations are the result of the casestudy t1nd­
1ngs and comments upon them, wh1ch 1dentified.several medel pro­
positions that were defio1ent in whole or 1n part and several 1n­
stances of needed model restructuring. S1nce the cr1t1c1sms 
were l1sted 1n the above comments, only the affected assert10ns 
143. ',-, 
.lllbe g1Yen here with the1r suggested alterat1ons: 
I..B.1.a.2)It appears that the autonomy,w1th1n the coa11t1on,ot 
. . 
coa11t1on members 1s lessened relat1ve to the coalition's control 
or resources and sophistication of 1nternal organ1zation. 
I.B.1.b.l) It is probable that in certain instances the extra.­
coalItIonal rela.t1ons of the coalit1on as an ent1ty could 816­
~tlcantll lnt1uence lts dec1sions and act1ons. 
I.B.l.d. Whlle a slng1e formal leader in a coat1t1on 1nd1cates 
« • ' 
an 1mbalance of formal power within the coa11t1on, several for­
mal leaders in a coa11tion ind1cates a balance of formal· power 
w1thin the coalltion.: 
I.B.l.e. While a single 1nfo.rmal leader in a coa11t1en 1nd1cates 
an imbalance of informal power withln the coalition, several In­
formal leaders in a coalition indicates a balance of formal po­
wer withln the coalltion. 
I.B.l.f. While a slngle leader (formally and informally) in a co­
alit10n 1ndicates an imbalance of overall power w1th1n the 00&11-­
tlon, several leaders (formally and/or informally) ln a coa11tlo~ 
indicates ,a balance of overall. power w1thin the coalltion. 
I.B.2.a. Formal coalltlonal roles, lf they are establ1shed, u­
. . 
sual1y carry little real power, internally. 
I.B.2.a.1) When formal coalit1onal roles do carry real power, 1t 
usually 1s the consequence of those in formal leadersh1p also 
concurrently controlllng S1grtlflcant informal power resources. 
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I.D.1-7. Analyt1cal Quest10ns to go before I.C. Exchange Issues. 
I.O.l.C. Un1t goals and unit cooperativeness ­
I.el,.c.,) It a un1t's goals are cons1stent with ~e coa11tlonl~~ 
&nd!the unlt is highly committed to lts interest in those goals~ 
the higher the level of cooperation of that member. 
1.0.1.0.2) It a unitts goals are contrar,r to the coalition's and 
theunlt is h1ghly committed to its interest in those goals, the 
lowe~ the level of cooperation of that member (dlsruptive, con­
tllctual behavior 1s 'quite poss1ble). 
1.0.3.&. and b. should be placed in between assertlons I.O.1.d. 
anci e. and the category "S1tuations" under ttExchange Isaues u 
should be eliminated under 1.• 0.3. and the sectlon I.O.l~, should 
read: "Oondltions and Situations." 
II.A.1. Degrees'of coalitional famillarity wlth problem sltua­
tions and solutlons (or decislons) are concelvable wlthin a 
-
continuum of routlne, lncremental, and innovative. 
II.A.2. Whlle problem sltuatlon and solution types may frequentl!' 
be ldentlcal, any combination of types also can, and frequently 
do.as, occnir. 
II.B.l. Among the early main declsions of a coalltion, there u­
sually are ene.or more problem sltuations and solutions which 
are both 1nnovatively oriented (innovative-innovative). 
II.B.3.b. While cooperatlon does not necessitate ratlcnal decl­
slon-mak1ng, it tends to be situationally conduclve for its occur­
renee; whlle conf11ct tends to have the opposlte result:. 
II:.B.5.a. Tundamental and ser10usly overt lssue and lnterest., 
dlsagreement tends to be 1ncompatlble w1th the ma1ntenance and 
contlnu~d exlstence of coalltiona.l membershlp, especlally/ lt 1t., 
1s in conflict w1th the member's goals. 
COHCLUSIOW~, 
The development and testing of these dec1s1on-maklng power 
and process assert10ns to the four casestud1es helped to focus 
the theoret1cally analytical onto the emplrlcally testable. The.~ 
result of this was a. general subst.antiatlon ot the proposed as­
sertlons w1 th the spec1flc revis10n of c'erta1n ot the propos1­
tions. The model d1d provide a usefu,l ~cheme for clar1ty-lng 
and expllcat1ng the decision-maklng ot the coalltlons. ,A broad­
er app11catlonof ~he model to addlt10nal casestud1es could fur­
ther the testlng and revlslng of it in'order to develop a more 
re11able instrument for assessment. 
fbe study sought to expand the body of knowledgeot lnter­
organlzational behavior in: the spec1f1c area ot, coa11tlonal deci­
slon-making. Th1s study has advanced that understanding and 
helped relate the theories and methods of social sclence to It. 
The purpose of the study was not to estab11sh "the analytlcal 
model bu~ to help' 1nitlate the 1nquiry lnto the fleld o~' lnter. 
organizational decis1o~makir~ behavior with a set of assertions 
that m1ght help to assess that phenomenon and to test-.those asse%'.­
t10na. t.rh1s was done and, rev1s1ons, were made inwhat.&ppeared to 
be a relat1vely sa11ent analytlcal model. Addit10nal testing 
--
1-46 
and the development of d1rferent and alternate assertions and 
models would further help analyze the little studied and under­
stood context and content of lnterorganizational behavior. To­
ward this goal, a further rev1ew and assessment of the l1tera­
ture glyen in Cha.pter 1, and additional relevant wr1t1ngs, 
would assist in prov1d1r..g subsequent a.nalytical mod1f1ca.t1ons 
and &l~ernat~ves to the model developed 1~ this study•. 
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1!be whole COllC'&pt ot a prae·tleum emphas1jzea the. value of the learnlng 
process to the student in". doing research. Beejause "practice learnlng~' was.:. 
80 central to this project., 1t,. would be remise not to assess what~was lea:cn.. 
ed tram the exper1ence. !h1s concern w11l be viewed from thr.ee perspectlves: 
(1) what -the researcher le&rned,.~ (~). what others might do ln l1ght, of this •• 
and (3) what the, pro~esselon of Soclal 'Work might_ learn. 
What the researcher learneid. 
I 
perhaps the most slgniflcant learnlng 01' the whole process was the 
real1zatlon'of the lImitations of any method of research. There tends to 
be a myth a.bout .. the irrefutability of the scle.ntlflc method. From th1s ex-­
p,rlence 1t is clear that this was not the case here. Thls ls· not, completely 
the fault of sclentific analysis"lt is also because of the' llmltations or­
all1 slngle ap-p11caticnot this method. The oonstruotive aspect ofthls 
reallzation·.ls that frequently many of the flaws in· a res~arch method and 
deslgn~ can be minimized once lts limltations are rec.ogn1.zed. 
W1th speclfic refe~ence to thls research projec~,; there are severa~ 
weaknesses 1n the. model which later became apparent... These weaknesses are: 
slgnlflcant not:.. only tor thefr impact on- the study but also upon, what the 
researcher learned about soclal sclence research. 
One of these reallzations conoerned how the research was lnltiated. 
fhe method of ldentifying·key c.oncep1:.s and variables for the analytlcal 
model wa.s through a review of pertinent:,. material in- the llterature. This-; 
focus was malnta.lned until the model was fully tormulat.ed before the case­
studies were referred to by the researcher. Thls resulted in a oonceptual 
dlstance between the model and the data. This was espec1ally evldent in 
~vo areas: (1) unolear ooncepts,~ and (2) too narrow a focus upon the model. 
W1th respect to polnt (l) ,; there were severa1 concepU which were 
, 
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either 1nsuff1ciently dellneated or were too broad or.: , too narrow' In'. 
meaning and appllcation. RAt1ona11ty was one such t:erm. I..t was meantt, 
to re~er to "obJectlv1ty" 1n: an-: 1mp.a.rt1:al assessment of goals and alter­
nat1ves. This" however"'referred to the coa11tion; as a Whole and did 
not:.,accountL fer the var1able of rat1onalitywh1ch descr1b.es th~ behav.,1or 
oft' goa~ and alternative assessment and choice by,' lndlvldual,~member: un1t.s,~ 
acc.ord1ns. to their. best:_, selt lnterest:" whlch could be considered qu1te 
jrratlonal. from the v1ew po1nt:. of the total coall~1on; y~t. qu1te rat1ona~. 
, , 
trom-. the member's perspective. Another.:" d1ff1culty with :rat"1onality also 
stems from the peculiar strategy whlch a coalit1on' mlght~ pursue. C~o·oper.-. 
at1on~ tends to appear to be more rational" .wh1le contllc;tt tends 'to appear" 
tQ. be more random and unplanned" yeu, both c:an: be equally as ra~1ona1 1:ft 
p~su1t: of" a'coal1t1onal 89a1. Th1s is' par:ticular.ly ev.ident. in: the "lU.ack. 
. , 
Coalit1on" casestudy" wh1ch appeared highly:, lrrational ln. many. of its', 
subgoal' dec1sions~: (communi ty school_" boycot.t", etc .'); but.:. wh1c.h was·: r.a.thel!"' 
. . 
8uccess.ful 1n~ attaining 1ts bas1c- goals: (~hang~s and more lnf'luence ~ 
thee school .. system and greater un1f1cation: of the black commun1ty). 
Another 1na.dequat,ely developed partL of' the conceptual structure or' 
the. model concerned the not1ons of conf11c11 and cooperation. These terms.: 
were used to rere~: to the 1nternal operat1ons of the coa.11tlon~ amon&. 1b.~ 
own.:member-· un1ts. Of equal signif1cance" but ~left_ undeveloped,: were~ 
these same cottcepts as applied to the strategy of thecoalitlon'~s a 
whole toward 1ts externa.l target" and the s-1gnlf1ea.nc~ of th1,s" in: turn" 
upon: the 1nterna.l operat1ons of. the coa.lltion'. Even Wlth_~ resp,ec"tt, t:o. in­
ternal dynamics, what"appeared to be cooperat1on could eas1ly have been: 
a sltuat1on: of confllct. An~ examp;Le is the "Child Adv,ocacytt case' wh1ch 
had elements' of c.ooperat1on" but;.. which was also. c.ha.racter1zed. by consider..... 
142. 
able conflict;.ot 1nterests and goals" butt, wh1ch also·':r.equl'red op_era­
tiolr. illC order '1#0 att,al~ the goa~ of' ac qu1ring pl"O Jeo t .funds • 
.AaoLher -variable wh1ch was defined ar-d analyzed too narrowly was:~ 
ex'ter.nalresources. It was accounted for wlth resp_eot:_ to. lnfluenclng_ the 
re1:at.lve pos1t.1on~ of .strength of members wlthin': the coalltlon'" butL a, 
un1t'a~ belong1Dg to the coalltion was not seen'l: in'. turn" as bSlng, US:edi 
bTmembers': for:' the purpose of: increasing their external strength. 'Dh1a 
awareness cou~d have given a dlfferent:. lnterpreta.tion·~ to some of the· 
members t coal1t10nal hehavio~ - espec1ally the.. less s 19n1:f'1cant: members:. 
fbe f'a1~ure to more broadly apply some of these var.1ables: 1a·: also. 
relat.ed to p01nt;.. (~):: t'eo narrow' a focus upon', the model. Th1s resulted~ 
ln~ an attempt to make the data. f1t: the. model" when' f.req\lent:ly .1tL was. or 
a d1fferent.. or~ broader.'meaning. As a result" some of these ~ar1ables 
(e.g. ClOnfllct~, (loa11tlozr membershlp~ foIt' extennal ga1n" ratJiona11ty" sue.) 
were:: l~ored. The: model,: from th~ theoretical v·lews up0n-' whlch it was 
constructed, was biased toward more of a strlctly ,ratlona:J., consensus 
perspectlve,~ 19noring confllct theory and analysis. Th1s st,1cklng to 
the model resulted in a too limlted data analysls and,~ therefore l1mlt,.. 
ed what wa.s learned for "exploratory" purposes. 
This all polnts toward the need for the development and use of a 
broader and more flex1ble model. I~·the researcher had used this a~­
p~ach, hls learnlng would have been conslderably greater and pr~bably 
~ore productlve. 
What, others might do in light of this~. 
I:r'&ll1one were to undertake a study of the same toplc area or were 
to use a s1mllar deslgn and method of research, 1 t would be helpful to_ 
correct" or at least.. aVOld,: some of the problems that resulted in th1s~ 
study. 
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.In; order, to co.mpensate tor the limitations ot developing an' analy;t1~ 
cal. model.. -trcmthe llterature~; 1t would greatly ~essen the conceptua~ 
cUstancebet,wee:c. that model and the data, lt the researcher were to pre.­
t,est~ that model.. This should be done before the' model ls finalized 'and 
app~ed to material s1m11ar to that.whlch wlll be assessed' 
. ': 
irr'the re. 
search. Realistic modificatlons can then be made ln the conoepts and 
theoretlcal framewo'rk of the model before fully undertaking the study. 
fills wou1d help to develop a more adequate set of concepts. HoY,..· 
ever,.to more tu11y correct this weakness,. it: would be helpful to re. 
t,&1na position'ot theoretica.l flexiblllty whl1e gathering and analy­
zing t.he data.. This would also respond to the problem of ut1l1z1ng a. 
model too narrowly. Thj.s could also be remed1ed wi th the initlal use. 
ot,;·,a, model wh,1ch was more compreher..s~ve. ~n": thls 1nstance" a model 
wh1ch could account tor both cooperation and contlictwould have allowed 
greater: analytical flex1bility.· It would also be more produa.tlv.e 1t L 
researcher were to concentrate on' what does net flt the model and why.". 
rather than" forcing the data to fl~ 
Some of the problems of this study could have been mlnimized, 1t" a 
more concise and 1nternally and theoretlcally consistent. model had been 
u~lzed. This would have allowed for greater concentration on the more' 
s1gn1:f1cant variables and possible alternatives to them. 
'. What!. the profession of Social Work might learn. 
", - } 
As 'was mentioned 1n the preface to this study, coalitional b,ehavior 
18 a common'; but 11ttle understood phenomenon.. Coa11t1on8 are also fre.. 
quently .ut1lized In". the soc1al work,; community organizat1on, m1l1eu•. '-'his 
is olear.1y evident when conslder1ng the tour casestud1es 1n~ this proJec.t:.. 
Eaoh one tnvolved soc1al welfare 1ssues and actors. It seems obv1ous 
tbatL&ny pract1ce ak11~st as well as theoretical knowledge,.whlch could 
be extracted 'from this study would be of use to soclal workers in coal1­
tional situations. Thls" however,;, was not the cent~al purpose of this 
st.udy and w1ll mostly be lett to inference or to further, analysls. 
There are certain genera.l polnts" however,~ which SholiLd be commented u­
pon in" order.' to avo1d being neg11gent. 
Probably the most, 1mportant. polnt., to, b.e learned by the so'clal work­
er trom this Study 1s that he or she needs to be aware of the 1nteror­
gan1zat1onal ~J.e1d in order to best promote h1s gO.als and 1nterests w1th~ 
1n~coalitlons. The data emphas1zed the s1gn1ficance of self interes~tn; 
these coalitions. Soclal workers tend to recede from Situations of manL.­
pulatlon,:confllct,:or anyth1ng that falls to uphold the value domi"nance 
or: altruism. However,t 1n.~ coa11t;1onal behavior,) 1 t 1s cruc1a~ to be aware 
. . 
of the goals" -hidden agendas," and resource manipulat10ns that usually 
character1ze the 1nterorgan1zat1cnal fleld. Not_to engage i~such cal­
culat10n·ot the tactlcs of others, , and the use of th~ same"is tanta­
mount _to outr1ght. concesslon 01' one IS' own"'1ntsrest. 
The next lssue'is whether In-: fact.. the interest of soclal workers, 
merlts the above type tact1cs and behaVior. For within the coalitlonal' 
t1eld"being aware ot the vulnerabillty of others ls not so much to re­
medy them (casework therapy) as 1t~1s to man1pulate the same for one's 
own: 1nterests and goa.ls. This: 1s "not _solely" w'ithout": altruistic or humam­
latic value" 1rr~that lt w11l be up to the moral dlscretion ot the'lndivi­
dual involved. Furthermo.re, ,the welfare of the pub11c, espec lally the 
ppor"ls often the least cons1dered lnterest in many. policy and p~og~ 
dec1sions" and soclal workers" can assume thelr role as an effectlve ad­
v.ocate tor these people only it ca.lculat.ed and reallst1c coalitional: 
practices are employed. F~om the findlngs: of the study:,; th1s would 1n~ 
;a 
c~u4e de11berate assessment', and use of. tact1cs dealing wi th such things 
as reoaaa1Z1ng eachmemberJs domain and the implications o~ that:. to_ this 
part1oula.r coalition and its goal and possible resources. Itt would be 
important to know the external resources and rela.tionsh1ps ot other mem­
bers, In.clud1ns other ties among member units and the importance of the1r 
membersh1~ in the coalition to their interests external to the coa11t1o~ 
Who. is more influentia.l on wh1ch 1ssues and where to most effect1vely 
use one·s· own 1nfluence is a key problem. I.t is also cruc1al to know', 
what~other units value for eXChange purposes. The role and use of con­
f11ct and cooperat1on by others and oneself 1nterms ot when they are a~~ 
propr1ate and what they mean when they occur are of cons1derable value 
to the pract1tloner,.as well as are other numerous aspects of coalition.. 
al behaVior wh1ch have been exam1ned by th1s and other stud1es. 
It~ls hoped that th1s study w1ll stimulate further exploration and 
. . 
.an~11sis of 1nterorganizat1onal coa11t1ons. It 1s also hoped that it. 
has raised as many, it not more, questions and issues as 1t has a~temp~­
ea 'LO cons1der and answer. What has been learned, as mentioned above, 
should :not be overlooked in, '. future 1nqu1r1es and p~ract.1Q.e.• 
FOO!£,NO.TES 

1'lerry N. Clark, "The C~ncept of ,Fower,!' Community Struc­
.t.ure and Decls1on-Y~k1ng. ed. Terry N. C~ark (San Franc1sco:: 
'968)" pp. 73-74. 
2xb:14. t PP. 74-78•. 
3ibid., pp. 7~80 •. 
4Ea.~a:~ Bantle ld, Poll t1cal Influence (New York:: 1961), 
5ibid., pp. 4.-6. 

6ibld., pp. 318-322. 

1~bert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (~glewood

Cl.lfts: .196,), .p ...40. 	 " 
8IbId.~ pp. 50-51. 
9B81san W. PolSby, Commun1ty Power and PolItical Theor.y 
(,New Raven:i965J" p. 5..:­
. 	 10zbld•• p. ~ 
11·- .Ib1d."pp. 
12·' .Ibid., p. 
123. 
124-136. 
137 • 
13N~rton E. Lons, tiThe Admin1strative Orga.nizat1on-' as a 
Pol1tlcal System,," Concepts and Issues in Administratlve B.e­
haYlor, ed. SIdney Mallick (Englewood Cliffs: 1962), pp. 113­
i 15.. _ 	 _ 
14yehezkel Drcr, Publlc PolicYmaklng Process (San FrancIs­
co: 1968), pp. 78-79. 
15IbId., p. 80. 
16ibld., pp. -8:J.-8~. 
17Robert_V. Presthus, "AuthorIty in Crganizations," Con­
'capts and Issues in Adminlstra.tive Behavior, ed. Sidney Mlllck 
(EDglewocd Cliffs: 1962), pp. 135-136. 
18 	 4Ibid., p. 12 • 
19ch~rles E. LIndblom, The Policy-Making Process (New York: 
1967), pp. 37-42. 
·20~•• pp. 93-99. 
-

154­
21Wl11lam J. Re1d, nlnt~r-organ1zatlonal Coord1nat1on 1rr: 
Soc1al Wel1'are." Read11'=6s 1n commun1tf Organ1zat1on Pract1ce t 
ed. Ralph M. Kramer and Harry Sp~cht Englewood Cliffs: 1969)" 
pp•.178-181. 
22xayer N. Zald, "Organ1zations as pollties," Read1ngs In.: 
Community Organizat1on Practice, ed. Ralph Mr. Kramer ~nd Harry...1 
specht (Englewood C11ffs: 1-969), pp. 152-153. 
23xayer N'. Zald, ttPo11tical Economy, n Power 1n Organizations,
ad. Hayer N. Zald (Nashville: 1970), pp. 231-232. 
24Dror, Opt cit. ~I pp. 188-191. 
25Bonald L. Nuttall, Erwin K. Scheuch, and Cha.d Gordon, "On 
the Structure of Influence," Community Structure and Declslon­
Mak1ng, edt Terry N. Clark (San Francisco: 1968), pp. 349-350. 
26~.~ pp. 352-356. 
21Ib1d., pp. 358-359. 
28ib1d., pp. 360-364'. 
29-ib1d., pp. 364-365 •. 
3OCha.~les R. Adrian and Charles Press, "Decision Costs In' 
Coa11tion Formation, tt The American Polltical Soience Review, LXII-, , . 
• 0 •. 2 (June, 1968), pp. 556-557 •. 
3f~., p. 562. 
32Clark Opt cit., pp. 49-52. 
33ibid., pp. 53-54. 
34Ibld., pp. 62~63. 
3Saaid, Opt Cit., pp. 182-184. 
36peter M. Blau, Exchange and Power in Soclal Lifa (New York:: 
1964), p •.124. . ... 
'37DaVld Braybrooke a.nd Charles E. Llndblom, A Strategy_Of De­
cislon (New York: 1967), p. 66. 
"SW1111am Gore, _nDec1sion-Making Research: Some Prospeots 
and Lim1tat1ons, It Concepts and Issues in Admln1strative Behav10r,: 
.e~. Sidney }/JA111ck (Englewood C11ffs: 1962), l pp. 52-53. . . 
39Ibld., pp. 55-58. 
40Eciward Ha.rvey and Russell M11ls,~ "Patterns at Organization­
al.Adaptatlon: A Politic· Perspective," Power in Organiza.tions, ed. 
Mayer N. Za.ld (Na.shv1l1e , 1970), p. ,1 90. 
~1
, Gore,., OPe cit., p. 58. 
42Harvey ~p. cit., pp. 194-198•
. ' 31b!d., p. 199. 
"ibId., pp. 200-101. 
450rv1119 G. Brim, Jr., Da.vid C. Glass', et. al., personal­
11'.:1 and Decision Processes (Stanford: 1962), pp. 9-10. 

. 46Terr-;y B. Clark, "The Concapt of Power, tt Community Struo~ 

ture and Deois1on-Ma.king, ad. Terry N. Clark (Sa.n Francisco: 

. '9G8). p. ,b5. . . ' 
; 
47Herbert A. SImon, Adm1nistrative Behavior (New York: 1961)" 
PP.• 65-66. 
48tbld., pp. 66-73. 
4-9"Ibid. , pp. 73-74. 
50ib1d., pp. 75-76. 
BanrleW, Edwa.rd C. PQ11t1ca.l Influence. New York: The Free press, 
.1961 • 
Blau,~Peter Me. Exchange and Power in 5021al L1fe. New York': John 

W1ley and .50ns, Inc.. 1964. '. . 

Bralbrooke, 'David a.nd Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Dec1sion. 
Hew :York: The .Free Press,. 1967 • 
. Brim, Orv111e G., Jr., Dav1d C. Glass, 'et.. ale Personal!ty and 
Dec1sign Processes.• Stanford: Stanford Univers1ty Press, 
'962. . 
Clark, Terry N. "The C.oncept of power." Community Structure and 

,DecJ.s1on-Mak1ng. e,d. Terry N. Clark. San. Franc1sco: Chand­

"ler Publ1sh1ng Company, 1968. 

Dahl, Robert A~ Modern Polit1cal Analysis. Englewood C11ffs: 

Prent1ce-Ha.l.l, Inc., 1963. 

l)&v1s, Morris and Marvin G. Weinbaum. Metropolltan Decision 

_ Proc-'esses. Chicago:- Rand McNally and Company, 1969. 

Dror, Yehezkel. Publ1c Po11cymaking Reexamined. San Franc1sco: 
. Chandler publish1ng Company, 1968. 	 . 
Gore, ·William. "DeciS1on-Mak1ng Research: Some prospects and 

Lim1tatlons." Conceots and Issues in Administrative 3_e­
. bav1or. ed.Sidney )1a1llck. Englewood CliffS" 1962. 

Harvey, .. Edward and Russell M111s. "patterns of Organizatlonal 

, Adaptation.·1 Power 1n Organ1zations. ed. Mayer N. Zald. 

Rashv1~e: Vanderb1lt Un1versity Press, 1970. 

Llndblom, Charles E. TbeFollcy-Making Process. Englewood C11ffs:: 
~ Prent1ce-Hall, Inc.,. 1968. 
LOng"Norton E., "The Adminlstratlve Crgan1zation as a Polltical 
.. System. tt C.oncents and Issues in' Administrative Behavlor., ed•. 
S1dney Ma1lick. Englewood Cliffs: l?rentice-Hall, Inc.,! 19.62 •. 
Nuttall, Ronald L."Erwln 1:. Scheuch, and Chad Gordon. tlOn the. 
. 	 Structure of Influence. tt Communi ty Structure and Declslon.. 
Kak:lng. ed. Terry N. Clark. Sa.n FranciscO: Chandler Pub­
lishing Company,; 1968. - . . 
Polsb7.Nalson W. Community: Power and PolitIcal Theory. New Ha-vero 
Yale Unlversi ty Press, :1965. 
Presthus , ,Robert v. "Author1ty in-Organ1zat1ons." Concepts and Is­
sues in Admin1strat1ve Behavior. ed. S1dney Ma.l1ick. Engle­
wood Oliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,. 1962. . 
15:7 

Reid, William J. ttInter-organ1zational Coordination 1nSoo1al ( 
Welfare," Readings in Community Organization Practice. edt \ J 
Ralph M~ Kramer and Harry Specht. Englewood C1Iffs:'Pren­
't1ce-Hall, Inc., 1969. ' 
S1mon, Herbert A. Administrative Behav10r. New York: The Mac­
m11lan Company, 1961. . ­
Warren,: Roland L. Truth, Love, and Social Change. Ch1cago: Rand 
MCNally and Company,.1971• 
ZaId, Mayer N. "Organ1zations as Polit1es." Readings in Community;
Organization Pract1ce. edt Ralph M. Kramer and Harry Specht.•. 
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969•. 
Zald, Mayer N. "Po11t1cal Economy.1t power 1n Organizations. ed. 
Kayer N. Zald. Nashville: Vanderbilt Un1versity Press, 1970~ 
PERl:CDICALS 
AdrIan, .. Charles R. and Charles Press, tfDec1s10n Costs in Coa11­
tion Formation. It The American Po11tical Science Review. 
LXII, .N. 2. 'June, .. 1968, pp. 556-563. 
UNPUBLISHED PAPERS. . 
Warren,Roland L. "The Concertin§ ot Decisions as a Var1able in 
. Ors~nizat1cnaI.lnteraction.' (orig1nal verSion). 
